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EQUAL PROTECTION, CLASS LEGISLATION,
AND COLORBLINDNESS
Melissa L. Saunders*
Scholars and judges have long assumed that the Equal Protec
tion Clause1 is concerned only with state action that has the effect
of singling out certain persons or groups of persons for special ben
efits or burdens. Under the traditional doctrinal framework, state
action that has this purpose and effect bears a certain burden of
justification under the clause, a burden whose stringency varies, de
pending on the criteria used to define the class being singled out for
special treatment and the importance of the interest affected.2 But
state action that lacks such a "discriminatory effect" is not, on the
traditional understanding, subject to equal protection challenge at
all; if its rationality is to be challenged, it must be under the Due
Process Clause instead.3
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has often had
difficulty deciding whether certain kinds of state action actually sin
gle out certain persons or groups of persons for special benefits or
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. B.A. 1983, Yale; J.D. 1987,
University of Virginia. - Ed. I thank Lou Bilionis, Caroline Brown, Molly McUsic, John
Orth, and Bob Saunders for their comments on earlier drafts of this article; John Bowers,
Kim Chapman, Ryan Guilds, Tom Johnson, and Rebecca Rogers for their research assist
ance; and Steve Case at the UNC Law Library for help in locating hard-to-find sources.

1. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. Though this article focuses on the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the interpretation advanced here is equally applicable to the
equal protection guarantee said to reside in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954), which the Supreme Court treats as essentially
congruent to that in the Fourteenth Amendment, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 {1995).
2. For a summary of the traditional doctrinal framework, see 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
J OHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE§ 18.1.4 {2d ed. 1992). But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452-53
{1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the Supreme Court is actually applying a single
rational basis standard in all of its equal protection cases); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 21112 {1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (same).
3. See ROTUND A & NOWAK, supra note 2, § 18.1, at 4, 6; id. § 18.4, at 41; LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 16-10, at 1460 (2d ed. 1988); Paul Brest, Palmer
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP.
Cr. REV. 95, 106-07; see also Note, Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1065, 1132 {1969) [hereinafter Developments: Equal Protection] (asserting that tradi
tional equal protection analysis asks "whether it is just to disadvantage one group in compari
son to another"); Note, Equal Protection: A Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny, 16 MicH. L.
R EV. 771, 831-42 (1978).
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burdens.4 But all of its great equal protection battles - over racial
segregation, state legislative reapportionment, gender discrimina
tion, and affirmative action - have been fought on the assumption
that such a discriminatory effect is a necessary element of an equal
protection claim. On this fundamental aspect of its equal protec
tion jurisprudence, the Court has long displayed remarkable una
nimity - that is, until the racial gerrymandering cases of the last
few years.5

In the racial gerrymandering cases, the Court has confronted
state action that, though undeniably race-conscious, does not ap
pear to single out any identifiable group of persons for special dis
advantage because of their race. Though various members of the
Court have argued in dissent that the action could not violate the
Equal Protection Clause precisely for this reason,6 a consistent five
member majority has steadfastly ignored this argument. This ma
jority has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as giving all per4. For some notable examples, compare Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883) (hold
ing that a law imposing more severe penalties for living together "in adultery or fornication"
upon interracial couples than upon intraracial couples does not single out either race for
special disadvantage) with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that a law
prohibiting interracial marriage singles out interracial couples for special disadvantage) and
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964) (same); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551
(1896) (holding that a law requiring racial segregation in public transportation does not single
out African Americans for special disadvantage) with Plessy, 163 U.S. at 556-63 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the same law does single out African Americans for special disad
vantage by "put[ting] the brand of servitude and degradation" upon them and
"humiliat[ing]" them) and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that a
law requiring racial segregation in the public schools singles out African-American school
children for special disadvantage); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (holding that a
state's use of peremptory challenges to remove African-American members of a jury venire
from the petit jury singles out the excluded jurors for special disadvantage) with 499 U.S. at
423-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that this same practice does not single out any partic
ular group for special disadvantage); Romer v. Evans, 116 S. a. 1620 (1996) (holding that a
state constitutional provision forbidding state and local governments to enact statutes or reg
ulations protecting homosexuals against discrimination singles out homosexuals for special
disadvantage) with 116 S. Ct. at 1629-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that this same provi
sion does not single out homosexuals for special disadvantage but simply "puts [them] in the
same position as all other persons" by prohibiting their "special treatment").
5. See Lawyer v. Justice, 65 U.S.L.W. 4629 (U.S. June 25, 1997); Abrams v. Johnson, 65
U.S.L.W. 4478 (U.S. June 19, 1997); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116
S. a. 1894 (1996) ("Shaw //"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); United States v. Hays,
515 U.S. 737 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) ("Shaw /").
6. At least six different Justices - only four of whom have been on the Court at any
given time - have taken this position. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1974-96 (Stevens, J., joined by
Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); 116 S. a. at 1997-2013 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg
and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Shaw II, 116 S. a. at 1907-22 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg
and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); 116 S. a. at 1923 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting); Miller, 515 U.S. at 929-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hays, 515 U.S. at 750-52 (Ste
vens, J., concurring in the judgment); Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 658-75 (White, J., joined by Black
mun and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); 509 U.S. at 676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 509 U.S. at 67678 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 509 U.S. at 679-87 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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sons a substantive constitutional right not to be dealt with by the
state on the basis of their race, whether or not this results in their
being singled out for any special disadvantage because of their race.
In this article, I argue that the interpretation of the Equal Pro
tection Clause embraced by the majority in the racial gerrymander
ing cases - though morally attractive, rhetorically powerful, and
politically popular - is profoundly inconsistent with the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Unlike others who
have attacked this "colorblind " interpretation of the Equal Protec
tion Clause on historical grounds, however, I do not contend that
the clause's framers and ratifiers understood it to strike only at
state action that tends to create or perpetuate a "caste " system, by
branding a certain class of persons as inferior to all others.8 Nor do
I take the position that they understood it to mandate equality only
with respect to the "remedial " or "protective " functions of state
government.9 Instead, I argue that they understood the Equal Pro
tection Clause to nationalize a constitutional limitation on state ac
tion developed by the state courts in the first half of the nineteenth
century: the doctrine against "partial " or "special " laws, which for7. Cf. Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, THE NEW REPUBuc, July 31, 1995, at 19-20
[hereinafter Rosen, Color-Blind Court] (describing the interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause advanced in the racial gerrymandering cases as "flamboyantly inconsistent" with the
intentions of the Reconstruction Republicans and calling upon legal scholars to do "the dark
and lonely work of historical excavation" necessary to demonstrate this). Rosen's historical
argument is quite different than mine: he contends, following Justice Harlan, that the Equal
Protection Clause, as originally understood, did not apply to "political " rights at all. See id.
at 22; Jeffrey Rosen, Conservatives v. Originalism, 19 HAR.v. J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 465 (1995);
see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As William Van
Alstyne has convincingly demonstrated, however, this argument "rests upon an extremely
doubtful view of the original understanding." William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth
Amendment, The "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965
SUP. Cr. REV. 33, 85; see also WILUAM E. NELSON, THE FoURTEENTii AMENDMENT: FROM
PounCAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 126-33 (1988) (observing that while "[s]ome
congressmen did assert that the Fourteenth Amendment affected only civil and not political
rights," a large number "took a different view," which conceded that the amendment did not,
in and of itself, "confer the right to vote on anyone," but argued that it "did require the states
to confer that right in a nonarbitrary, equal fashion").
8. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Of Constitutional Seances and Color-Blind Ghosts, 72 N.C. L.
REv. 401, 441 (1994). For more on this "anti-caste" or "anti-subordination" approach to the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, see TRIBE , supra note 3,§ 16-21; Ruth Colker, Anti
Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986);
Owen M. Flss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. PuB. A.FF. 107 (1976); Ken
neth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HAR.v. L. REv. 1, 48-53 (1977); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317,
349-55 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994).
9. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME CouRr. THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 349 & n.143, 350 n.148 (1985); John Harrison, Reconstructing
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1433-51 (1992); Earl A. Maltz, The
Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws: A Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN Dmoo L. REv. 499
(1985).
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bade the state to single out any person or group of persons for spe
cial benefits or burdens without an adequate "public purpose"
justification.10
This original understanding is, I believe, reflected in the lan
guage and structure of orthodox equal protection jurisprudence. In
recent years, however, it has been forgotten, obscured by an in
creasing focus on abstract rhetoric about "discrimination," "sus
pect" criteria, and impermissible "stereotyping." The result, I
contend, has been mounting confusion about the basic evil to which
the clause is directed. In the racial gerrymandering cases, this con
fusion has reached its logical conclusion, leading the Court to em
brace a vision of the Equal Protection Clause that cannot be
squared with the original understanding.
In Part I of the article, I examine the antebellum state constitu
tional doctrine against partial or special l;iws, a tradition too often
neglected in scholarly accounts of the origins of the Equal Protec
tion Clause.11 I first trace the development of this doctrine from its
10. I recognize, of course, that those who participated in the framing and ratification of
the Equal Protection Clause did not have a completely unified vision of its meaning. See
NELSON, supra note 7, at 61; John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding
of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421, 432 (revising and updating an
article published under the same title at SO COLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950)); Mark C. Yudof,

Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One Small Cheer for Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1366-68 (1990) (reviewing NELSON,
supra note 7). But I do not believe that this difficulty authorizes judges and scholars to
interpret the Equal Protection Clause however they like. There is plenty of principled
ground between "an oversimplified unitary theory of equal protection" and the "infinite un
predictability and chaos of complete subjectivity," id. at 1408, and much room for historical
scholarship that seeks to ascertain the intentions of the framers and ratifiers at the level of
general principle. Like Professor Nelson, I believe such scholarship is more useful to modem
interpreters than that which searches the historical record for answers to specific legal ques
tions that the framers either did not consider or did not resolve. See NELSON, supra note 7, at
6-12.
11. In recent years, legal historians have discovered the general antebellum hostility to
the use of governmental power to advance the special interests of a particu}ar segment of
society. They have used this hostility to argue that the Lochner-era substantive due process
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court was neither as unprincipled nor as unprecedented as its
critics have maintained. See, e.g., HowARD GILL.'.iAN, THE CoNSTITU110N BESIEGED: THE
RISE AND DEMISE OF LoCHNER ERA POUCE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); Michael Les
Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation ofthe Meaning and Origins of Laissez·
Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (1985); Robert E. Gamer, Justice Brewer
and Substantive Due Process: A Conservative Court Revisited, 18 VAND. L. REV. 615 (1965);
Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53
J. AM. HIST. 751 (1967) [hereinafter Jones, Cooley and Laissez-Faire]; Alan Jones, Thomas
M. Cooley and the Michigan Supreme Court, 10 AM. J.L. HIST. 97 (1966) [hereinafter Jones,
Cooley and Michigan]; Charles M. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Govern
ment-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 61 J. AM.
HIST. 970 (1975).

But the antebellum state constitutional doctrine against partial or special laws has yet to
receive the attention it deserves in connection with the original understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause. Some of the more thorough accounts of the clause's intellectual anteced
ents make brief reference to Jacksonian ideas of equality before the law, see ROBERT J. HAR·
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roots in English common law, early American political thought, and
the political rhetoric of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian reformers to its
transformation into positive state constitutional law between 1830
and 1860.12 I then explain how the doctrine differed from its close
relative, the "vested rights" doctrine.13 Finally, I show how the doc
trine worked its way into the ideology of the infant Republican
Party at mid-century and became the linchpin of that party's oppo
sition to slavery and the Black Codes.14
Part II makes the case that those who framed and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment understood and intended its Equal Protec
tion Clause to nationalize the developing state constitutional doc
trine against partial or special laws. I begin by demonstrating that
the framers and ratifiers did not understand or intend the clause to
render all race-based or race-conscious state action absolutely, or
even presumptively, unconstitutional; indeed, they repeatedly re
jected proposals that they believed to embody such a rule.15 I then
present the evidence that they did understand andmtend the clause
to write into the Constitution the doctrine against partial or special
laws that was then developing in the state courts, modifying that
doctrine only to make clear, as the antebellum state courts had not,
RIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUAUTY 16-17 (1960); NELSON, supra note 7, at 15-16, and to the
equality provisions in the early state constitutions, see HARRIS, supra, at 18-19; Frank &
Munro, supra note 10, at 438 n.45. Some note the frequent references to class legislation - a
mid-nineteenth century synonym for partial or special laws, see infra note 29
in the con
gressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, see JUDITH A. BAER, EQUAIITY UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURlEENTH AMENDMENT 92-93 {1983), and some
assert, without explanation, that the framers intended the clause to reach certain forms of
class legislation, see Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segrega
tion Question, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1049 (1956); Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981, 1055 (1979); see also John Harrison, Ifthe Eye
Offend Thee, Turn Off the Color, 91 MlcH. L. REV. 1213, 1241 n.87 (1993) (reviewing AN.
DREW KULL, THE CoLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992)) (urging those who labor to under
stand the Equal Protection Clause to stop assuming that it is "an empty statement of the
principle of [formal] justice" and focus on "trying to understand what the nineteenth century
meant by 'class legislation' "). Still others note that the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause seems to be patterned on antebellum state court cases. See
GILLMAN, supra, at 61-75; NELSON, supra note 7, at 176-81; Joseph Tussman & Jacobus ten
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 344 n.9 (1949); Note, Devel
opments in the Law: The Interpretation ofState Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324,
1472-73 (1982) [hereinafter Developments: State Constitutions]. Dean Yudors short but
enormously helpful account of the connection between Jacksonian notions of "equality
before the law" and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause makes brief ref
erence to the antebellum state court doctrine against partial or special legislation. See Yudof,
supra note 10, at 1375-76, 1379-81. To my knowledge, however, no one has attempted to
demonstrate that the framers of the Equal Protection Clause actually intended to write the
doctrine into the federal Constitution.
-

12. See infra text accompanying notes 28-70.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 71-79.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 80-97.
15. See infra sections II.A and H.B.
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that state action singling out African Americans for special disad
vantage was presumptively unconstitutional.16
Part III contends that the Supreme Court's equal protection ju
risprudence has long been consistent with this original understand
ing. Indeed, many of the lawyers, scholars, and judges who first
dealt with the Equal Protection Clause recognized that it had been
patterned on the preexisting state law tradition against partial or
special laws.17 This recognition, I contend, profoundly influenced
the Supreme Court's early equal protection jurisprudence, explain
ing a number of its otherwise curious interpretive tums.18 The
Court remained faithful to this original understanding for most of
the twentieth century, even as the historical underpinnings of that
understanding faded from its consciousness.19
Part IV argues that the racial gerrymandering cases of the 1990s
adopt an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that devi
ates from the original understanding in a subtle but significant way
- an interpretation that sees the clause as limiting not only the
states' ability to favor one group of persons over another, but also,
and perhaps more fundamentally, the states' ability to deal with
people as members of racial groups, rather than as individuals.20 In
those cases, I contend, the Court has read the clause as giving all
persons a substantive constitutional "right " not to have the state
deal with them on the basis of their race, even when doing so does
not result in their being singled out for any special disadvantage
because of their race.21 I conclude that if this "right " has any con
stitutional foundation at all, it lies not in the Equal Protection
Clause, but in the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause.
Part V asks why a Court comprised of justices who claim to be
originalists - as the members of the Shaw-Miller majority do might have chosen to ground the limitation on state action recog
nized in the racial gerrymandering cases in the Equal Protection
Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause.22 I suggest that the
explanation may not be as sinister as most critics have maintained:
the Court did not invoke equal protection dishonestly, as a means
of disguising what it knew to be the recognition of a new substan16. See infra sections II.C and II.D.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 214-35.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 236-48.
19. See infra section III.B.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.
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tive due process right; it genuinely believed it was being faithful to
the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause. The ap
parent inconsistency stems simply from the fact that the Court's
memory of that understanding is no longer accurate; it has forgot
ten a number of critical details. I conclude with some thoughts
about how the Court came to forget these details, and some sugges
tions on how it might recast the racial gerrymandering decisions to
bring them more in line with the original understanding.
J.

THE ANTEBELLUM STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADmON
AGAINST PARTIAL OR SPECIAL LAW S

As constitutional historians have long recognized, any attempt
to recover the original understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause must include a careful examination of the various strands of
antebellum thought from which the clause was derived, for its fram
ers were "not original thinkers."23 In drafting the clause and ex
plaining it to their colleagues and constituents, its framers drew
upon a number of distinct ideas that were afoot in the public dis
course of the day.24 The existing literature has thoroughly ex
amined the influence of the abolitionist movement, with its theories
of natural rights and racial equality,25 and the antebellum concept
of federalism.26 But it has given very little attention to an equally
important strand of that rich and diverse intellectual history: the
antebellum state constitutional tradition against partial or special
23. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 235, 241 (1984).
24. For general accounts of the intellectual origins of the Equal Protection Clause, see
BAER, supra note 11; HARRIS, supra note 11; HAROLD M.HYMAN & WILUAM M. WIECEK,
EouAL JusnCE UNDER LAW: CoNS11TUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1 835-1875 (1982); NELSON,
supra note 7; J ACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1 st ed.1951); LOUIS WARSOFF, EQ UAUTY AND THE LAW (1938); WILUAM M.
WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONAUSM IN AMERICA: 1760-1848

(1977); Farber & Muench, supra note 23; Frank & Munro, supra note 10; Howard Jay Gra
ham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment (pts. 1 & 2), 1950
Wis. L.REv. 479, 610 [hereinafter Graham, Antislavery Backgrounds]; Howard Jay Graham,
Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN L. REv. 3 (1954) [hereinafter Graham,
Declaratory]; Kelly, supra note 11; Maltz, supra note 9; Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amend
ment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305 (1988); Yudof, supra note
.

10.

25. See, e.g., TENBROEK, supra note 24; WIECEK, supra note 24; Graham, Antislavery
Backgrounds, supra note 24; see also NELSON, supra note 7, at 21-27, 64-71; WILUAM E.
NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 41-61 (1982).
26. See, e.g., HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIR1H OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBUCAN PARTY
AND FREEDMEN'S RIGHI"S, 1861-1 866, at 157-82 (1976); HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MoRE PER
FECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE C!vJL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSilTU
TION 367-90 (1975); EARL M. MALTZ, CJvIL RIGIITS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS:
1863-1869, at 2-3 (1990); NELSON, supra note 7, at 27-39.
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laws.21 The oversight has obscured the significance of much of what
the framers and ratifiers said about the clause, distorting our view
of the original understanding and encouraging the misperception
that the concept of equal protection was something invented by the
antislavery movement and thus primarily racial in its focus. This
Part seeks to correct that misperception, and to lay the groundwork
for a more accurate understanding of the intentions of the framers
and ratifiers, by exploring the link between the antebellum state
constitutional tradition against partial or special laws and the ideol
ogy of the Republican Party at mid-century.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, state courts across
America developed a decided hostility to laws that singled out cer
tain persons or classes of persons for special benefits or burdens. In
case after case, they invoked their state constitutions to strike down
laws of this sort,28 which they called partial or special laws.29 As the
27. See Yudof, supra note 10, at 1371 (stating that "too many modem constitutionalists
ignore th[is] history").
28. See, e.g., Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15, 27-28 (Iowa 1849) (law singling out halfbreed
Indians for special disadvantage as land owners); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326 (1825) (law grant
ing certain person a special right to appeal); Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396 (1814) (law sus
pending operation of the statute of limitations for claims by a certain person); Budd v. State,
22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 483 (1842) (special criminal law applicable only to employees of a certain
bank); Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 59 (1836) (law granting guardian of certain
minors a special right to sell their property); Officer v. Young, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 320 (1833)
(law granting a certain person a special right to prosecute an appeal in the name of a de
ceased person); Tate's Executors v. Bell, 12 Tenn. (4 Yer.) 202 (1833) (law granting certain
persons a special right to revive an expired judgment); Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn.
(2 Yer.) 599, 606-08 (1831) (law setting up a special tribunal for the disposition of suits by a
certain bank); Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554, 556-57 (1831) (law barring
suits brought on behalf of another only when they were brought to enforce claimed reserva
tions of rights in Indian lands); Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121 (Vt. 1825) (law granting a certain
person a special right to bail). For a discussion of some of the leading cases, see RoDNEY L.
Morr, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE OF THE PRINCI
PLES AND METIIODS FOLLOWED BY THE CoURTS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF
THE L AW OF THE LAND" 256-74 (1926) .
"

'

See, e.g., Reed, 2 Greene at 28 (defining a special law as one "confined to a particular
class of individuals"); Lewis, 3 Me. at 336 (defining a special law as one "granting a privilege
and indulgence to one man, by way of exemption from the operation and effect of [a] general
law, leaving all other persons under its operation"); Jones' Heirs, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) at 78
(defining a partial or special law as one that is "restricted in its operation" to certain per
sons); Wally's Heirs, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 556 (defining a partial law as one that is "limited in
its operation ... to a very few individuals"); Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 269
(1829) (Peck, J.) (describing a partial law as one "which is partial in its operation, intended to
affect particular individuals alone, or to deprive them of the benefit of the general laws"); 10
Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 269 (Catron, J., concurring) (describing a partial law as one that "tend(s]
directly or indirectly to deprive a corporation or an individual of rights . . . to the equal
benefits of the general and public laws of the land"). In the mid-nineteenth century, lawyers
and judges began to use the term "class legislation" as a synonym for partial or special laws.
See, e.g., Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 666, 673 (1867) (argument of counsel); Lehman v.
McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573, 606-07 (1863) (using class legislation to describe legislation in
which "operation is limited to
certain classes of persons"). By the late nineteenth cen
tury, proponents of laissez-faire constitutionalism were using the term class legislation more
broadly, to refer to any law - even one that was general in its operation - that was
29.

. . •
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Supreme Court of Massachusetts put it in the leading case of

Holden v. James,3o
[i]t is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and nat
ural justice . . . that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advan
tages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that
any one s)lould be subjected to losses, damages, suits or actions, from
which all others under like circumstances are exempted.31

The state courts of the antebellum era found partial or special
laws offensive for two basic reasons.32 First, they thought such laws
represented a perversion of the state's proper role in society. Like
most early Americans, they subscribed to the Lockean view that
government was created and existed primarily - and perhaps ex
clusively - to protect the preexisting "natural " rights of its citizens
against private interference.33 From this basic premise, it followed
easily that the state should not exercise its power to benefit one
citizen or group of citizens at the expense of others, but should con
fine itself to serving as a "neutral umpire " providing equal protec
tion to the rights of all.34
designed to advance the special interests of a certain class, rather than to benefit the public as
a whole. See Benedict, supra note 11, at 305-14 (citing, inter alia, laws imposing protective
tariffs and regulating conditions in the workplace ).
30. 11 Mass. 396 (1814 ).
31. 11 Mass.at 404; see also Cooper, 10 Tenn.(2 Yer.) at 606-08 (Green, J. ) (asserting that
laws must be "general in [their] operation, affecting alf alike" and "operat[ing] equally on
all"); Wally's Heirs, 10 Tenn.(2 Yer.) at 555 ("The rights of every individual must stand or fall
by the same rule or law that governs every other member of the body politic, or land, under
similar circumstances; and every partial or private law . . .is unconstitutional and void.");
Vanzant, 10 Tenn.(2 Yer.) at 269 (Catron, J., concurring ) ("[A] partial law, tending directly
or indirectly to deprive a corporation or an individual of ...the equal benefits of the general
and public laws of the land, is unconstitutional and void ....").
32. In the late nineteenth century, proponents of laissez-faire constitutionalism would
add a third reason, grounded in classical economic theory. See SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ-FAIRE
AND TiiE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CoNFUcr IN AMERICAN THOUGH!" 5361 {1956 ); James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Con
stitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHio ST. L.J. 257, 262-76 (1989 ). This eco
nomic rationale did not appear, however, in the antebellum decisions.
33. See JoHN Locirn, T wo T REATIES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 123-24 (stating that "[t]he
great and chief end • . • of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under
Government, is the Preservation of their Property," that is, of "their Lives, Liberties, and
Estates"); 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120 ("The principal aim of society is to protect
individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the im
mutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace without ... mutual assist
ance."). On this view, the state and its citizens owed each other reciprocal obligations: the
state to protect the natural rights of its citizens, and the citizens to submit to the state's
authority. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *47-48, *119; see also Maltz, supra note 9, at 507-10
(discussing this "allegiance-protection"bargain ). For more on these social contract theories,
see J.W.GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CoNTRAcr (2d ed.1957 ); GoRDoN Wooo, THE CREATION OF
TIIE AMERICAN REPUBUC 282-91 (2d ed. 1972 ); SOCIAL CoNTRAcr (E.Barber ed., 1962 ).

34. See, e.g., Lewis, 3 Me. at 335-36 (holding that "it can never be within the bounds of
legitimate legislation to enact a special law . . . granting a privilege and indulgence to one
man"that is not granted to "all other persons,"for the laws are "prescribed for the benefit
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Second, the state courts believed such laws threatened true re
publican government and with it, personal liberty. In their view,
the state's decision to bestow a special favor upon one group would
induce other groups to demand comparable favors, which would
corrupt the political process and reduce it to a system of crass com
petition between special interest groups.35 Under such a system,
the rich and powerful elements of society would inevitably gain
control of the government and use it to advance their own private
interests at the expense of the weaker, replacing free republican

and regulation of the whole community," and all persons have "an equal right" to their "pro
tection"); People v. Township Bd.of Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 486-87 (1870) (holding that "[t]he
state can have no favorites," for "[i]ts business is to protect the industry of all, and to give all
the benefit of equal laws," not "to make discriminations in favor of one class against an
other"); see also KAN. CONST. of 1859 (Wyandotte), Bill of Rights,§ 2 ("All political power is
inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and are
instituted for their equal protection and benefit."), reprinted in 4 WILUAM F. SWINDLER,
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 83 (1979); Omo CONST. of
1851, art. I, § 2 ("Government is instituted for the[ ] equal protection and benefit" of "the
people"), reprinted in 7 SWINDLER, supra, at 558; PA. CONST. of 1776, preamble
("[G]overnment ought to be instituted ... for the security and protection of the community
as such, and to enable the individuals who compose it to enjoy their natural rights
without
partiality for, or prejudice against any particular class, sect, or denomination of men."), re
printed in 8 SWINDLER, supra, at 277-78; PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I (Deel. of Rights), § V
("[G]ovemment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security
of the people, nation, or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of
any single man, family, or sett [sic] of men, who are a part only of that community."), re
printed in 8 SWINDLER, supra, at 278; William Leggett, Editorial, True Functions of Govern
ment, N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 21, 1834 (asserting that "[g]ovemments have no right to ...
offer encouragements and grant privileges to any particular class," for the "true function of
Government" is "the protection of person and property from domestic and foreign enemies,"
and "all men are . . . equally entitled to [its] protection"), reprinted in 1 A COLLECTION OF
THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILUAM LEGGETT 162 (Theodore Sedgwick, Jr. ed., 1840)
[hereinafter SEDGWICK] . For the argument that this principle of governmental neutrality is
"the most basic organizing principle of American constitutional law," see CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE PARTIAL CoNSTITUTION 2 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitu·
tion, 84 CoLuM. L. REv. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences]; Cass R. Sun
stein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law, 92 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992).
. . •

35. See, e.g., Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 470 (1871) (asserting that such a
decision would "open[ ] the door to the greatest corruption, partiality, and favoritism"). An
drew Jackson made the same point in his 1832 message vetoing the recharter of the Second
Bank of the United States. See 2 A CoMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS: 1789-1897, at 590 (James D. Richardson ed., 1 896) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS] (arguing that the practice of enacting special or partial laws has
"arrayed section against section, interest against interest, and man against man, in a fearful
commotion which threatens to shake the foundations of our Union"); see also Ward v. Bar
nard, 1 Aik. 121, 123 (Vt. 1825) (argument of counsel) ("If the legislature have power to
select any individual, as the object of particular legislation, and exempt him from obligations
to which all others are subject, it may be the instrument of the grossest favoritism; or, in
times of political excitement, of the most cruel persecution."); SEDGWICK, supra note 34, at
163-64 (arguing that when the legislature enacts "partial" or "special" laws, it makes "almost
every man's personal interests . ..become deeply involved in the result of the contest," and
"give[s] to the force of political rivalry all the bitterest excitement of personal interests con·
fiicting with each other").
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government with tyranny and oppression.36 The best safeguard
against such oppression, these judges thought, was to insist that the
laws be "general" ones that operated equally upon all persons.37
The nineteenth-century judicial hostility to partial or special
laws had deep roots in Anglo-American legal and political thought.
Since the early seventeenth century, the English common law
courts had been invalidating royal grants of monopolies and other
special privileges in domestic and foreign trade, on the ground that
government should use its power only to advance the general wel
fare of the community as a whole, rather than the special interests
of a favored few.3 8 The founding generation of Americans was well
schooled in this tradition. John Locke's Second Treatise, which had
a significant influence on early American political thought,39 de36. See, e.g., Salem, 20 Mich. at 487 ("[W]hen the State once enters upon the business of
subsidies, we shall not fail to discover that the strong and powerful interests are those most
likely to control legislation, and that the weaker will be truced to enhance the profits of the
stronger. "); Wally's Heirs, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 557 (asserting that if "the majority, who . . •
exercise the legislative power," could exempt themselves from their own laws, it would be
come "a many-headed tyrant, with capacity and power to oppress the minority at pleasure"
by enacting "odious laws binding [only] on the latter"); Vanzant, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 270-71
(Catron, J., concurring) (arguing that to allow the legislature to "mak[e] laws whereby are
swept away the life, liberty and property of one or a few citizens, by which neither the repre
sentatives nor their other constituents are willing to be bound, is too odious to be tolerated in
any government where freedom has a name"); see also William Leggett, Editorial, Monopo
lies, N.Y. EVENING PoST, Nov. 29, 1834 ("[A]ll acts of partial legislation are undemocratic,
.. . and, in their final operation, [will] build up a powerful aristocracy, and overthrow the
whole frame of democratic government."), reprinted in 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 34, at 85.
37. See, e.g., Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 268 (1851) ("[W]hen . . . general laws are en
acted, which bear . . . on the whole community, if they are unjust and against the spirit of the
constitution, the whole community will be interested to procure their repeal . . . . "); Budd v.
State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 483, 491 (1842); Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599,
606 (1831) (Green, J.) ("[T]he minority are safe, [if] the majority, who make the law, are
operated on by it equally with others."); see also GILLMAN, supra note 11, at 54 (contrasting
this equality-based approach to the preservation of individual liberty with the "preferred
freedoms" approach favored by many twentieth-century constitutionalists).
38. See, e.g., Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614); Darcy v.
Allein (Case of Monopolies), 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602); Davenant v. Hurdis, 72 Eng.
Rep. 769 (K.B. 1599). For more on the influence of this English antimonopoly tradition on
American constitutional law, see Benedict, supra note 11, at 314-17; Michael Conant, An
timonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughterhouse Cases
Re-Examined, 31 EMORY LJ. 785, 792-97 (1982).
39. See, e.g., CAROL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1922); MORTON
WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1978). During the 1960s and

1970s, revisionist scholars associated with the revival of civic republicanism attempted to
minimize Locke's importance to the founding generation. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22-54 (1967) (arguing that Locke's
work was far less influential than that of classical and Machiavellian republicans); J.G.A.
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT. FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHI' AND THE AT
LANTIC REPuBuCAN TRADmoN 506-52 (1975) (same); GORDON S. Woon, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBUC 46-90 (1969) (same); see also GARRY WILLS, INVENTING
AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 169-75 (1978) (arguing that
Locke's Second Treatise was far less influential than the thought of David Hume and other
Scottish moral philosophers); John Dunn, The Politics of Locke in England and America in
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clared that there should be "one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the
Favourite at Court, and the Country Man at Plough." 40 James
Madison expressed the prevailing sentiment of the founding gener
ation when he said that the state should be "neutral between differ
ent parts of the Society, " 41that "equality ...ought to be the basis
of every law, " and that the law should not subject some persons to
"peculiar burdens " or grant others "peculiar exemptions." 42
Opposition to partial or special laws quickly became a familiar
refrain in American political rhetoric.43 Jeffersonian Republicans
attacked the Federalists for granting special privileges to business
interests, arguing that government should provide "equal rights for
all, special privileges for none." 44 In the 1830s, the Maine Whigs
advocated "[e]qual rights, equal laws, and equal privileges for all
classes of the community," 45 and Andrew Jackson and his followers
the Eighteenth Century, in JOHN LocKE: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 45, 69-80 (John w.
Yelton ed., 1969) (conceding that Locke's Second Treatise was read by the intellectual leaders
of the American Revolution, but asserting that it did not have any great influence on them).
More recent historical scholarship has taken a more balanced approach, which concedes that
Locke's work had a significant influence on the political philosophy of the founding genera
tion, but also acknowledges the influence of classical republican theory, the Scottish moral
philosophers, and Protestant Christian thought. See, e.g., FORREST McDONALD, Novus
0RDO SEC LORUM : THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985); DAYID A.J.
RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAUSM 78-130 (1989); James T. Klop
penberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early Ameri
can Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
19-56 (1995) (challenging the revisionists' assertion that Locke's work, particularly his Sec·
ond Treatise, did not play a significant role in shaping the political thought of the founding
generation).

40. LocKE, supra note 33, § 142.
41. Madison to Jefferson, October 24, 1787, quoted in Gary J. Schmitt & Robert H.
Wehking, Revolutionaries, Antifederalists, and Federalists: Comments on Gordon Wood's Un·
derstanding ofthe American Founding, 9 PoL. Ser. REVIEWER 195, 228 (1979).
42. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS·
MENTS (1785), reprinted in THE SUPREME CoURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 20 (Roberts.
Alley ed., 1988); see THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 231 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield
ed., 1981) (stating that the legislature should not enact "unjust and partial laws" which oper
ate "to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens"). For more on the
framers' fear that special interest groups, or factions, would use the power of government to
advance their own privat� interests at the expense of the general public, see GILLMAN, supra
note 11, at 22-33; GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 193-200 (1981);
WooD, supra note 33, at 53-65; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
LJ. 1539, 1561 (1988).

43. For a general discussion of the ideology of equality in American politics between 1830
1860, see NELSON, supra note 7, at 13-20.
44. Benedict, supra note 11, at 317-18; see also LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN
PERSUASION: EvoLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY 108-13 (1978); Paul Goodman, The First
American Party System, in THE AMERICAN pARTY SYSTEM: STAGES OF POLITICAL DEVELOP
MENT 78 (William N. Chambers & Walter Dean Burham eds., 1975).
45. What the Whigs Wan� BANGOR DAILY WHIG AND COURIER, Sept. 3, 1839, at 16.
and
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made opposition to legislative grants of monopolies and other spe
cial privileges the rallying cry of the modem Democratic party.46
Jackson's 1832 message vetoing the recharter of the Second
Bank of the United States stands as the single best expression of his
party's position on partial or special legislation.47 Jackson conceded
that "[d]istinctions in society will always exist under every just gov
ernment, " for "[e]quality of talents, of education, or of wealth can
not be produced by human institutions." 48 It was not the place of
government, said he, to attempt to eradicate these natural differ
ences in the fortunes of men, for "[i]n the full enjoyment of the gifts
of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue,
every man is equally entitled to protection by law." 49 But, he con
tinued, "when the laws undertake to add ...artificial distinctions "
to the "natural ... advantages " that some men enjoy over others,
the other members of society "have a right to complain of the injus
tice of their Government." 0
5 Rather than imposing special benefits
or burdens, government should "confine itself to equal protection,
and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high
and the low, the rich and the poor." 51 It is time, he concluded, to
"take a stand " against the "prostitution of our Government to the
advancement of the few at the expense of the many." 52
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the state courts
transformed this general aversion to partial or special laws, present
in American political rhetoric from the founding, into positive law,
46. On the Jacksonian aversion to partial or special laws, see GILLMAN, supra note 11, at
33-45; WILLIAM LEGGEIT, DEMOCRATICK EDITORIALS: ESSAYS IN JACKSONIAN POUTICAL
ECONOMY 19-20 (Lawrence H. White ed., 1984); MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PER
SUASION: Pouncs AND BELIEF 1 85-233 (1960); ROBERT REMINI, THE AGE OF JACKSON at
xvi-xix (1972); ROBERT REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND TiiE CoURSE OF AMERICAN FREE
DOM: 1822-1832, at 34 (1981); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 306-21
(1945); GLYNDON G. vAN DEUSEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA 95, 103 (1959); SOCIAL THEORIES
OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY: REPRESENTATIVE WRITINGS OFTiiE PERIOD 1825-1850, at 7576 (Joseph L. Blau ed., 1954); Benedict, supra note 11, at 318-21.
47. One of the principal authors of the veto message was Jackson's attorney general,
Roger B. Taney, see SCHLESINGER, supra note 46, at 365-66, who would later serve as Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
48. 3 MEssAGES AND PAPERS OF TiiE PRESIDENT S, supra note 35, at 1153.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (emphasis added). This is the first known use of the phrase "equal protection" in
American political rhetoric. See Yudof, supra note 10, at 1376; see also HARRIS, supra note
11, at 17. For another example from the same period, see Leggett, True Functions of Govern
ment, supra note 34, at 162, 163 (arguing that because "all men are equally important to the
general welfare, and equally entitled to protection," government should not legislate to "ele
vate one class and depress another").
52. 3 MEssAGES AND pAPERS OF TiiE PRESIDENTS, supra note 35, at 1154.
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as a state constitutional limitation on legislative power.s3 By the
time of the Civil War, it had been incorporated into the constitu
tional law of nearly every state. Some states actually ratified consti
tutional provisions forbidding their legislatures to grant "to any
citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the
same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens."s4 In states
whose constitutions were less explicit, the courts displayed consid
erable ingenuity in finding a constitutional basis for the prohibition
against partial or special laws.ss Some relied on provisions declar
ing that "no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate
emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration
of public services,"s6 some on separation-of-powers provisions,s1
and some on "law of the land" or "due process" clauses.ss
53. The grounding of this limitation in the state constitutions, rather than their federal
counterpart, was a matter of necessity: until the ratification of the Civil War amendments,
the federal Constitution contained no language which could be read to impose a general
prohibition against partial or special laws upon the states, though the Bill of Attainder and
Contract Clauses of Article I, Section 10 could, of course, be interpreted to forbid certain
specific kinds of partial laws.
54. See IND. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 23, reprinted in 3 SWINDLER, supra note 34, at 379;
see also lowA CoNST. of 1846, art. I, § 6, reprinted in 3 SWINDLER, supra note 34, at 435; OR.
CoNST. of 1857, art. I, § 21, reprinted in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 34, at 206.
55. See Morr, supra note 28, at 267 (describing the state courts in this era as "groping"
for some provision in their constitutions that could "serve as a prop" for this limitation).
56. McRee v. Wilmington & Raleigh R.R. Co., 47 N.C. 179, 183 (1855) (relying on N.C.
CONST. of 1776, Deel. of Rights, § 3, reprinted in 7 SWINDLER, supra note 34, at 402); see, e.g.,
Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19 (1856) (relying on CoNN.
CoNST. of 1818, art. I, § 1, reprinted in 2 SWINDLER, supra note 34, at 144); Hewitt v. Charier,
33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 353 (1835) (relying on MASS. CONST. of 1780, Deel. of Rights, art. VI,
reprinted in 5 SWINDLER, supra note 34, at 94); Smith's Administrator v. Smith, 2 Miss. (1
How.) 102 (1834) (relying on Miss. CONST. of 1832, art. I, § 1, reprinted in 5 SWINDLER, supra
note 34, at 361).
57. See, e.g., Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Me. 140, 143-44 (1826) (relying on ME. CONST. of
1819, art. 3, §§ 1-2, reprinted in 4 SWINDLER, supra note 34, at 316); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326,
328-35 (1825) (same); Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 127 (Vt. 1825) (relying on VT. CoNST. of
1793, chap. II, §§ 6, 9, reprinted in 9 SWINDLER, supra note 34, at 509-10). Citing the Black
stonian definition of "law,'' these courts argued that special laws were not really "laws" at all,
but improper attempts by the legislature to exercise judicial powers. See, e.g., Lewis, 3 Me. at
331, 333 (arguing that a legislative resolution conferring a special right of appeal upon liti
gants in a particular case was not an act "of a legislative character" because it was not "gen
eral and prospective; a tule for all, and binding on all,'' but was instead "an act
of a
judicial character, in the simple form of legislation"(emphasis added)); Ward, 1 Aik. at 127
("An act conferring upon any one citizen, privileges to the prejudice of another, and which is
not applicable to others, in like circumstances, in the language of the learned commentator
upon the English law, does not enter into the idea of municipal law, having no relation to the
community in general."). The reference was to Blackstone's definition of "municipal or civil
law" as "a rule of civil conduct . . commanding what is right and prohibiting what is
wrong
[N]ot a transient sudden order
to or concerning a particular person; but
something permanent, uniform, and universal." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at *44 (inter
nal quotation marks omitted).
58. The courts of Tennessee took the lead in this respect. In a concurring opinion in a
1829 case, Justice Catron of the Tennessee Supreme Court suggested that the "law of the
land" clause in that state's constitution, see TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. 11, § 8 ("That no free
.
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The emergence of this doctrine against partial or special laws
was perhaps "the chief constitutional development of pre-Civil War
America,"59 and it did not escape the notice of contemporary legal
scholars. Chancellor Kent, author of a popular four-volume trea
tise on American law published in the 1820s, wrote that the laws
should "have a general and equal application" and be "impartial in
the imposition which [they] create[ ]."6° Thomas Cooley's famous
treatise on the limits of state legislative power, first published at
mid-century, contained a long section on "unequal and partial legis
lation" that gathered together and organized the various state court
cases invalidating such laws.61 In that section, Cooley declared it a
basic "maxim" of state constitutional law that " [t]hose who make
the laws 'are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be
man shall be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers or
the law of the land"), reprinted in 9 SWINDLER, supra note 34, at 148, might be read to require
that the laws be "equally binding upon every member of the community." Vanzant v. Wad
del, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 270 (1829) (Catron, J., concurring); see also Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 580-83 (1819) (argument of Daniel Webster)
(suggesting that a law that "affect[s] only particular persons and their particular privileges"
cannot be the "law[ ] of the land"). In two cases decided in 1831, the Tennessee court ex
pressly relied on the "law of the land" clause to invalidate special or partial laws. See Bank
of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 605 (1831) (Green, J.) ("By 'law of the land' is
meant a general and public law, operating equally on every individual in the community."
(emphasis omitted)); Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554, 555 (1831) (The " 'law
of the land' means a general and public law, equally binding upon every member of the
community." (emphasis omitted)). Courts in Maryland, Michigan, and Texas soon read simi
lar limitations into the "law of the land" clauses of their state constitutions. See Regents of
the Univ. of Md. v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 412 (Md. 1838) ("An act which only affects . . . a
particular person, or his rights and privileges, and has no relation to the community in gen
eral," is not the "law of the land."); Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251, 254 (1858) (stating that the
"law of the land" clause requires that the laws be "general in their operation
affect[ing]
the rights of all alike," and forbids special laws passed "to affect the rights of an individual . . .
in a way in which the same rights of other persons are not affected"); Janes v. Administrators
of Reynolds, 2 Tex. 250, 251-52 (1847) (stating that the "law of the land" clause requires that
the laws be "general public laws, binding all the members of the community under similar
circumstances," rather than "partial or private laws, affecting [only] the rights of private indi
viduals, or classes of individuals"); see also Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15, 22-23 (Iowa 1849)
(reading a similar limitation into the "law of the land" clause in a congressional ordinance
governing the Northwest Territory). For more on the development of this branch of antebel
lum "law of the land" jurisprudence, see Mon, supra note 28, at 260-74.
. . •

59. Yudof, supra note 10, at 1375 (citing F.A. HAYEK , THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
188 (1960)).
60. W1LUAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETIERS OF JAMES KENT, LL.D 163 (1898) (quoting
from an opinion Kent wrote in 1816 in his capacity as a member of the Governor's Council of
Revision).
61. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES IN THE AMERICAN UNION 389-97 (3d
ed. 1874). Though Cooley's treatise was first published just a few months after the ratifica
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, its section on "unequal and partial legislation" did not
purport to be an interpretation of the new amendment and made only passing reference to it,
concentrating almost exclusively on state law prior to its adoption.
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varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor.' "6 2
"Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should
be the aim of the law," said Cooley, for "[s]pecial privileges are
always obnoxious, and discriminations against persons or classes
are still more so."63
Though the antebellum state courts believed the state should
have no favorites, they understood that the imposition of special
benefits and burdens was often necessary to promote the general
welfare,64 and they were willing to tolerate laws singling out certain
persons or classes of persons for special treatment when they could
be justified on this ground. For example, state courts upheld legis
lative grants of exclusive rights to operate ferries, toll bridges, and
the like, when they were satisfied that the legislature had awarded
those rights on public grounds, rather than on the basis of mere
favoritism or prejudice.6 5 Similarly, they upheld laws subjecting
persons engaged in certain business activities to special regulations
for the general benefit.66 On the other hand, they would not toler
ate laws that singled out certain persons for special disadvantage
merely because of their political opinions.6 7
62. Id. at 392 (quoting Locke); see also id. ("[E]very one has a right to demand that he be
governed by general rules, and a special statute which . • . singles his case out as one to be
regulated by a different law from that which is applied in all similar cases, would not be
legitimate legislation.").
63. Id. at 393; see also People v. Township Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 486 (1870) (Coo·
ley, J.) ("[T)he discrimination by the State between different classes . • . and the favoring of
one at the expense of the rest . . • is not legitimate legislation, and is an invasion of that
equality of right and privilege which is a maxim in State government."). For the influence of
Jacksonian political theory on Cooley's legal thought, see Jones, Cooley and Laissez-Faire,
supra note 11; Jones, Cooley and Michigan, supra note 11.

64. See, e.g., Bradley v. New York & New Haven Ry., 21 Conn. 293, 307 (1851) {"It is
universally understood to be one of the implied and necessary conditions upon which men
enter into society and form governments, that sacrifices must sometimes be required of indi·
viduals for the general benefit of the community.").
65. See, e.g., Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & New Haven R.R. Co., 17 Conn. 40
(1845) (toll bridge); Pontchartrain R.R. Co. v. Orleans Navigation Co., 15 La. 404 {1840)
(railroad); Martin v. O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21 (1857) (wharf); see also COOLEY, supra note 61, at
394-96 (asserting that "the State may grant privileges to specified individuals without violat·
ing any constitutional principle" when the existence of those privileges is "important" to the
general welfare, yet their "nature" makes it "impossible" for them to "be possessed and
enjoyed by all," and citing, as an example. the privilege of operating a ferry or tollbridge).
66. See, e.g., Mayor of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137, 142-43 (1841) (licensing law for baker
ies); Commonwealth v. Blackington, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 352, 358 (1837) (law forbidding sale
of "spiritous liquors" without a license); Hewitt v. Charier, 33 Mass. {16 Pick.) 353, 354-56
{1835) (law forbidding persons practicing surgery to charge for their services if they had not
been licensed by the state); see also CooLEY, supra note 61, at 390 (asserting that laws impos·
ing special regulations on common carriers and bankers are permissible, so long as the regu·
lation is "for the general benefit").
67. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rel. Bd. of Police, 15 Md. 376, 484 (1860)
(questioning the constitutionality of a law providing that "no Black Republican . . • shall be
appointed to any office" within the jurisdiction of the Baltimore Board of Police); see also
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The general principle that emerged from the cases was some
thing like this: Courts would disfavor laws that singled out certain
individuals or classes for special benefits or burdens but would up
hold such laws upon a showing that the "discrimination" they
worked was designed to further some legitimate "public purpose"
- that is, to benefit the citizenry as a whole, as opposed to the
purely "private" interests of a certain class.68 Of course, distin
guishing "discrimination" that had a legitimate "public purpose"
CooLEY, supra note 61, at 390-91 (asserting that a law denying certain persons the right to
hold public office purely because of their political opinions would be an unconstitutional
partial law).

68. See, e.g., Blackington, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) at 358-59 (rejecting a partial law challenge
to a law forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquors without a license on the ground that the
law's "real object" was "to promote the public good," rather than to confer a special advan
tage on the licenseholders); Hewitt, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) at 356 (rejecting a partial law chal
lenge to a law conferring a special benefit on licensed medical practitioners on the ground
that the law's "leading and sole purpose" was "to guard the public," rather than "to promote
the[ ] private interests" of the licenseholders). The distinction was evidently between ine
quality as an end in itself and inequality as a means to some public end. See Blackington, 41
Mass. (24 Pick.) at 358-59 (holding that laws which have the "effect" of conferring special
benefits upon certain persons are not invalid, so long as that effect is "collateral and inciden
tal" to a "purpose
to promote the public good," rather than "one of the objects and
purposes of the law"); Hewitt, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) at 355-56 (stating that laws which have the
"effect" of conferring special benefits on certain persons are not invalid, so long as that effect
is "incidental, and not one of the purposes" of the law); see also Memorandum from Roger
Taney to President Andrew Jackson (June 20, 1836), in CARL B. SWISHER, RoGER B. TANEY
366-67 (1935) ("It would be against the spirit of our free institutions . . . to grant peculiar
franchises and privileges to a body of individuals merely for the purpose of enabling them
more conveniently and effectually to advance their own private interests. . . . [s]uch peculiar
privileges can be granted [with] the expectation and prospect of promoting thereby some
public interest."); GILLMAN, supra note 11, at 49 (describing the standard as requiring proof
that the special treatment is "really related to the welfare of the community as a whole,"
rather than being simply a "corrupt attempt[ ] to use the powers of government to advance
purely 'private' interests"); id. at 54-58 (describing this "public purpose" standard).
As Dean Yudof points out, see Yudof, supra note 10, at 1385-86, this analysis bears a
striking resemblance to the "public value" interpretation of orthodox equal protection juris
prudence put forth by Cass Sunstein and others. See Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private
Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SuP. Cr. REV. 127, 134-35 (arguing that "the
essence of the equality principle that underlies the [Supreme] Court's equal protection juris
prudence" is that "[w]hen the government operates to benefit A and burden B," it must be
"prepared to justify its decision by reference to a public value" - that is, to show that the
discrimination represents an "attempt[ ] to remedy a perceived public evil," rather than
merely a response "to the interests or preferences of some of its constituents"); see also Rob
ert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection's Rationality Review, 37 V1LL. L.
REV. l, 43-47 (1992) (illustrating that the Supreme Court's equal protection cases establish
"that a state may not purposely prefer A over B for A's own sake," but only "to serve public
purposes"); Richard S. Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court: 18 73-1903,
29 BuFF. L. REV. 667, 685-89, 696 (1980) (asserting that the Supreme Court's early equal
protection cases established that "legislation imposing special burdens or granting special
benefits" was valid only if the discrimination was shown to be merely a "means" to a "proper
public justification," rather than the result of mere "favoritism" or "spite"); Tussman & ten
Broek, supra note 11, at 358-59 (arguing that under orthodox equal protection jurisprudence,
"[t]he imposition of special burdens, the granting of special benefits . . . can only be justified
as being directed at the elimination of some social evil, the achievement of some public
good," rather than being driven by the "proscribed motives" of "hate, prejudice, vengeance,
[or] hostility" or "favoritism[ ] and partiality").
•

.
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from that which was designed to advance only the special interests
of a particular class was enormously difficult.69 This distinction
seems dubious to us today, steeped as we are in modem political
theory's teaching that the democratic process is nothing but a strug
gle between competing interest groups and that all legislation is in
tended to favor one interest group at the expense of another.70 But
it was a distinction that made sense to lawyers and judges in ante
bellum America, and it was one with which the framers of the Four
teenth Amendment were intimately familiar.
The doctrine against partial or special laws was closely related
to another limitation on state action widely recognized by the state
courts in the antebellum period: the vested rights doctrine. The
vested rights doctrine, which courts used to invalidate laws deemed
to interfere with certain fundamental rights of liberty or property
without adequate justification (or "arbitrarily"),71 has long been
recognized as the progenitor of our modem law of substantive due
69. Simply distinguishing the public interest from the purely private presents enormous
theoretical problems, as the U.S. Supreme Court discovered in applying a similar "public
purpose" requirement in its Lochner-era substantive due process jurisprudence. See GILL
MAN, supra note 11, at 10-11, 13-15, 76-103; TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 8-5, 8-6. Identifying the
purpose of a particular legislative act poses further difficulties, both definitional and empiri
cal. See RoQert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and
Democratic Theory, 67 CAL L. REv. 1049, 1071-77 (1979); Farrell, supra note 68, at 9-22. On
the dangers of making the constitutional validity of a law turn on judicial inquiry into the
motivation of those who enacted it, see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968); Brest, supra note 3, at 119-30; John
Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1212-23 (1970).
70. Cf. NELSON, supra note 7, at 177 (noting that the nineteenth-century distinction be
tween laws enacted for a public purpose and those enacted for the benefit of special interests
"may not seem useful to modern political theorists who view all law as a product of interest
group conflict"); Sunstein, supra note 68, at 143-45 (noting the essential incompatibility be·
tween the public values standard utilized by orthodox equal protection jurisprudence and the
interest group theory of legislation); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 11, at 350 (same). For
a summary of the literature on interest group theory and its contemporary variant, public
choice theory, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice,
65 TEXAS L. REV. 873, 883-92 (1987).
71. See, e.g., Wynehamer v. New York, 13 N.Y. 378, 385-87 (1856); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill
140, 143-45 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1, 24-26 (1833); Trust·
ees of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 310 (1804). A vested right was "[an] interest
which it is right and equitable that the government should recognize and protect, and of
which the individual could not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice." COOLEY, supra
note 61, at 358; see also id. at 358-59 (asserting that vested rights are "the interests of which
one cannot be deprived by the mere force of legislative enactment" but only through judicial
proceedings). On the development of the vested rights doctrine, see Edward S. Corwin, The
Basic Doctrine ofAmerican Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REv. 247 (1914) [hereinafter
Corwin, Basic Doctrine]; Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine ofDue Process ofLaw Before the
Civil War (pts. 1 & 2), 24 HAR.v. L. REV. 366, 460 (1911) [hereinafter Corwin, Due Process];
Charles Grove Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation in the United States and the Doctrines of
Vested Rights and ofImplied Limitations on Legislatures (pt. 1), 2 TEXAS L. REV. 257, 275-90

(1924).
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process.72 Like the doctrine against partial or special laws, the
vested rights doctrine was often derived from the law of the land or
due process clauses of the antebellum state constitutions.73 The two
doctrines overlapped a good deal in application, and many laws,
particularly those that regulated economic relations, were, if skill
fully characterized, vulnerable to challenge under both.74 The two
doctrines also employed a common standard of justification: courts
would uphold both partial or special laws and those that interfered
with vested rights upon a showing that the inequality or interfer
ence they worked served some legitimate public purpose, as op
posed to merely the special interests of a particular class.75 For
these reasons, laissez-faire constitutionalists of the late nineteenth
century merged them into a single doctrine forbidding legislation
designed to advance the interests of a certain class, rather than the
public as a whole.76 But lawyers and judges of the antebellum pe
riod saw them as two separate limitations on legislative power: one
addressed to laws that singled out certain persons or classes of per
sons for special benefits or burdens without adequate justification;
the other to laws that, though equally applicable to all, deprived
individuals of certain fundamental interests in liberty or property
without adequate justification.77 The Thirty-ninth Congress carried
72. For more on the link between the antebellum doctrine of vested rights and modem
substantive due process analysis, see Haines, supra note 71, at 397-405; Charles Grove
Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation in the United States and the Doctrine of Vested Rights
and ofImplied Limitations ofLegislatures (pt 3), 3 TEXAS L. REv. 1 (1924); Lowen J. Howe,
The Meaning of "Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
18 CAL. L. REv. 583 (1930); Wallace Mendelson, A Missing Link in the Evolution of Due
Process, 10 VAND. L. REV. 125 (1956). See also HowARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CON
STITUTION 242-65 (1968); Morr, supra note 28, §§ 82-83.
73. See Charles Grove Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation in the United States and the
Doctrines of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations on Legislatures (pt. 2), 2 TEXAS L.
REv. 387, 393-96 {1924); Howe, supra note 72, at 596-600; Maltz, supra note 24, at 317; Men
delson, supra note 72, at 125.
74. See, e.g., Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Me. 140, 143-44 (1826) {chalJenging the same law on
both grounds); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 331-37 (1825) (same); see also Corwin, Due Pro
cess, supra note 71, at 381-83 (noting that the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in
Foy could have been based on either doctrine). On the overlap between the vested rights
doctrine and the doctrine against partial or special laws, see Morr, supra note 26, §§ 100,
102.
75. See GILLMAN, supra note 11, at 49-50.
76. See NELSON, supra note 7, at 182 (observing that during the late nineteenth century,
the Supreme Court "conflated" these two separate limitations on legislative power into "a
single line of doctrine prohibiting unequal and unreasonable regulations").
77. See, e.g., Bull v. Conroe, 13 W1S. 260, 266-69 (1860); Lewis, 3 Me. at 331-37. The point
emerges quite clearly from Cooley's treatise. His chapter on "law of the land" jurisprudence
dealt with the two doctrines separately. See COOLEY, supra note 61, at 355-89 (vested rights
doctrine); id. at 389-97 {doctrine against unequal and partial laws). Cooley's explanation of
the vested rights doctrine made clear that he regarded it as something separate and distinct
from the doctrine against partial or special Jaws:
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this dichotomy forward in the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,78 and it survives even today
in the distinction drawn between equal protection and substantive
due process review.79
The antebellum state constitutional doctrine against partial or
special laws, fairly applied, would have justified the invalidation of
most laws subjecting African Americans to special disadvantage.
But the antebellum state courts - even those in the North - were
generally unwilling to invoke the doctrine to that end.80 Nor did
the Jacksonians extend their antipathy toward partial or special
[G]eneral rules may sometimes be as obnoxious as special, if they operate to deprive
individual citizens of vested rights. While every man has a right to require that his own
controversies shall be judged by the same rules which are applied in the controversies of
his neighbors, the whole community is also entitled • . . to demand the protection of the
ancient principles which shield private rights against arbitrary interference, even though
such interference may be under a rule impartial in its operation. It is not the partial
nature of the rule, so much as its arbitrary and unusual character, which condemns it as
unknown to the law of the land.

Id. at 355. Modem students of the era consistently describe the two doctrines as separate
limitations on legislative power. See, e.g., GILI.MAN, supra note 11, at 49-50; CLYDE E. JA
COBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY, CffruSTO·
PHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31-32 &
n.16 (1954); Corwin, Basic Doctrine, supra note 71, at 258-59; Corwin, Due Process, supra
note 71, at 382-83; Haines, supra note 71, at 393-97; Maltz, supra note 24, at 317 & nn.49-52;
Developments: State Constitutions, supra note 11, at 1465.
78. Cf. Corwin, Basic Doctrine, supra note 71, at 258-59 (suggesting the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause "takes its rise" from the antebellum doctrine against
"partial" or "special" laws).
79. See 2 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 2, § 14.7, at 370-71, § 15.4, at 399-400 (drawing
a distinction between equal protection and due process analysis); Brest, supra note 3, at 107
(stating that to "trigger" equal protection review, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the chal
lenged law "operates . . . to his comparative disadvantage," whereas to trigger substantive
due process review, he must only allege that it "operates to his disadvantage" (emphasis
added)); Lupu, supra note 11, at 1001 n.98 (arguing that equal protection review "speaks to
the permissibility of classification bases, and to no more," whereas substantive due process
review "speaks to substantive liberties, without direct regard to the inequality of their distri
bution," though "inequality may enter the analysis at the level of evaluating the state's justifi
cation for restricting the liberty"); Developments: State Constitutions, supra note 11, at 147374 (describing the difference between equal protection and substantive due process review).
80. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, 42-43 (1837) (rejecting the argument that
the "no exclusive privileges" provision in the Connecticut Constitution outlawed slavery in
the state); Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209-10 (1849) (rejecting the
argument that a law mandating racial segregation in the public schools violated the equality
provision in the Massachusetts Constitution); State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (Dev. & Bat.) 144,
163-64 (1838) (rejecting the argument that a statute singling out free Blacks for special crimi
nal penalties violated the "law of the land" and "no exclusive privileges" clauses of the North
carolina Constitution). As J.H. Martindale, New York's Republican Attorney General,
wrote to Senator John Sherman during the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, "nearly
all the precedents in the General [and] State [Governments] up to the time of the [thirteenth]
amendment • . . have recognized the power to classify the inhabitants of African descent and
to deprive them of political [and] civil rights." Letter from J.H. Martindale to John Sherman
(May 12, 1866), quoted in NELSON, supra note 7, at 128 & n.67. But see Fisher's Negroes v.
Dabbs, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 119, 137-140 (1834) (invoking the doctrine against partial or special
laws to invalidate a law operating to the special disadvantage of certain former slaves).
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laws to these laws. Few Jacksonian Democrats believed Blacks
were entitled to equality before the law, and Jackson himself most
certainly did not.81 But the leaders of the youthful antislavery
movement were well aware of the antebellum distaste for laws sin
gling out certain classes of persons for special benefits or burdens,
and they soon put it to use in the service of their cause. In the
process, they changed the rhetoric of the movement in a way that
would have profound implications for the Equal Protection Clause,
by divorcing it from the notion that race had no legitimate place in
governmental decisionmaking.
When the American antislavery movement first gained national
prominence in the 1830s, its leadership was dominated by members
of the clergy, who couched their arguments chiefly in moral terms
that stressed the wrong being done the slaves themselves.82 In the
1840s and 1850s, however, lawyers and politicians transformed the
movement from a moral crusade into a national political campaign,
ultimately embodied in the Republican party, by crafting arguments
with broader popular appeal.83 One of their principal tactics was to
characterize southern slaveholders as the kind of special interest
group against which the Jacksonians had railed. This "aristocracy
of slave holders," or "Slave Power," so the argument went, had
seized control of the federal government and was manipulating it to
advance its own interests at the expense of the rest of the country.
If the "Slave Power" were not curtailed, it would soon abolish true
republican government and threaten the liberty of all nonslavehold
ing Americans.84
Antislavery leaders consciously designed the Slave Power argu
ment to appeal to those who did not believe in the fundamental
equality of the races, by stressing the threat slavery posed to the
interests of nonslaveholding Whites, rather than the wrong it did to
the slaves themselves.ss The argument proved spectacularly sue81. See J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 146 (1978);
Yudof, supra note 10, at 1379.
82. See GRAHAM, supra note 72, at 163-69; TENBROEK, supra note 24, at 94-95.
83. See generally Eruc FONER, FREE Son., FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF
THE REPUBUCAN PAR.TY BEFORE THE ClvIL WAR 73-74 (1970); GRAHAM, supra note 72, at
168-85.
84. For a more complete discussion of the Slave Power argument, see FoNER, supra note
83, at 87-102. Senator Thomas Morris of Ohio, a Jacksonian Democrat with a long history of
opposition to special privileges for business interests, first popularized the argument. In a
widely publicized speech on the Senate floor in February of 1839, Morris equated the Slave
Power with the Money Power of Jackson's day, calling it the "goliath of all monopolies," and
warned that it posed an equally great threat to the liberty of ordinary Americans. See id. at
90-91.
85. See id. at 99. On the closely-related "free labor" argument, see id. at 40-72, 58-65.
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cessful in this respect, and each of the three successive political par
ties that grew out of the antislavery movement made prominent use
of it: the Liberty Party used it in the early 1840s, the Free Soil party
in 1848, and the Republican Party in the 1850s.86
The Slave Power argument resonated deeply with Jacksonian
Democrats, and it attracted many of their number to the antislavery
cause. 87 In the mid-1850s, thousands of these heirs of the Jackso
nian political tradition left the Democratic Party for the Republican
Party, driven by the belief that the former was "no longer the cham
pion of popular rights that it had been in Jackson's day," but had
become " 'the tool of a slave-holding oligarchy.' "88 By 1856, for
mer Democrats made up a substantial portion of the Republican
Party's membership in the northern and western states. 89 They
were disproportionately well-represented in the party's leadership
ranks,90 and they played a major role in the development of its poli
cies and ideology.91
The former Democrats in the early Republican party shared two
attributes that would prove influential in shaping the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. First, unlike Republicans

86. See id. at 92-98; see also F REE SOIL PLATFORM OF 1848, reprinted in NATIONAL
PARTY PLATFORMS 22, 22-24 (Kirk H. Porter ed., 1924); LIBERTY PLATFORM OF 1844, re
printed in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra, at 7, 10-11 ; REPUBLICAN PLATFORM OF
1856, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra, at 47, 47-48; REPUBLICAN PLATFORM
OF 1860, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra, at 55, 57.
87. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 1267 (1859) (statement of Sen. James Doolit
tle) ("The same men who, when the United States Bank undertook to enforce its recharter,
organized to put it down, are [now] organizing to put down a similar despotism which seeks
to-day to control the administration of this Federal Government . . . . ); FoNER, supra note
83, at 150-75.
88. FoNER, supra note 83, at 177 (quoting David Dudley Field). For more on the mass
influx of Jacksonian Democrats into the Republican Party in the 1850s, see id. at 149-85.
"

89. See id. at 163-66.
90. See id. at 165-66. For example, Francis and Montgomery Blair, Matthew Carpenter,
James Doolittle, David Dudley Field, Stephen J. Field, Hannibal Hamlin, Preston King, Lot
Morrill, Lyman Trumbull, Gideon Welles, and David Wilmot were all former Democrats. See
id. at 149 & nn.1-2; MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONORES·
SIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1869, at 61 (1974); Eruc L. MCKITRICK,
ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 46 (1960).
91. See FoNER, supra note 83, at 168-85.
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who were former Conscience Whigs92 or Liberty Party93 men, they
came from a political tradition that was decidedly hostile to Black
rights.94 They based their opposition to slavery more on fear of its
political, economic, and social consequences than on moral objec
tions to the institution itself,95 and many of them were quite openly
racist.96 On the other hand, they harbored an abiding conviction
that government should not play favorites, and a corresponding dis
taste for all state action that singled out certain classes of persons
for special benefits or burdens.97 In the early years of Reconstruc
tion, this distaste was often strong enough to overcome their racial
prejudices, leading them to support measures - like the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment - that were
designed to prevent the states from subjecting African Americans
to special disadvantage. But it is a mistake to conclude that they
supported these measures because they saw race as irrelevant to
any legitimate governmental objective, for they plainly did not hold
that view. They supported the measures for a very different reason:
92. The Conscience Wliigs were a radical faction of the Massachusetts Whig Party during
the 1840s. Led by Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson, they devoted themselves to urging the
Massachusetts Whig Party to break with the southern Whigs and adopt an antislavery posi
tion. When this effort failed, the Conscience Whigs left the Whig Party for the Free Soil
Party, where they continued to agitate for adoption of an antislavery platform. By the early
1850s, most of the Conscience Whigs had become members of the Republican Party. See
KINLEY J. BRAUER, COTION VERSUS CONSCIENCE 17-18, 129 (1967); FONER, supra note 83,
at 104, 113, 117-18, 124; Frank 0. Gatell, Conscience and Judgment: The Bolt ofthe Massa
chusetts Conscience Whigs, 21 HISTORIAN 18 (Nov. 1958).
93. The Liberty Party was a national political party founded in 1839 by a group of New
York abolitionists who had become frustrated with the persistent failure of the existing na
tional parties - the Whigs and the Democrats - to take a stand against slavery. The party
was active in the North and West throughout the 1840s. In the Northeast, it was dominated
by religious abolitionists, who denounced slavery as morally and religiously abhorrent and
called upon the federal government to abolish it immediately throughout the United States.
In the West, the party was led by Salmon Chase of Ohio, who agreed with the eastern aboli
tionists that slavery was morally wrong, but believed the federal government lacked constitu
tional authority to abolish it in the states. Chase and his followers did, however, consistently
urge the repeal of state laws that discriminated against Blacks. Many members of the Liberty
Party joined the Free Soil Party in 1848 and became members of the Republican Party in the
early 1850s. See FoNER, supra note 83, at 78-82, 124-25, 281-82.
94. See id. at 267, 281-82; ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE
Clv!L WAR 79, 92 n.38 (1980).
95. See FONER, supra note 83, at 60; FoNER, supra note 94, at 81-85.
96. See FoNER, supra note 83, at 261-62, 266-67. Of course, racial prejudice was virtually
universal in the Republican Party at that time, as it was in antebellum America generally.
See id. at 261; LEON F. LITWACK, NORlH OF SLAVERY 15-29 (1961); NELSON, supra note 7, at
96-100; V. JACQUE VoEGEU, FREE BUT NoT EQUAL: THE MIDWEST AND THE NEGRO DUR
ING THE C!vIL WAR 1-9 (1967). The former Democrats, however, were the "most extreme"
racists in the Republican party. See FONER, supra note 83, at 267. On the racial attitudes of
these former Democrats, see LAWANDA Cox & JoHN H. Cox, POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND
PREJUDICE 1865-1866, at 54-55, 214-19 (1963).
97. See FoNER, supra note 83, at 168-69; NELSON, supra note 7, at 16.
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because they saw the measures as logical applications of a broader
principle that lay at the heart of their political philosophy - that
government should not use its power to create favored or disfa
vored classes of citizens, but should confine itself to the "equal pro
tection" of all.
II.

THE

FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF

PROTECTION CLAUSE:

THE E Q UAL

NATIONA LIZING

THE ANTEBELLUM TRADITION

The legislative history of the Equal Protection Clause is rich and
complex,98 and anyone who approaches it with the hope of finding
concrete answers to specific legal problems is bound to be disap
pointed. Those who drafted the clause and secured its ratification
"did not view themselves as involved in the task of delineating a
logical and coherent set of legal doctrines," but rather of devising a
plan for the reconstruction of the Union that would secure the prin
ciples for which the North had fought the Civil War.99 Their com
ments on the clause were generally designed to gamer support for
it, rather than to shape its future interpretation,1 00 and they often
had difficulty explaining the concepts they understood it to em
body. But they did understand the language of the Equal Protec
tion Clause to mean something. While that understanding often
98. There is an extensive literature on the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., CHEsrnR JAMES ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE
FOURTEENTii AMENDMENT (1981); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDIClARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTii AMENDMENT (1977); HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE
ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTii AMENDMENT (1908); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF
THE FOURTEENTii AMENDMENT (1956) [hereinafter JAMES, FRAMING]; JOSEPH B. JAMES,
THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTii AMENDMENT (1984); MALTZ, supra note 26;

HERMINE HERTA MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTii AMENDMENT
(1977); NELSON, supra note 7, at 41-147; TENBROEK, supra note 24, at 201-34; Alfred Avins,
The Equal "Protection" of the Laws: The Original Understanding, 12 N.Y.L.F. 385 (1966);
Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 29-65 (1955); Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-88, in 6 THE Ou.
VER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
1207-300 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971); Frank & Munro, supra note 10; Graham, Declaratory,
supra note 24; Kelly, supra note 11; Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political
Compromise: Section One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 933

(1984). All of this literature draws upon the same basic primary sources: the debates of the
Reconstruction Congresses, as reported in the Congressional Globe, and the deliberations of
the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, as recorded by the Committee's clerk,
George Mark, in THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUC

TION, reprinted in BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF
FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 37-129 (1914). Some of the more recent work - like that of
Chester Antieau, Wiliiam Nelson, and Joseph James - also considers the state ratification
debates, the private papers of key members of the Reconstruction Congresses, and newspa
pers accounts, judicial opinions, and legal commentary from the Reconstruction era.
99. Yudof,
100.

supra note 10, at 1370; see also NELSON, supra note 7, at 8-9, 61-62, 110-11.
See BAER, supra note 11, at 73-74.
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existed only at the level of general principle,101 it is difficult to
square with the interpretation of the clause advanced by the major
ity in the recent racial gerrymandering cases.
In this part, I argue that the framers and ratifiers of the Four
teenth Amendment did not understand or intend its Equal Protec
tion Clause to call into constitutional question any and all forms of
race-conscious action. Indeed, they repeatedly rejected proposals
that would have done that, opting instead for one that would do
nothing more than nationalize the doctrine against partial or special
laws already being recognized by many state courts. They recog
nized, and most certainly intended, that this provision would, when
coupled with the amendment's "citizenship" clause, invalidate most
state laws subjecting African Americans to special disadvantage be
cause of their race. But the rule they adopted was not confined to
that narrow purpose, and the vice at which it struck was not the
consideration of race per se but rather the use of governmental
power to single out certain classes of persons for special benefits or
burdens.102
My discussion focuses primarily on the work of the Thirty-ninth
Congress, which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment and sent it to
the states for ratification.103 As modem historians have demon101.

See NELSON, supra note 7, at 7, 80.

102. Several commentators have argued that the state constitutional prohibitions against
partial or special laws and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were
aimed at different evils: the former at the practice of singling out certain favored classes for
special benefits, and the latter at the practice of singling out certain disfavored classes for
special burdens. See Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in Ore
gon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125, 141-42 (1970); Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEXAS L. REv. 1195, 1207-08 (1985). The problem with this argument
is that the decision to extend a special benefit to one group always has the effect of imposing
a relative burden on everyone else. See Correspondence between the House of Representa
tives of the State of Maine and the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 58 Me. 590, 593 (1871)
(opinion of Appleton, C.J., Walton, & Danforth, JJ.) (observing that "a discrimination in
favor of one . . . is a discrimination adverse to all other[s]"); Developments: Equal Protection,
supra note 3, at 1086 n.47 ("[W]hen a benefit is extended to one group but refused to an
other, the excluded group may be seen as suffering a relative burden."); id. at 1110-11, 1163.
Once we realize this, it becomes clear that both the Equal Protection Clause and its state
constitutional predecessors were in fact aimed at the same basic evil: the practice of singling
out certain classes for special benefits or burdens. Cf. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332-33
(1921) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause was "aimed at undue favor and individual or
class privilege on the one hand, and at hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality,
on the other").
103. In addition to the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, my discus
sion considers that of several related proposals that also came before the Thirty-ninth Con
gress: the two Freedmen's Bureau Bills; the Civil Rights Act of 1866; a proposed
constitutional amendment dealing with the representation question, drafted by James Blaine,
a Maine Republican; and a proposed civil rights amendment drafted by the Ohio Republican
John Bingham. I have also considered the congressional debates on the Fifteenth Amend
ment and the various civil rights bills of the early 1870s, all of which provoked extensive
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strated, the Republican majority in the Thirty-ninth Congress was
dominated not by radicals like Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sum
ner but by a coalition of moderates and conservatives, many of
whom were former Jacksonian Democrats.104 Like their more radi
cal brethren, these Republicans, led by Bingham and Blaine in the
House and Trumbull and Fessenden in the Senate, believed the fed
eral government should take some action to protect the rights of
the newly emancipated slaves. But they parted company with the
radicals on how far the federal government should go in taking such
action; while they agreed that it should guarantee Blacks the same
"civil" rights as everyone else, few believed it should guarantee
them the same "political" rights, and fewer still that it should guar
antee them full "social" equality.105 Their more cautious approach
to Black rights stemmed in part from their sense of political expedi
ency,106 in part from their own racial prejudices,101 and in part from
their deeply held concern for states' rights, which gave them a cor
responding fear of any move to expand the power of the federal
government.108
discussion of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause by those who either participated in
or were present at its framing and ratification.

104. See BENEDICT, supra note 90, at 21-58; WILUAM R. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRis1s:
CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-67, at 153-211 (1963); Cox & Cox, supra note 96, at
172-232; DAVID DONALD, THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1867, at 53-82 (1965);
JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS AND nm NEGRO IN
nm ClvIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 341-56 (1964); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF
RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, at 84 (1965); Fairman, supra note 98, at 253-364.
105. See FoNER, supra note 83, at 290-95; Maltz, supra note 98, at 935-36. To these
Republicans, "civil" rights included the rights to make and enforce contracts; to buy, lease,
inherit, hold, and convey property; and to sue, be sued, and give evidence in court. By con
trast, they considered the rights to vote, to hold office, and to serve on juries to be "political"
rights. For more on the distinction between civil, political, and social rights, see BERGER,
supra note 98, at 27-36; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOUR
TEENTH AMENDMENT AND nm BILL OF RIGHTS 41-54 (1986); K.C. Cerny, Appendix to the
Opinion of the Court, 6 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 455, 460-61 (1979); Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947, 1023-29 (1995).
106. As these Republicans were well aware, most American voters of that era - even
those who favored abolition of slavery - were hostile to the position that Blacks were enti
tled to full social and political equality. See FoNER, supra note 83, at 262-67; MALTZ, supra
note 26, at 2, 5, 10. Most of the free states still had laws singling Blacks out for special
disadvantage, and a number of them - Illinois, Indiana, and Oregon - had recently
adopted measures prohibiting the immigration of free Blacks. See EUGENE H. BERWANGER,
THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY (1967); LITWACK, supra note 96, at 64-112.
107. See FoNER, supra note 83, at 266-67; MALTZ, supra note 26, at 2. For more on the
racial attitudes of the Reconstruction Republicans, see FONER, supra note 83, at 261-300; C.
VANN WOODWARD, AMERICAN CoUNTERPOINT: SLAVERY AND RACISM IN nIE NORTH·
Sourn DIALOGUE 163-71 (1971); Maltz, supra note 24, at 306-07; Maltz, supra note 98, at
935-37.
108. See MALTZ, supra note 26, at 29-36, 52-60,90-91; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 26,
at 394-96.
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The Vice of the Black Codes

Those who read the Equal Protection Clause as rendering all
race-based state action presumptively unconstitutional rely primar
ily on the specific historical events that precipitated its addition to
the Constitution. They note that the Thirty-ninth Congress's most
immediate concern was the Black Codes, which singled out the
newly emancipated slaves for a wide variety of special disadvan
tages based on their race.1 0 9 Because the framers of the Equal Pro
tection Clause intended it to invalidate these race-based laws, they
reason, the framers must have intended the clause to repudiate. the
whole enterprise of regulating people by race. The Equal Protec
tion Clause, they conclude, must therefore render all race-based
state action presumptively unconstitutional.11 0
Examination of the record of the Thirty-ninth Congress, how
ever, reveals that few of the members who objected to the Black
Codes did so on the ground that race had no proper place in gov
ernmental decisionmaking.111 Some found the Codes offensive be
cause they reduced the freedmen to a condition approaching
involuntary servitude, thereby undermining the command of the
Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment.11 2
109. The Black Codes of the South, which the states of the former Confederacy were
passing as the Thirty-ninth Congress gathered in December of 1865, responded to the Eman
cipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment. But the Codes were not unique to
the South: many of the free states already had similar laws in place. See LrrwACK, supra
note 96, at 15-20, 64-112. Most of the Black Codes were explicitly race-based; others, such as
vagrancy and apprenticeship laws, were facially race-neutral, but had the purpose and effect
of keeping the newly emancipated slaves in a system of "virtual peonage." See Paul R. Di
mond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Pro
tection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 MicH. L. REv. 462, 472-77
{1982). For more on the Black Codes, see 1 wALTER L. FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY H!sTORY
OF RECONSTRUcnON 273-312 (1960); ERIC FoNER, NoTIUNG BUT FREEDOM: EMANCIPA
TION AND ITS LEGACY 48-73 (1983); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFIN
ISHED REVOLUTION 199-201 (1988); EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUcnON 29-44 {1871); THE
ODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965); Fairman, supra note
98, at 110-17.
110. See, e.g., William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights:
a/Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995 {1984); William Van Alstyne, Rites ofPassage: Race,
Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1979).

The Legacy
the Supreme

111. See BAER, supra note 11, at 83 (noting that "for most speakers, what made the
[Black Codes] so odious was not that [they] based classification on race as opposed to some
other characteristic"). Indeed, as Eric Schnapper has pointed out, the Thirty-ninth Congress
actually passed a number of pieces of legislation that were explicitly race-based. See Eric
Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71
VA. L. REv. 753, 753-88 (1985).
112. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1621-22 {1866) (statement of Rep.
Myers (R-Penn.)) (suggesting that Black Codes "impose by indirection a servitude which the
Constitution now forbids"); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866) (statement of
Rep. Thayer (R-Penn.)) (arguing that Black Codes are being used to "reduce this class of
people to the condition of bondmen"); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1124 (1866)
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Others complained that they denied the freedmen rights that were
inherent in their citizenship113 or belonged to all free men as a mat
ter of natural law.114 Still others opposed the Codes because they
"discriminated against" the freedmen by singling them out for spe
cial disadvantage. u s
This last objection enjoyed considerable currency with the mod
erate to conservative Republicans who controlled the Thirty-ninth
Congress. Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, who "virtually de
fined the conservative edge of the Republican mainstream,"116 at
tacked the Codes for "depriv[ing] [some] citizen[s] of civil rights
which are secured to other citizens."117 Senator William Pitt Fes
senden of Maine, the conservative leader of the Republican major
ity in the Senate, called them impermissible "class legislation."118
(statement of Rep. Cook (R-Ill.)) (arguing that the Black Codes "practically reduc[e] these
men to the condition of slavery"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1866) (statement
of Sen. Wilson (R-Mass.)) (arguing that Black Codes "make slaves of men whom we have
made free"); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard (R
Mich.)) (stating that Black Codes reduce the freedmen "to a condition infinitely worse than
that of actual slavery"); CoNo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Wilson) (stating that Black Codes "practically make the freedman a peon or a serr'); CoNo.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865) (statement of Sen. Wilson (R-Mass.)) (arguing that
Black Codes "practically make slaves of men we have declared to be free").
113. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. S. app. 217 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Howe (R-Wis.)) (stating that Black Codes deny "the plainest and most necessary rights of
citizenship"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer (R
Penn.)) (stating that Black Codes withhold "the fundamental rights of citizenship").
1 14. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull
(R-III.)) (arguing that Black Codes deny "privileges which are essential to freemen"); CoNo.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3034 (1866) (statement of Sen. Henderson (R-Mo.)) (stating
that Black Codes deny the freedmen "the commonest rights of human nature"). To Ameri
cans of this generation, the "natural rights of men" were the right of personal security, the
right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. See 2 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1 (1826).
115. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3034 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Henderson (R-Mo.)) (arguing that Black Codes subject the freedmen to "unequal burdens");
CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866) (statement of Rep. Moulton (R-Ill.)) (arguing
that Black Codes "discriminat[e] against" the freedmen, by subjecting them to restrictions
that "do not operate against the white men").
116. MALTZ, supra note 26, at 48.
117. CoNG. GLOBE, ·39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (asserting additionally that the
Codes violated Blackstone's admonition that " 'the restraints introduced by the law should
be equal to all' "). Trumbull was referring to a passage in Blackstone's Commentaries that
attempted to define political or civil liberty. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at *126-27.
The phrase Trumbull quoted, however, was not written by Blackstone himself, but by one of
his many editors: it appears in an editorial footnote in most editions of the Commentaries
published in America in the first half of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACK·
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON nm LAws OF ENGLAND 90-91 n.5 (J.B. Lippincott & Co., Phila
delphia, 1855); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES ON nm LAWS OF ENGLAND 122-23
n.3 (Robert H. Small, Philadelphia, 1825).
118. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1866); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. H. app. 156 (1866) (statement of Rep. Delano (R-Ohio)) (referring to "unequal"
and "discriminating" laws); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866) (statement of
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Even President Andrew Johnson suggested that he found the Codes
objectionable for this reason: in his December 1865 State of the
Union address, he declared that "there is no room for favored
classes or monopolies," for "the principle of our Government is
that of equal laws," which "accord 'equal and exact justice to all
men,' special privileges to none. "119
The initial package of legislation the Republican leadership in
the Thirty-ninth Congress offered to deal with the Black Codes comprised of a Freedmen's Bureau Bill and a Civil Rights Bill, both
drafted by Trumbull - strongly suggests that its members did not
find the Codes offensive simply because they were race based.
Neither of these bills actually forbade the states to take race into
account in governing. Instead, they forbade the states to "discrimi
nate against" certain persons because of their race - that is, to
single them out for certain kinds of special disadvantages. The
Freedmen's Bureau Bill, for example, made it a federal criminal
offense for persons acting "under color of any State or local law" to
"discriminate[] against" any "negro, mulatto, freedman, refugee, or
other person" because of their "race or color," by subjecting them
"to the deprivation of any civil right secured to white persons, or to
any other or different punishment than white persons are subject to
for the commission of like acts or offenses."120 Along the same
lines, the Civil Rights Bill declared that "there shall be no discrimi
nation in civil rights or immunities . . . on account of race . . . but the
Sen. Poland (R-Vt.)) (referring to "partial legislation"); The Proposed Amendment to the
Constitution, N.Y. CoM. ADVERTISER, Jan. 23, 1866, at 2 (referring to "class legislation").
119. 6 MEsSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 35, at 361-62 (Dec. 4,
1865). Johnson continued to proclaim his opposition to laws that singled out the freedmen
for special disadvantage even as he vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. His veto message
asserted that he was still willing to "cooperate with Congress in any measure that may be
necessary for the protection of the civil rights of the freedmen, as well as those of all other
classes of persons throughout the United States, by judicial process, under equal and impar
tial laws." 5 MEssAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 35, at 413 (Mar. 27,
1866).
120. Freedmen's Bureau Bill, S. 60, 39th Cong., reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 209-10 (1866) (emphasis added). The bill also contained provisions that would have
extended the life and jurisdiction of the Freedmen's Bureau and authorized it to provide
special assistance to Blacks and refugees. See Freedmen's Bureau Bill, S. 60, 39th Cong.,
reprinted in CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 209-10 (1866); see also Schnapper, supra
note 111, at 762-63. The bill passed both houses of Congress, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 688 (1866) (House vote); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 421 (1866) (Senate
vote), but President Johnson vetoed it, see 5 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,
supra note 35, at 398-405 (Feb. 19, 1866). An attempt to override the veto failed by a narrow
margin in the Senate. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 943 (1866). After sending the
Fourteenth Amendment to the states, the Thirty-ninth Congress passed another Freedmen's
Bureau Bill, H.R. 613 - considerably narrower than S. 60 - over the veto of President
Johnson. See Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173; CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
3850 (1866) (House vote); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3842 (1866) (Senate vote).
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inhabitants of every race and color . . . shall have the same right[s]
. . . and . . . be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties." 121
Time and again, supporters of the Civil Rights Bill assured their
colleagues that its antidiscrimination provision was aimed only at
state action that singled out certain persons for special disadvan
tages. Trumbull said the provision would "have no operation in any
State where the laws are equal. " 122 Representative James Wilson,
the Iowa Republican who sponsored the bill in the House, said it
would mean only that
[w]hatever exemptions there may be shall apply to all citizens alike.
One race shall not be more favored in this respect than another. One
class shall not be required to support alone the burdens which should
rest on all classes alike. This is the spirit and scope of the bill, and it
goes not one step beyond.123

Representative Shellabarger, an Ohio Republican, said it would
mean that
whatever rights . . . the States may confer upon one race or color of
the citizens shall be held by all races in equality. Your State may de
prive [citizens] of the right to sue or contract or testify . . . [b]ut if you
do so . . . as to one race, you shall treat the other likewise.124

Perhaps the best evidence that the Republican leadership in the
Thirty-ninth Congress did not find governmental consideration of
race offensive, in and of itself, lies in its responses to the suggestion,
made repeatedly by members of the Democratic opposition, that
Trumbull's bills would invalidate laws forbidding interracial mar
riage. 125 The leadership's response was a simple one: The bills
121. Civil Rights Bill, s. 61, 39th Cong., reprinted in CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
474 (1866) (emphasis added). This bill, as modified, would become the Civil Rights Act of
1866, passed by the Thirty-ninth Congress over President Johnson's veto. See Act of April 9,
1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C.§§ 1981, 1982 (1994)). The final version of the
bill omitted the broad "antidiscrimination" clause which had appeared in its original version,
see CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366 (1866), because Democrats and moderate
Republicans voiced concern that it could be interpreted to outlaw racial discrimination in
suffrage, jury service, and education. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291
(1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham (R-Ohio)); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1270-71
(1866) (statement of Re�. Kerr (D-Ind.)).
122. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866); see also CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1760 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull (R-Ill.)) (this bill "simply declares that in
civil rights there shall be an equality among all classes of citizens," that "all alike shall be
subject to the same punishment," and that the "laws shall be impartial").
123. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson (R
Iowa)).
124. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger (R·
Ohio)); see also CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard
(R-Mich.)) (stating that the bill "simply gives to persons who are of different races or colors
the same civil rights").
125. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. S. app. 182 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Davis (D-Ky.)); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1121 (1866) (statement of Rep. Rogers
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would not affect antimiscegenation laws at all, because antimis
cegenation laws did not "discriminate against " anyone because of
their race.12 6 The explanation given for this conclusion varied:
Trumbull reasoned that both members of the interracial couple
were subject to the same punishment;121 Fessenden and others that
members of both races were equally forbidden to marry outside
their own race.12s Of course, as Democratic Senator Reverdy John
son of Maryland pointed out at the time,12 9 and the United States
Supreme Court would recognize a century later,130 both lines of
reasoning are faulty; laws forbidding interracial marriage do single
out certain people for special disadvantage because of their race.131
Faulty though the reasoning was, it was the reasoning of the moder
ate to conservative Republicans who crafted the Thirty-ninth Con
gress's response to the Black Codes. It tells us that they did not
find governmental consideration of race offensive in and of itself, so
long as it did not have the effect of singling out certain persons for
special disadvantage because of their race.
B.

The Rejection of Proposals Aimed Specifically
at Race-Based State Action

Before it took up the Fourteenth Amendment itself, the Thirty
ninth Congress considered - and rejected - a number of propos
als for constitutional amendments that would have specifically out
lawed some or all kinds of race-based state action. These proposed
amendments were of two types: those that forbade certain "distinc(D-NJ.)); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 604 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan (R
Penn.)); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson (D
Md.)); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 417-18 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis (D-Ky.)).
126. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866) (statements of Sen. Fessenden
(R-Me.) and Sen. Trumbull (R-Ill.)).
127. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 420 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull
(R-Ill.)); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
128.

See CoNo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866) (statement of Rep. Moulton (R

ill.)); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 {1866) (statement of Sen. Fessenden (R-Me.)).
129. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505-06 (1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson (D
Md.)).
130.

See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.

1, 7-9 (1967).

131. As Senator Reverdy Johnson explained, the law "says to the black man, 'You shall
not marry a white woman,' and says to the white man, 'You may.' There is therefore . . . one
law in relation to this question for the white man, and another law for the black man.''
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505-06 (1866). In addition, such laws, viewed in social
context, operated to single out a particular racial group - African Americans - for a special
stigmatic burden, by implying that they were not fit to mix with other races. Cf. Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (stating that "to separate [one group of persons]
from [all] others • • . because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority"); see also infra
note 266.
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tions" based on race, and those that forbade certain forms of "dis
crimination" because of race.
The proposals outlawing certain "distinctions" based on race
were the first to be considered. In January of 1866, Thaddeus Ste
vens of Pennsylvania, one of the most radical Republicans in the
House, gave the Joint Committee on Reconstruction a proposed
amendment providing that " [a]ll laws, state or national, shall oper
ate impartially and equally on all persons without regard to race or
color."132 A subcommittee on which Stevens sat rewrote this pro
posal to explicitly outlaw all laws drawing racial "distinctions" in
political and civil rights. 133 Read literally, this proposal would have
prohibited all laws that used race as the basis for distinguishing be
tween citizens in assigning civil and political rights, whether or not
those distinctions resulted in actual inequalities in benefits and
burdens.134
The Joint Committee rejected this "no racial distinctions" pro
posal135 in favor of a proposed amendment dealing with apportion132. THADDEUS STEVENS, Proposed Constitutional Amendment (Jan. 12, 1866), reprinted
in KENDRICK, supra note 98, at 46.
133. See id. at 50 (Jan. 20, 1866) ("[A]ll provisions in the Constitution or laws of any state,
whereby any distinction is made in political or civil rights or privileges, on account of race,
creed, or color, shall be inoperative and void."). The "no racial distinctions" language was
already familiar to the Thirty-ninth Congress: in December of 1865, Senator Henry Wilson
of Massachusetts had proposed several statutes using it, none of which was ever put to a vote.
See S. 55, 39th Cong., reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 108, 111 (1865); S. 9,
39th Cong., reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865); see also Frank &
Munro, supra note 10, at 439. For a general history of the "no racial distinctions" language,
see ANDREW KuLL, Tm: CoLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 22-66 (1992) (tracing the language
back to petitions that antislavery activists submitted to the legislatures of the free states in
the 1830s).
134. The subcommittee patterned the "no racial distinctions" proposal on an amendment
which the Massachusetts abolitionist Wendell Phillips had been promoting since 1863. See
KuLL, supra note 133, at 58. Phillips almost certainly intended his proposed amendment to
invalidate all race-based state action, for he said publicly that he thought the government
should be "color-blind," see NATL. ANTISLAVERY STANDARD, Feb. 11, 1865, at 2 (printing
speech of Jan. 26, 1865), that there should "be no recognition of race by the United States or
by state law," NATL. ANTISLAVERY STANDARD, June 8, 1867, at 1 (printing speech of May 29,
1867), and that he hoped America would one day be "a nation that does not know Black
from white," NATL. ANTISLAVERY STANDARD, May 22, 1869, at 1 (printing speech of May 11,
1869). Since Stevens was certainly familiar with Phillips's position on race, it is very likely
that he intended his "no racial distinctions" proposal to have the same basic meaning.
135. See KENDRICK, supra note 98, at 50-51. During the Senate debates on the Joint
Committee's representation amendment, Senator Richard Yates of Illinois made a last-min
ute attempt to revive the "no racial distinctions" proposal, introducing a resolution that the
Constitution be amended to provide:
That no State . . . shall, by any constitution, law, or other regulation whatever
make
or enforce in any way, or in any manner recognize any distinction between citizens
on account of race or color or previous condition of slavery; and that hereafter all citi
zens, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of slavery, shall be pro
tected in the full and equal enjoyment and exercise of all their civil and political rights,
including the right of suffrage.
• • .

. . •
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ment of representation in Congress - a proposal that explicitly
countenanced denial or abridgement of the franchise on the basis of
race, though it penalized states that did this by reducing their repre
sentation accordingly136 - and a proposed civil rights amendment,
drafted by the conservative Republican John Bingham of Ohio, that
did not mention race at all.137 The Joint Committee's records do
not tell us why it rejected the "no racial distinctions" proposal.13 8
The Committee's chairmen later said it was because they did not
believe the proposal could be ratified. Stevens, the House chair,
said that while he preferred his "no racial distinctions" proposal, he
had been persuaded, "after comparing ideas with others," that it
could not be ratified.139 Fessenden, the Senate chair, said that he
would have preferred an amendment "doing away at once with all
distinctions on account of race or color in all of the States of this
Union so far as regards civil and political rights, privileges, and im
munities," but that the Committee did not believe such an amend
ment could be ratified, because of "existing prejudices and existing
institutions."140 As he explained, most of the states in the North
and West still had laws that denied or limited the right to vote on
the basis of race,141 and Connecticut had recently "reject[ed] a
proposition which proposed to do away with all distinctions beCONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1287 (1866). The resolution failed by a vote of 7-38; only
Senator Yates, Senator Sumner of Massachusetts, and five other Radicals voted for it. See
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1287 (1866).
136. See KENDRICK, supra note 98, at 53 ("Representatives and direct taxes shall be ap
portioned among the several States [of] this Union, according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed; provided
that whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of
race or color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of representa
tion."). The House approved this proposed amendment, but the Senate postponed it indefi
nitely, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1258 (1866), after Senator Charles Sumner
lambasted it for bringing "Oligarchy, Aristocracy, Caste, and Monopoly, founded on color,
under the sanction of the Constitution," CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1227 (1866).
137. See KENDRICK, supra note 98, at 60-62.
infra note 160.

This proposal was never put to a vote.

See

138. The journal records the proposals the Joint Committee considered, and the votes of
its members on those proposals, but not the Joint Committee's discussions. See KENDRICK,
supra note 98, at 37-129.
139. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 537 (1866).
140. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 703-05 (1866); see also CoNG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1033 (1869) (statement of Sen. Fessenden (R-Me.)) (recalling that the Com
mittee had rejected Stevens's "no racial distinctions" proposal because the Committee
thought "it would be impossible at that time to carry it through Congress or to obtain for it
the support of the requisite number of States").
141. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1866). On these Black Laws of the free
states, see BERWANGER, supra note 106, at 123-41; LITWACK, supra note 96, at 15-29, 64-112;
VOEGEU, supra note 96, at 160-82; Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment:
Black Legal Rights and the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 417 (1986).
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tween men on account of color."142 In such a climate, said Fes
senden, the Committee thought it foolish to waste the nation's time
with a proposal to abolish all legal distinctions based on race.143
When it became clear that the "no racial distinctions" proposal
was going nowhere, radical Republicans began suggesting proposed
amendments that would outlaw certain forms of "racial discrimina
tion" instead.144 In March of 1866, Senator William Stewart, a Ne
vada R epublican, suggested a constitutional amendment
prohibiting " [a]ll discriminations among the people becaus e of race,
.
color, or previous condition of servitude, either in civil rights or the
right of suffrage. "145 In April, Stevens gave the Joint Committee a
proposed amendment, drafted by Robert Dale Owen, whose first
section would have provided that "[n]o discrimination shall be
made by any state, nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of
persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servi
tude."146 Section 2 of the proposal outlawed all "discrimination,"
after July 4, 1876, "as to the enjoyment by classes of persons of the
142. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1866). In the fall of 1865, voters in Con
necticut had rejected a referendum proposal that would have replaced a state constitutional
provision denying the vote to "colored persons, except those who were citizens of the State at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, in 1811," with one giving the vote to "[e]very
male citizen of the United States who shalI have attained the age of twenty-one years." THE
AMERICAN ANNUAL CYCLOPEDIA AND REGISTER OF IMPORTANT EVENTS OF THE YEAR
1865, at 304 (1870).
143. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1866).
144. The proponents of these "no racial discrimination" proposals probably saw them as
being somewhat narrower than the "no racial distinctions" proposals. As noted earlier, the
latter were probably intended to abolish aI1 Jaws that used race as the basis for drawing
distinctions between citizens in assigning civil and political rights, whether or not those dis
tinctions resulted in actual inequalities in benefits and burdens. See supra notes 132-34 and
accompanying text. But, as the debates over the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights
Bill reveal, the members of the Thirty-ninth Congress used the term "discrimination" to refer
to the practice of singling out for special benefits or burdens, as opposed to merely sorting
into groups. See supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text. Given this usage, and the fact
that the "no racial discriminations" proposals surfaced after the rejection of the "no racial
distinctions" proposals, it seems reasonable to assume that the former were intended to be
somewhat narrower than the latter.
Professor Kull, however, apparently sees no difference between these "no racial discrimi
nation" proposals and the earlier "no racial distinctions" proposal. See KULL, supra note 133,
at 67-87 (assuming that both were intended to invalidate all laws that used race as a basis for
distinguishing among people in assigning civil and political rights, whether or not those dis
tinctions resulted in actual inequalities in benefits or burdens). Indeed, Kull often uses the
term "discriminate" as if it meant simply "distinguish between" or "sort," without regard to
the effect of that sorting on the distribution of benefits and burdens. Cf. Epps, supra note 8,
at 441 (noting that Kull often fails to distinguish between four different kinds of governmen
tal uses of race: to "classify," to "distinguish," to "discriminate," and to "separate or segre
gate"). Perhaps this is the source of Justice O'Connor's curious use of the term
"discriminate" in Shaw I: KuII's book was drawing considerable attention in legal circles in
1993. See infra notes 313-25 and accompanying text.
145. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1906 (1866).
146. KENDRICK, supra note 98, at 83.
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right of suffrage, because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude," and Section 3 provided that any state that engaged in
this sort of racial "discrimination" before July 4, 1876 would face a
corresponding reduction in its representation.141
These "no racial discrimination" proposals fared no better than
their "no racial distinctions" predecessor. The Joint Committee re
jected Stewart's "no discrimination" amendment rather quickly. 148
It gave the "no discrimination" provision in the Owen proposal
more serious consideration, and in fact initially approved it.149 One
week later, however, the committee replaced the "no racial discrim
ination" provision in the Owen proposal with the following lan
guage proposed by Representative Bingham:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due pro
cess of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.150

At the same time, the Committee deleted the provision forbidding
racial "discrimination" in suffrage after 1876151 and removed the
references to race from the proposal's representation-reduction
provision.152 As a result, by the time the Committee reported out
the Owen proposal, it contained no mention of race whatsoever.
Again, the Joint Committee's journal does not tell us precisely
why it made these changes. But there is compelling evidence that it
was because the moderate and conservative Republicans who con147. Id. at 83-84. The remaining sections of the Owen proposal dealt with the confeder
ate debt and congressional enforcement power. See id. at 84.
148. See JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 98, at 102.
149. See KENDRICK, supra note 98, at 85 (approving a motion to adopt the first section of
the original Owen proposal).
150. Id. at 106-07. This language would eventually become the second sentence of sec
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For accounts of the complicated set of procedural
maneuvers through which Bingham managed to get the "no racial discrimination" provision
in the original Owen proposal replaced with this new tripartite formulation, see JAMES,
FRAMING, supra note 98, at 113-14; KENDRICK, supra note 98, at 85-120; MALTZ, supra note
26, at 82-92; Bickel, supra note 98, at 42-44.
151. See KENDRICK, supra note 98, at 101 (approving the motion to strike section 2 of the
proposal).
152. See KENDRICK, supra note 98, at 102 (approving the motion to replace the original
section 3 with new language). Thus revised, the third section of the proposal read as follows:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states . . . according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state excluding Indi
ans not taxed. But whenever in any State the elective franchise shall be denied to any
portion of its male citizens, not less than twenty-one years of age, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation
in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of male citizens shall
bear to the whole number of male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age.
Id. at 102. This language would eventually become section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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trolled the Committee became persuaded, after consulting with the
Republican delegations of various states, that their endorsement of
a constitutional amendment that would forbid the states to deny
African Americans the right to vote, and perhaps to maintain ra
cially segregated public schools and restrict interracial marriage as
well, would doom their party to certain defeat in the fall elec
tions.153 As Earl Maltz reminds us, the Fourteenth Amendment
"was in large measure a campaign document, designed to outline
the Republican program of Reconstruction for the upcoming elec
tions in 1866," and its provisions "were carefully drafted to appeal
[to] swing voters."154
The Joint Committee's consistent rejection of proposals explic
itly forbidding racial distinctions and racial discrimination - even
in access to basic civil rights - casts considerable doubt on the as
sertion that the framers intended the language of the Equal Protec
tion Clause to strike at all race-based or race-conscious state
action.15s Instead, the strong inference is that they intended the
153. During the week of April 21-27, 1866, the Republican congressional delegations of
various states met in caucuses to discuss the upcoming elections. See JAMES, FRAMING, supra
note 98, at 109-10. Many of these delegations informed the Joint Committee that they did
not want to have to run on a platform of Black rights. See Robert Dale Owen, Political
Results From the Varioloid, 35 ATLANTIC MoNTiiLY, June 1875, at 660, 666; see also CoNo.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2948 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson (R-Iowa)) ("[T]he fall
elections lie between us and posterity, and some fear the result of the former more than they
consider the welfare of the latter."); 2 FRANCIS FESSENDEN, LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF
WILLIAM Prrr FESSENDEN 21-24 (1907). For more on the influence these state caucuses ex
erted on the Joint Committee, see BENEDICT, supra note 90, at 185-87; BEROER, supra note
98, at 529; Kuu., supra note 133, at 85-86; MALTZ, supra note 26, at 87-92.
154. Earl M. Maltz, A Dissenting Opinion to Brown, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 93, 94 (1995); see
also BENEDICT, supra note 90, at 198-202; McKITRICK, supra note 90, at 349, 355-56.
155. Cf. BAER, supra note 11, at 87 (stating that the framers of the Equal Protection
Clause "had little concern with race as an abstract category"); id. at 116 ("[T]he debates
refute the contention that the goal was to eliminate all legislation based on race."); Kuu.,
supra note 133, at vii (arguing that the historical evidence "tends strongly to refute" the
argument that the framers intended the clause "to require color blindness on the part of
government"); Nelson Lund, The Constitution, The Supreme Court, and Racial Politics, 12
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1129, 1148-50 (1996) (expressing doubt that the Equal Protection Clause
was intended to impose a general rule of colorblindness on the states); McConnell, supra
note 105, at 1016 (asserting that the Reconstruction Republicans did not view racial discrimi
nation "as a general moral evil"); Schnapper, supra note 111 (arguing that the framers of the
Equal Protection Clause did not intend it to prohibit all race-based affirmative action, be
cause they passed several such programs themselves); Rodney A. Smolla, The Ghosts of
Homer Plessy, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1037, 1080 (1996) (maintaining that "the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not understand the law they were enacting as turning the Consti·
tution color-blind," because they did not understand it to abolish racially segregated public
schools); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2439 (explaining that the framers of the Equal Protection
Clause "emphatically" did not understand it as "excis[ing] all use of race in [governmental]
decisionmaking," but simply as "an effort to eliminate racial caste"); Laurence H. Tribe, Jn
What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Color Blind?, 20 JoHN MARSHALL L. REV.
201, 204 (1986) (stating that "we know, with as much certainty as such matters ever permit,
that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not think 'equal protection of the laws'
made all racial distinctions in law unconstitutional," because they did not understand it to
• • •
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clause to aim at some evil other than the bare consideration of race.
Some believe that evil was the state's failure to provide some or all
of its citizens with the means necessary to protect and enforce cer
tain rights derived from other sources.156 But, as traditional equal
protection jurisprudence has long recognized, the evil was in fact
something quite different: the practice of singling out certain per
sons or groups of persons for special benefits or burdens - that is,_
of "discriminating" either in favor or against them - without ade
quate justification. We see this becoming clear as Congress consid
ers the Joint Committee's next effort, the Bingham amendment.
C.

The Bingham Amendment: Shifting the Focus from
Consideration of Race to Inequality of Benefits and
Burdens

The "equal protection" language in section one of the Four
teenth Amendment first came before the Thirty-ninth Congress in a
proposed amendment suggested by Representative John Bingham
in December of 1865, which would have given Congress the power
"to pass all necessary and proper laws to secure to all persons in
every State of the Union equal protection in their rights, life, lib
erty, and property."157 Bingham's proposal was referred to the
Joint Committee, which revised it several times, before finally re
porting it out in the following form:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be neces
sary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States; and to all persons in
the several States, equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property.158
outlaw racially segregated public schools). But see Reynolds, supra note 110, at 997 ("His
tory faithfully records that the purpose of the[ ] [Civil War] Amendments was to end forever
a system which determined legal rights, measured status, and allocated opportunities on the
basis of race, and to erect in its place a regime of race neutrality."); Van Alstyne, supra note
110, at 776-77 (asserting that the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment "permit[s]
us" to read the Equal Protection Clause "as repudiating the propriety of regulating people by
race," though it "do[es] not compel that conclusion").
156. See, e.g., TENBROEK, supra note 24, at 207, 221; Avins, supra note 98, at 427-28;
Harrison, supra note 9, at 1433-51; Maltz, supra note 9, at 510-13.
157. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865). While Bingham was the first to in
clude the phrase "equal protection" in a proposed constitutional amendment submitted to
the Thirty-ninth Congress, he did not invent it. Nor was it invented by the antislavery move
ment, as many scholars have assumed; the first known use of the phrase in American political
rhetoric was in Andrew Jackson's 1832 message vetoing the Second Bank Bill. See supra
note 51.
158. KENDRICK, supra note 98, at 61 (citations omitted).
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This proposal was introduced in both houses of Congress, 1 s9 and
the House debated it for several days, though it ultimately took no
action on it.160 The debates, which focused on the proposal's equal
protection language, cast considerable light on the intended mean
ing of the strikingly similar language in section one of the Four
teenth Amendment.
The debates strongly suggest that Bingham himself did not in
tend his equal protection proposal to call into question all race
based state action. Of course, as any student of the Reconstruction
debates can attest, attempting to divine Bingham's intentions from
his remarks on the floor is a risky business, for he was not known
for clarity of thought or speech.161 In speaking about his proposal
on the House floor, Bingham gave conflicting accounts of its precise
purpose: at times, he said it was designed to guarantee all citizens
an absolute - and only incidentally equal - right to have their
"natural" or "personal" rights of life, liberty, and property pro
tected by the states;162 at others, that it was designed to guarantee
all persons a general right to equal treatment at the hands of the
159. See H.R. Res. 63, 39th Cong. (1866), reprinted in Corm. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1033-34 (1866); S. Res. 30, 39th Cong. (1866), reprinted in CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 806 (1866). The proposal was never formally debated in the Senate.
160. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033-35, 1054-67, 1083-95 (1866). On Feb
ruary 28, 1866, the House voted to postpone consideration of the proposal indefinitely, after
moderate Republicans like Hale and Hotchkiss expressed concern that it would give Con
gress too much power to legislate in areas traditionally reserved to the states. See CONG. '
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094-95 (1866). It was never mentioned again in the House.
161. See MALTZ, supra note 26, at 53 (noting that Bingham was not known for "the
trenchance of his argument" or "the force of his logic," but for his "style"); Fairman, supra
note 98, at 462, 1289 (stating that Bingham was "not a man of exact knowledge or clear
conceptions or accurate language," and that "his utterances cannot be accepted as serious
propositions"); Frank & Munro, supra note 10, at 470 n.181 (concluding that Bingham was a
"windbag," and "as a legal thinker he was not in the same class with the top notch minds of
his time"); Harrison, supra note 9, at 1404 n.61 (expressing the view that Bingham's "analyti
cal powers were [either] mediocre or he was too lazy to use them"); see also HARRIS, supra
note 11, at 39-40 (accusing Bingham of frequent "confusion").
162. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1866) (stating "that . . . every
man in every State of the Union . . . may, by the national law, be secured in the equal
protection of his personal rights"); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866) (describ
ing the "great wrong" against which his proposal was directed as the states' practice of "deny
ing to citizens therein equal protection or any protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property"); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866) (arguing that the amendment
would "provide for the efficient enforcement . . . of the[ ] 'equal rights of every man,' " which
he defined, borrowing from President Johnson, as the rights " 'to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness; to freedom of conscience, to the culture and exercise of all his faculties' ");
CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866) (stating that the amendment would give Con·
gress "the power to pass all laws necessary and proper to secure to all persons
their equal
personal rights"). Those who favor a natural rights reading of the Equal Protection Clause
place heavy emphasis on these comments. See, e.g., TENBROEK, supra note 24, at 125-28;
Graham, Antislavery Backgrounds, supra note 24, at 483-84, 499; Graham, Declaratory, supra
note 24, at 18-24.
. • .
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law.163 But it does seem clear that Bingham intended his proposal
to strike at some evil other than the bare consideration of race. In
his first major speech on the proposal, delivered when it consisted
solely of the equal protection language, he said he had introduced it
because the Constitution's guarantee of "equal and exact justice to
all men" had been "flagrantly violated" by many of the states, "in
respect of white men as well as Black men. "164 The example he
gave - the South Carolina legislature's passage of a law expelling a
White abolitionist, Samuel Hoar, from the state - did not involve a
race-based distinction.16s In later speeches, he assured his col
leagues that his equal protection language was not aimed solely at
protecting the newly emancipated slaves, but would also give Con
gress the power to protect "loyal white citizens of the United
States" in the South, who were then being persecuted for their
political views, rather than for their race.166 Bingham's steadfast
insistence that his equal protection language would protect South
ern Whites who were loyal to the Union is compelling evidence that
163. Bingham's speeches about the proposal are shot through with references to the notion of "equality before the law." At one point, Bingham argued that:
Your Constitution provides that no man, no matter what his color, no matter beneath
what sky he may have been born . . . no matter how poor, no matter how friendless, no
matter how ignorant, shall be deprived of life or liberty or property without due process
of law - law in its highest sense, that law which is the perfection of human reason, and
which is impartial, equal, exact justice.
CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1866); see also CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
158 (1866) (stating that "the divinest feature of your Constitution is the recognition of the
absolute equality before the law of all persons"); CoNo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 157
(1866) (stating that the Constitution's "foundation principle" is "the absolute equality of all
men before the law").
164. CoNo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 157, 158 (1866). Bingham was referring to his
original proposal, which was then before the Joint Committee. As noted above, that propo
sal contained only the equal protection language; the privileges and immunities language was
added by the Committee several weeks later. See supra text accompanying note 157.
165. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866). In 1844, the Massachusetts leg
islature commissioned Hoar, a prominent Boston lawyer and judge, to go to South carolina
and file a lawsuit challenging that state's treatment of free Blacks. See Resolve of March 16,
1844, ch. 111, 1844 MAss. Acrs 330. When Hoar arrived in Charleston, the South Carolina
legislature ordered him expelled from the state. See H. Res. of Dec. 5, 1844, 1844 S.C.
HousE J. 65-66, reprinted in 67 NILES NATL. REG., Dec. 14, 1844, at 226-227.
166. See CoNo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065 (1866). At this point, the proposal
contained both the equal protection language and the privileges or immunities language.
Bingham made this statement, however, in response to questions from Representative Hale
of New York. Hale expressly had directed his questions only to the proposal's equal protec
tion clause. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hale (R
N.Y.)) ("[M]y argument is directed exclusively to the consideration of the final clause of the
amendment proposed [the Equal Protection Clause] . . . without refer[ence] at all to the
other clause [the Privileges and Immunities Clause]."). Bingham made the same basic point
again the following day. See CoNo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1866) (arguing that
his proposal would give Congress the power to protect both "the loyal white minority" and
the "disenfranchised colored" in the Southern states).
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he did not view the evil to which the language was directed as the
use of race to distinguish between persons.167
Other participants in the debate indicated that they understood
Bingham's equal protection language to be aimed only at laws that
singled out certain classes of persons for special benefits or bur
dens. Thaddeus Stevens, who voted for the Bingham proposal in
the Joint Committee and defended it actively on the floor of the
House, assured his colleagues that its equal protection language
would permit Congress to override state legislation only when it
was "unequal. "168 According to him, it would not entitle Congress
to interfere when "the legislation of a State was equal, impartial to
all."169 Representative Hotchkiss of New York, a moderate Repub
lican who spoke in opposition to the proposal, said its equal protec
tion language was designed to forbid a state to "discriminate
between its citizens and give one class of citizens greater rights than
it confers upon another."170 Although he found that goal a worthy
one, he refused to support the proposal because it left protection
against such unequal legislation "to the caprice of Congress."171 In
his view, it would be better to enact an amendment directly outlaw
ing all such legislation by providing that "no State shall discriminate
against any class of its citizens."172
The Joint Committee took Hotchkiss's advice to heart. When
the equal protection proposal re-emerged from the Committee as
part of section one of the omnibus amendment that would become
the Fourteenth Amendment, it had been changed from a grant of
authority to Congress to a limitation on state legislative authority,
and its sponsors were explaining it as an attempt to constitutional167. See Maltz, supra note 9, at 519 ("Bingham did not view the proposed constitutional
amendment as being race-focused."). This is not to say, of course, that Bingham did not
intend the amendment to give Congress the power to legislate against the Black Codes; he
plainly did. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065 (1866) (stating specifically
that his proposal aimed its equal protection language at laws like the provision of the Oregon
Constitution that denied African Americans access to the courts to enforce their rights).
168. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063, 1064 (1866). While Stevens
spoke after the privileges or immunities language had been added to the proposal, he did so
in response to criticisms directed solely to its equal protection clause. See CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063-64 (1866) (criticism of Rep. Hale (R-N.Y.)).
169. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063 (1866).
170. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866). Like Stevens, Hotchkiss spoke
after the privileges or immunities language had been added to the proposal. But he stated
explicitly that his comments were directed to the proposal's Equal Protection Clause, rather
than to its Privileges and Immunities Clause. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095
(1866).
171. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
172. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
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ize the doctrine against partial or special laws already recognized by
many state courts.113
D.

The Joint Committee's Final Proposal: Nationalizing the
Developing State Constitutional Tradition Against Partial
or Special Laws

The congressional debates on the final version of the Fourteenth
Amendment do not contain a great deal of discussion of the Equal
Protection Clause. The debates focused primarily on the represen
tation and disenfranchisement provisions in the amendment's sec
ond and third sections, not on section one. When speakers did
mention section one, they tended to speak of it as a unified whole,
without differentiating between its various clauses.174 Despite these
difficulties, the debates, read with an understanding of the constitu
tional language developed by the state courts in the antebellum era,
contain some useful information about the intended meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, they strongly suggest that many
of the Republicans who participated in the drafting and ratification
process understood it to do nothing more than nationalize the ante
bellum state constitutional principle against partial or special laws,
which they called, in the legal vernacular of the day, "class
legislation." 11s
When Thaddeus Stevens officially presented the Fourteenth
Amendment to the House, he characterized its first section as al
lowing "Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so
. . . that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally
173. See infra section II.D.
174. See Karst, supra note 8, at 15.
175. For more on the way in which the members of the Reconstruction Congresses used
the term "class legislation," see infra note 198. It is not difficult to understand why the fram
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment felt the need to write a broad general prohibition against
partial or special legislation into the federal Constitution, though similar prohibitions already
existed in the constitutional law of many states. As noted earlier, the state courts had been
largely unwilling to invoke the existing state law prohibitions to invalidate laws singling out
Blacks for special disadvantage. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. By adding a
similar provision to the federal Constitution - one that was clearly applicable to Blacks as
well as to Whites - the framers hoped to overcome this problem. See Morr, supra note 28,
at 275-76 (asserting that the Joint Committee proposed the Equal Protection Clause "to pre
vent a repetition of " decisions like Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849)
(holding that under the constitution and laws of the Commonwealth, the general school com
mittee of the city of Boston had the power to provide for the instruction of Black children in
separate schools and to prohibit their attendance at other schools)). In addition, the existing
prohibitions - couched as prohibitions against partial or special laws - were generally ap
plied only to discrimination by legislatures. The framers also believed discrimination in the
administration of facially equal laws to be a serious problem, requiring a broader provision
like the Equal Protection Clause.
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upon all."176 This would, he said, be a great improvement over the
"present codes" of the states, under which "different degrees of
punishment are inlli.cted, not on account of the magnitude of the
crime, but according to the color of the skin," and "color disquali
fies a [Black] man from testifying in courts, or being tried in the
same way as white men."177 Section one would mean, he contin
ued, that
[w]hatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the
black man precisely in the same way and to the same degree.
Whatever law protects the white man shall afford "equal" protection
to the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall
be afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man to testify in
court shall allow the man of color to do the same.178

Stevens did not indicate, however, which particular clause of sec
tion one would accomplish this; indeed, he seems to have assumed
that the three clauses were essentially three different ways of saying
the same thing.
The speech presenting the amendment to the Senate,119 deliv
ered by Senator Jacob Howard, a Michigan Republican, was consid
erably more precise. Howard's speech contains the most thorough
explanation of section one found in the debates, and it deserves
special attention, for it was carefully prepared as the Joint Commit
tee's official explanation of its proposal.180 Unlike most speakers,
Howard did not run the three clauses of section one's second sen
tence together. He spoke first about the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, which he said would absolutely guarantee certain "funda
mental" rights against state interference.181 He turned then to the
Equal Protection Clause, which he said would "abolish[ ] all class
legislation in the States and do[ ] away with the injustice of subject
ing one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another."182
This suggests that Howard viewed the Equal Protection Clause as
176. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
177. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (referring to such laws as "partial"
laws).
178. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
179. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-67 (1866).
180. See JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 98, at 137.
181. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
182. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). Howard's language suggests he
may have thought the Due Process Clause would also offer some protection against class
legislation. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (speaking of the "last two
clauses" of section 1 as "abolish[ing] all class legislation in the States"). This is not surprising,
for a number of the antebellum state courts had located their state constitutional prohibitions
against partial or class legislation in "law of the land" or "due process" provisions, for want
of a better foundation. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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serving a function quite different from that of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause: specifically, as nationalizing the existing state
law doctrine against partial or special laws, which he knew as class
legislation.183 This is confirmed by his later statement that section
one would not only prevent the states from interfering with "those
fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the
United States," but also "establish[ ] equality before the law . . .
giv[ing] to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the race
the same rights and the same protection before the law as it gives to
the most powerful, the most wealthy, or the most haughty."184
Echoing the antebellum state courts, Howard concluded by saying
that this principle of "equality before the law" was essential to the
preservation of republican government.185
Throughout the ratification process, Republicans consistently
took the position that section one would do nothing but nationalize
the preexisting state constitutional tradition against partial or spe
cial laws.186 Senator Timothy Howe of Wisconsin said it was
designed to prevent the states from "deny[ing] to all classes of
[their] citizens the protection of equal laws"187 and to give the fed
eral government "the power to protect classes against class legisla
tion."188 Representative Thomas Eliot of Massachusetts said it
would "prohibit State legislation discriminating against classes of
citizens."189 Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania said
183. Howard did not expressly define the term "class legislation"; he apparently thought
its meaning would be clear to his audience (as indeed it would have been to anyone familiar
with the legal language of the day). He did, however, use it to refer to legislation "subjecting
one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2766 (1866). Also, he cited as examples laws which authorize "the hanging of a black
man for a crime for which the white man is not to be hanged" and laws under which "one
measure of justice is to be meted out to a member of one caste while another and a different
measure is meted out to the member of another caste." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2766 (1866). For further discussion of what the term "class legislation" meant to the mem
bers of the Thirty-ninth Congress, see infra note 198.
184. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
185. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). Other members of the Thirty
ninth Congress expressed similar sentiments. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 40
(1866) (statement of Sen. Lot Morrill (R-Me.)) ("The republican guarantee is that all laws
shall bear upon all alike in what they enjoin and forbid, grant and enforce."); CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 174 (1866) (statement of Rep. James Wilson (R-Iowa)) (stating that in a
true republican government there is "no class legislation, no class privileges" and no laws that
"legislate against [one class] for the purpose of advancing the interests of [another]").
186. Cf. NELSON, supra note 7, at 115 (observing that Republicans frequently said that
section l's "only effect" would be to forbid the states to "discriminat[e] arbitrarily between
different classes of citizens" and require them to "treat[ ] [their] citizens equally, distinguish
ing between them only when there was a basis in reason for doing so").
187. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. S. app. 219 (1866).
188. CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 883 (1868).
189. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866).
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it would mean only that "the same laws must and shall apply to
every mortal, American, Irishman, African, German or Turk"19o
and that "the same law which punishes one man shall punish any
other for the same offense . . . the law which gives a verdict to one
man shall render the same verdict to another, whether he is Dutch,
Irish, or [N]egro."191 Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois said it
would "constitutionalize" the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, which had
outlawed the most egregious partial or special legislation of the day:
the Black Codes.1 92
One of the most influential Republican newspapers, the Cincin
nati Commercial, also saw section one as writing into the Constitu
tion the antebellum doctrine against partial or special laws. Section
one, said the Commercial, was designed to enforce "the great Dem
ocratic principle of equality before the law" and to invalidate all
"legislation hostile to any class." 193 The Commercial continued:
With this section engrafted upon the Constitution it will be impossible
for any Legislature to enact special codes for one class of its citizens,
as several of the reconstructed States have done, subjecting them to
penalties from which citizens of another class are excepted if con
victed of the same grade of offense, or confer privileges upon one
class that it denies to another.194

Though many Republicans in 1866 understood section one to
constitutionalize the antebellum doctrine against partial or special
laws, few bothered to explain which part of it would accomplish
that purpose. In the early 1870s, however, congressional Republi
cans began to specifically identify the Equal Protection Clause as
the source of that limitation. One of the first to do this was Repre
sentative James Garfield of Ohio, who told his colleagues in 1871
190. Thaddeus Stevens, The Pending Canvass!, Speech Delivered at Bedford, Pa. (Sept.
4, 1866), in THADDEUS STEVENS PAPERS 11 {Beverly Wilson Palmer ed., 1993).
191. Thaddeus Stevens, Speech at Lancaster, Pa. (Sept. 27, 1866), in N.Y. HERALD (Sept.
29, 1866). Another noted Radical, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, has been
quoted as stating that section 1 abolished " 'oligarchy, aristocracy, caste, or monopoly with
peculiar privileges and powers.' " See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51-52 n.8 {1947)
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting from Brief for Plaintiffs on Rear
gument at 21, The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. {16 Wall.) 36 (1872), reprinted in 6
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 714 {Philip B. Kurland & Ger
hard Casper eds., 1975)); Fairman, supra note 98, at 1348 (same).
192. See, e.g., Senator Lyman Trumbull, Speech at the Chicago Opera House (Aug. 1,
1866), in CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1866, at 4; see also CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2512-13
(1866) (statement of Rep. Raymond (R-N.Y.)); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511
(1866) {statement of Rep. Eliot (R-Mass.)); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2505 (1866)
(statement of Rep. McKee (R-Ky.)); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2498 (1866) (state
ment of Rep. Broomall (R-Penn.)); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2464 (1866) (state
ment of Rep. Thayer (R-Penn.)).
193. The Constitutional Amendment, CINCINNATI CoM., June 21, 1866, at 4.
194. Id.
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that the Equal Protection Clause forbade the states to "mak[e] or
enforc[e] laws which are not on their face and in their provisions of
equal application to all the citizens of the State . . . like the air of
heaven, covering all and resting upon all with equal weight."195 The
following year, Senator Oliver Morton of Indiana said the Equal
Protection Clause means "that no person shall be deprived by a
State of the equal benefit of the laws."196 The clause was added to
the Constitution, he said, because " [t]here was class legislation in
some of the States," and "it was intended to strike at all class legis
lation, to provide that the laws must be general in their effects. "197
"If we read the history of this amendment," said Morton, "we shall
understand . . . that it was intended to promote equality in the
States, and to take from the States the power to make class legisla
tion and to create inequality among their people."198 According to
195. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. H. app. 153 (1871). Note the striking similarity
between Garfield's "air of Heaven" metaphor and the "rains of heaven" image used by
Andrew Jackson in his 1832 veto message. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
196. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1872) (emphasis added).
197. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1872) (emphasis added); see also CoNG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1872) (asserting that the clause "provides that whatever law
a State may have, the protection and the benefit of that law shall extend to all classes . . . in
other words, the States cannot create inequality by their own legislation").
198. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1872). Like Howard before him, Morton
did not expressly define the term "class legislation." But he consistently used it as a synonym
for partial or special legislation. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1872) (using
"class legislation" to describe laws that are not "general in their effects," but are "confined to
a class").
Members of the Reconstruction Congresses consistently used the term "class legislation"
to refer to legislation that antebellum state courts had called partial or special laws. See, e.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2608-09 (1868) (statement of Sen. Sherman (R-Ohio))
(using "class legislation" to mean "a provision applying to a particular class," rather than "to
all classes"); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1867) (statement of Sen. Grimes (R
Iowa)) (using "class legislation" to refer to legislation that "single[s] out one class and con
fer[s] upon them a consequence which [it does] not confer upon another class"); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2780 (1866) (statement of Rep. LeB!ond (D-Ohio)) (using
"class legislation" to refer to legislation which "do[es] for [one] class of persons what you do
not propose to do for the [rest]"); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 544 (1866) (statement
of Rep. Taylor (D-Tenn.)) (using "class legislation," "partial legislation," and "special and
discriminating legislation" to refer to legislation which "discriminates and favors one class at
the expense of another"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at H. app. 298 (1866) (state
ment of Rep. Bingham (R-Ohio)) (using "class legislation" to describe legislation which is
not "general . . . in its character," but "operate[s] injuriously upon" only a certain class of
persons); see also 5 MEssAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 35, at 425 (July
16, 1866) (reprinting President Johnson's message vetoing the second Freedmen's Bureau
Bill passed by the Thirty-ninth Congress, H.R. 613) (using "class legislation" to describe leg
islation which singles out "a particular class of citizens" for a special benefit).
The Reconstruction Republicans certainly believed caste legislation - that is, legislation
that singles out a certain class of persons for special disadvantage, so as to reduce them to (or
maintain them in) a state of subordination - to be a form of class legislation. See, e.g.,
CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard (R-Mich.)) (as
serting that the Equal Protection Clause "abolishes all class legislation and does away with
the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another" (emphasis
added)). But they did not use the terms "caste legislation" and "class legislation" synony-
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Morton, "the word 'protection,' " as used in the clause, "means not
simply the protection of the person from violence, the protection of
his property from destruction, but . . . the equal benefit of the
law. "199 Morton and others continued to advance this view
throughout the Reconstruction era.200
Professor Harrison dismisses the Garfield-Morton interpreta
tion of the Equal Protection Clause as revisionist history.20 1 While
he agrees that the framers of section one intended it to embody a
broad requirement of "equality or impartiality in [state] lawmak
ing,'•202 he believes they understood that requirement to lie in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.203 Further, he believes that they
intended the Equal Protection Clause to mandate equality only
with respect to the "remedial" or "protective" functions of state
government - that is, the mechanisms by which government
secures individual rights against private invasion.204 According to
mously, as modem commentators often seem to assume. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 9, at
1413; Kelly, supra note 11, at 1049; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2435-36. Instead, as demon
strated above, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment used "class legislation" more
broadly, to refer to any law that singled out a certain class for special benefits or burdens,
whether or not it had a subordinating effect on a particular class. For this reason, while the
historical evidence supports the assertion that the framers and ratifiers intended the Equal
Protection Clause to abolish all caste legislation, it does not support the further assertion,
frequently made by modem caste theorists, that this was all the framers and ratifiers intended
the clause to do.
199. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1872).
200. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 2d Sess. 1793 (1875) (stating that the clause
means "that all men shall be equals before the law" and "that no State shall deny to any man
the equal advantage of the law, the equal benefit of the law, the equal protection of the
law"); CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. S. app. 360 (1874) (stating that the clause "pre
vents any State from making any odious discrimination against any class of people"); CoNG.
GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. S. app. 359 (1874) (stating that the clause "denies to any State
the power to make a discrimination against any class of men as a class"); CONG. GLOBE, 43d
Cong., 1st Sess. S. app. 358 (1874) ("[W]hen the fourteenth amendment declares that every
person shall be entitled to the equal protection of the laws, it means to the equal benefit of
the laws of the land."); see also CoNG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 3454 (1874) (statement of
Sen. Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.)) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause is "a provision against
all discrimination and in favor of perfect equality before the law"); CoNG. GLOBE, 43d Cong.,
1st Sess. 412 (1874) (statement of Rep. Lawrence (R-Ohio)) (arguing the word "protection"
in the Equal Protection Clause refers to "every benefit to be derived from laws").
201.

See Harrison, supra note 9, at 1430, 1440-41.
Id. at 1411; see also id. at 1410-13.
203. See id. at 1410-32. Professor Currie first advanced the theory that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause was intended to be a general antidiscrimination provision. See CURRIE,
supra note 9, at 342-51.
204. See Harrison, supra note 9, at 1433-51. Earl Maltz was the first to suggest this nar
row reading of the Equal Protection Clause. See Maltz, supra note 9, at 499 ("[T]he main
202.

thrust of the equal protection clause was to guarantee to all persons equality in a discrete
right - the right to protection of the laws."); see also CURRIE, supra note 9, at 349-50 (sug
gesting a similar interpretation). Other students of the original understanding have advanced
a related, though subtly different, interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, arguing that
it was intended to impose upon the states an affirmative obligation to provide all persons
with "full" protection of their natural rights. See, e.g., TENBRoEK, supra note 24, at 26-29, 96-
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him, the notion that "equal protection of the laws" meant "the pro
tection of equal laws" did not occur to Reconstruction Republicans
until the Supreme Court's decision in the Slaughter-House Cases205
made clear that the Privileges and Immunities Clause could not
support the legislation that became the Civil Rights Act of 1875, as
its sponsors originally had assumed.206
Professor Harrison does not cast his historical net back far
enough. It may be true that the sponsors of the Civil Rights Act of
1875 did not rest it on the Equal Protection Clause until after the
Supreme Court's decision in the Slaughter-House Cases. But Sena
tor Morton first advanced his theory that the Equal Protection
Clause was a general prohibition against unequal laws in February
of 1872, more than a year before the Supreme Court handed down
that decision in April of 1873. The theory that the "equal protec
tion of the laws" means "the protection of equal laws" did not, in
any event, originate with Morton; it was deeply embedded in Amer
ican legal and political thought long before he spoke.207 Like "too
many modem constitutionalists," Professor Harrison makes the
mistake of "ignor[ing] the history of the Jacksonian concept of
98, 175-80, 194-99, 206-07, 221-22; Avins, supra note 98, at 427; Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil
Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 702·05 (1979). On this
view, unlike the Maltz-Harrison view, the denial of protection to all persons on an equal basis
would violate the clause. See TENBROEK, supra note 24, at 221 (arguing that because
"[p]rotection of men in their fundamental or natural rights was the basic idea of the clause,"
the "[e]qual denial of protection • • . is • • • a denial of equal protection").
205. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
206. See Harrison, supra note 9, at 1440-41, 1425-33; see also Avins, supra note 98, at 424.
The 1875 Act provided that "all persons" were entitled to "full and equal enjoyment" of inns,
common carriers, and places of public amusement, "subject only to the conditions and limita
tions established by law and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color," and forbade
the states to deny any person the right to serve on a jury because of his race. Act of Mar. 1,
1875, ch. 114, §§ 1, 4, 18 Stat. 336-37.
207. In 1832, for example, Andrew Jackson equated the equal protection of the laws with
the equal benefit of the laws. 3 MEssAGES AND PAPERS OF nm PRESIDENTS, supra note 35,
at 1153 (stating that the government should "confine itself to equal protection, and, as
Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the
poor"). The Ohio Constitution of 1851 declared that "[g]ovemment is instituted for the[ ]
equal protection and benefit" of the people. Omo CoNST. of 1851, art. I, § 2, reprinted in 7
SWINDLER, supra note 34, at 558. In 1866, Senator Tunothy Howe told the Thirty-ninth Con
gress that the Equal Protection Clause would prevent the states from "deny[ing] to all classes
of [their] citizens the protection of equal laws." CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. S. app.
219 (1866). In 1871, the Supreme Court of Maine wrote that "[t]he State is equally to protect
all, giving no undue advantages or special and exclusive preferences to any," Correspondence
between the House of Representatives of the State of Maine and the Supreme Judicial Court,
58 Me. 590, 593 (1871) (opinion of Appleton, Walton, and Danforth, JJ.), and "giv[ing] all
alike the benefit of equal laws without favoritism or partiality," 58 Me. at 609 (opinion of
Barrows, J.). In short, the conventional wisdom that the phrase "equal protection" had no
significant history prior to its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, see Frank &
Munro, supra note 10, at 438-40; Kelly, supra note 11, at 1052; Developments: Equal Protec
tion, supra note 3, at 1069, is simply incorrect.

292

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:245

equal protection before it was transformed by the abolitionists and
embodied in the fourteenth amendment. "20s
In short, there is considerable evidence that a majority of the
Republicans who participated in the framing and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment understood its Equal Protection Clause to
do nothing more than nationalize the antebellum doctrine against
partial or special laws. In their view, the clause modified that doc
trine only to make clear, as the antebellum state courts had not,
that state action that singled out African Americans for special dis
advantage was presumptively unconstitutional.209 As such, the
clause represented a carefully forged compromise between the abo
litionists in the Republican Party's radical wing, who would have
liked to prevent the states from ever taking race into consideration
in governing, and the former Democrats in its moderate wing, who
were not prepared to concede that race should be completely ex
cised from governmental decisionmaking but were firmly commit
ted to the idea that the states should not be allowed to single out
certain groups for special benefits or burdens without adequate jus
tification.210 Each gave up some ground to the other: the abolition208. Yudof, supra note 10, at 1371.
209. I do not contend, of course, that this was the only reading of the clause held by those
who participated in its framing and ratification; there were certainly those who saw it differ
ently. My argument is simply that the dominant understanding among the framers and ra
tifiers was that the clause wrote this developing state law doctrine into the federal
Constitution, with the modification noted.
210. The depth of the Thirty-ninth Congress's consensus on this proposition can be seen
in its debates over the two Freedmen's Bureau Bills that came before it: S. 60 and H.R. 613.
Both of those bills contained provisions that singled out those of African descent for special
benefits on a temporary basis. See Schnapper, supra note 111, at 762 (S. 60); id. at 771-73
(H.R. 613). Opponents of the bills charged that these provisions were impermissible class,
partial, or special legislation. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2780 (1866)
(statement of Rep. LeBlond (D-Ohio)) (calling the race-conscious relief measures in H.R.
613 "class legislation," which "do[es] for that class of persons what you do not propose to do
for [everyone else]"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 544 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Taylor (D-Tenn.)) (complaining that the race-conscious relief measures in S. 60 were "class
legislation," "partial legislation," and "special and discriminating legislation," because they
"discriminate[ ] and favor[ ] one class at the expense of another" and do not "in [their] opera
tion affect all alike"); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3840 (1866) (statement of
Sen. Saulsbury (D-Del.)) (complaining that H.R. 613 provides public support to only "a por
tion of the people, discriminating against all others"); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
401 (1866) (statement of Sen. McDougall (D-Cal.)) (complaining that S. 60 "gives [Blacks]
favors the poor white boy in the North cannot get"). President Johnson raised the same
objection in vetoing the bills. See 8 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note
35, at 3599 (Feb. 19, 1866) (veto message for S. 60) (voicing concern about the propriety of
Congress passing legislation that singles out "one class . . . of our people" for special benefits
not provided everyone else); id. at 3623 (veto message for H.R. 613) (criticizing the bill for
singling out "a favored class of citizens" for special treatment and warning Congress about
"the danger of [such] class legislation").
When confronted with this objection, those who supported these race-conscious relief
measures did not take issue with its central premise that government should not single out
certain classes of citizens for special benefits without an adequate public purpose justifica-
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ists agreed to accept a rule that tolerated some consideration of
race, and the former Democrats to accept a rule that forbade some
racial distinctions. The result was a rule that called into constitu
tional question all state action that singled out any class of persons
of any race for special benefits or burdens.211 The Court's famous
dictum that "the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the pro
tection of equal laws"212 is thus not a "textual sleight of hand," as
Professor Harrison alleges,213 but an accurate translation of what
the clause meant to those who framed and ratified it.
III.

ORTHODOX EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE:
FIDELITY To THE TRADmoN

In this part, I argue that the Supreme Court's traditional equal
protection jurisprudence reflects the understanding that the framers
and ratifiers intended the Equal Protection Clause to nationalize
the preexisting state constitutional doctrine against partial or spe
cial laws. Several Justices made this point explicitly in early equal
protection cases. As time wore on, the explicit references to the
original understanding became less frequent. But the understand
ing itself lived on in the language and structure of the Court's equal
protection doctrine.

tion. Instead, they argued that the discrimination worked by these bills was permissible, even
under that rule, because it served a legitimate public purpose. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 939 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull (R-Ill.)) (arguing that the race-con
scious relief measures in S. 60 would make Blacks financially self-sufficient, so they would
not require public assistance in the future); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866)
(statement of Rep. Moulton (R-111.)) (arguing that the race-conscious relief measures in S. 60
would "break down the discrimination between whites and blacks" and "ameliorat[e] . . . the
condition of the colored people"); CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 590 (1866) (statement
of Rep. Donnelly (R-Minn.)) (arguing that the race-conscious relief measures in S. 60 would
bring "industry, prosperity, morality, and religion" to the nation).
211. Unlike the rejected "no racial distinctions" and "no racial discrimination" alterna
tives, this rule would not necessarily forbid the states to deny or abridge the right to vote on
the basis of race. While this rule would not permit states to single out Blacks for special
disadvantage in the franchise for no reason other than racial prejudice or animus, it might be
construed to permit race-based distinctions in access to the franchise that were said to serve
some more legitimate public purpose, though laws like this would of course trigger the repre
sentation-reduction provision in section 2 of the Amendment. Nor would this rule necessar
ily invalidate laws mandating racial segregation in the public schools and forbidding
interracial marriage. Such laws might be upheld on either of two possible grounds: that they
did not discriminate against any particular group because of their race, see supra notes 126-28
and accompanying text, or that any discrimination they worked served some legitimate public
purpose.
212. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
213. See Harrison, supra note 9, at 1390.
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Early Interpretations: The Insight of
Cooley, Field, and Bradley

Many of the lawyers, judges, and scholars who first grappled
with the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause in the years fol
lowing its ratification recognized that it was designed to nationalize
the antebellum state constitutional doctrine against partial or spe
cial laws, modifying that doctrine only to make clear that it was
fully applicable to laws singling out African Americans for special
disadvantage. Thomas Cooley - state court judge, law professor,
and the most influential constitutional scholar of the Reconstruc
tion era - was one of these. The first edition of his famous trea
tise, published just a few months after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, included a brief discussion of the Equal
Protection Clause in its section on "unequal and partial legisla
tion. "214 Cooley wrote:
It was not within the power of the States before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment to deprive citizens of the equal protection of
the laws; but there were servile classes not thus shielded, and when
these were made freemen, there were some who disputed their claim
to citizenship, and some state laws were in force which established
discriminations against them. To settle doubts and preclude such
laws, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted; and the same securi
ties which one citizen may demand, all others are entitled to.21s
When Cooley said the states had not been permitted to deny their
citizens "the equal protection of the laws" even before the Four
teenth Amendment, he was referring to the doctrine against partial
or special laws, which forbade states to do so as a matter of state
constitutional law.216
Justices Stephen Field and Joseph Bradley of the United States
Supreme Court also recognized the connection between the Equal
Protection Clause and the antebellum doctrine against partial or
special laws.217 We can see them beginning to make this connection
in the Court's very first encounter with the Equal Protection
Clause, the Slaughter-House Cases of 1872. In those cases, a group
214. See CooLEY, supra note 61, at 397.
215. Id.
216. See Yudof, supra note 10, at 1376; id. at 1373 (noting that Cooley saw the Equal
Protection Clause as "only clarif[ying] the application of [this] older principle of law to the
newly emancipated slaves"); cf. GILI.MAN, supra note 11, at 59 (arguing that Cooley under
stood the Equal Protection Clause as "just a formalization of what [he] had already consid
ered the singular aim of the Jaw, which was the protection of equality of rights and
privileges").
217. As a former Jacksonian and state court judge, see Loren P. Beth, Stephen Johnson
Field, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 289,
290 (Kermit Hall et al. eds., 1992), Field was intimately familiar with that doctrine.
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of butchers argued that a state law granting a partial monopoly in
the slaughtering business to a single corporation denied them "the
equal protection of the laws" because it was "an act of legislative
partiality" that "enriches seventeen persons" at the expense of
"nearly a thousand others of the same class, and as upright and
competent as the seventeen."218 The majority gave this claim short
shrift,219 but Justices Field and Bradley, in dissent, paid close atten
tion to it. In the process, they began to sketch out the link between
the clause and the antebellum case law.
Justice Field's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases is best
remembered for its suggestion that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause protects certain "fundamental" rights belonging to all free
men - including the right to pursue any lawful trade or calling -

218. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 56 (argument of John A. Campbell and J.Q.A. Fellows for
plaintiffs). Plaintiffs also argued that the law violated their rights under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's opinion is best known for its
disposition of that claim, which rendered the Privileges and Immunities Clause virtually in
consequential. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 73-75 (holding that the "privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States" are limited to a narrow category of rights uniquely associated
with the relationship between the individual citizen and the federal government).
219. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81. Justice Miller's majority opinion, which spanned 26
pages in the United States Reports, devoted only two paragraphs to the plaintiffs' equal pro
tection claim, and the explanation it gave for the Court's rejection of that claim was some
what curious. Miller began by asserting that the historical events leading up to the enactment
of the Fourteenth Amendment indicated that "the evil to be remedied by" the Equal Protec
tion Clause was "[t]he existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes
resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class." 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81. He therefore expressed "doubt . . . whether any action of a State not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81. But
he expressly reserved judgment on that issue. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81 (asserting that "we
may safely leave that matter" for another day). He then went on to reject the plaintiffs'
equal protection claim on a very different ground: that the clause applied only to "case[s] of
State oppression, by denial of equal justice in its courts," which was not the situation in the
case before the Court. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81.
At this early stage, Justice Miller apparently did not see the connection between the
Equal Protection Clause and the antebellum tradition against unequal or partial laws. But I
do not believe Miller's offhand remarks here are entitled to much weight in any effort to
reconstruct the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause. In the first place, his
assertion that the clause was intended only to reach discrimination against Blacks is impossi
ble to reconcile with the actual historical record, which leaves no doubt that the framers and
ratifiers meant it to protect White Unionists in the South as well. See supra text accompany
ing notes 163-67; see also NELSON, supra note 7, at 163 (calling Miller's assertion "flatly in
consistent with the history of its framing in Congress and its ratification by the state
legislatures"); Yudof, supra note 10, at 1396-97 (calling it "in complete disregard of history").
In the second place, Miller himself later den!ed that he had intended his Slaughter-House
dictum to suggest that the clause applied only to discrimination against Blacks. See CHARLES
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 186-87 (1939) (quoting Miller's
comments during oral argument in a subsequent equal protection case). Under these circum
stances, I believe the best explanation for Miller's Slaughter-House dictum is that it was sim
ply wrong, and that he and the rest of the Court quickly came to this realization.
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against state interference.220 But a careful reading of the dissent
reveals that Field also objected to the law at issue because it vio
lated a principle of equality before the law that he believed to be
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.221 He repeatedly charac
terized the law as one that singled out a small group of persons for a
special privilege without adequate justification.222 Such a law, he
said, ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because the latter
"inhibit[s] any legislation which confers special and exclusive privi
leges"223 and gives every citizen the right "to pursue his happiness
. . . unrestrained, except by just, equal, and impartial laws. "224 Field
did not specifically identify the Equal Protection Clause as the
source of this limitation, and much of his language suggests that he
found it in the Privileges and Immunities Clause instead.225 Justice
Bradley's dissent was more specific: "[A] law which prohibits a
large class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment," wrote
Bradley, "deprives those citizens of the equal protection of the
laws."226
220. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96-100 (Field, J., dissenting) (citing
the rights listed in Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)). This portion of Field's dissent is often cited as the first
suggestion of what would become the substantive due process jurisprudence of the Lochner
era. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE LAw IN AMERICA 104 (1974); Roscoe Pound, Lib
erty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 479 (1909).
221. Other commentators have also noted the strong emphasis on equality in Field's
opinion. See GILLMAN, supra note 11, at 66; NELSON, supra note 7, at 156-58; Harrison, supra
note 9, at 1466-67; Kay, supra note 68, at 676; Yudof, supra note 10, at 1397.
222. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 87 (Field, J., dissenting)
(calling the statute "a mere grant
of special and exclusive privileges by which the health of
the city is in no way promoted"}; 83 U.S. (16 Wall.} at 88-89 (Field, J., dissenting) (describing
the law as "the naked case, unaccompanied by any public considerations, where a right to
pursue a lawful and necessary calling
is . . . vested exclusively for twenty-five years
in a
single corporation").
223. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 93 (Field, J., dissenting).
224. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 111 (Field, J., dissenting). To support his assertion that the right
"to be free from disparaging and unequal enactments" was a "fundamental" one, Field cited
three state court cases. See 83 U.S. at 106-09 (citing City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90
(1867); Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 18 (1856); Mayor of Hud
son v. Thome, 7 Paige Ch. 261 (N.Y. 1838)).
225. For example, Field wrote that "equality of right, with exemption from all disparaging
and partial enactments, in the lawful pursuits of life
is the distinguishing privilege of
citizens of the United States." The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 109-10
(Field, J., dissenting). For an argument that Field originally understood the Privileges and
Immunities Clause to serve as a general antidiscrimination provision, see CURRIE, supra note
9, at 346-51. But see Kay, supra note 68, at 676 n.33 (suggesting that Field saw the three
clauses of section 1 as together comprising a single guarantee against state interference with
certain fundamental rights of free men, one of which was the right to equality before the
law).
226. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (Wall.) at 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting). As Jus
tice Bradley further explained in a related case 10 years later, it is a "denial of the equal
protection of the laws to grant to one man, or set of men, the privilege of following an ordi
nary calling in a large community, and to deny it to all others." Butchers' Union Slaughter. • .

. • .
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By the early 1880s, Justices Field and Bradley were describing
the Equal Protection Clause as a general prohibition against partial
or special laws. In 1882, Field wrote that the clause "stands in the
constitution as a perpetual shield against all unequal and partial leg
islation by the states,"227 ensuring " 'that the law which operates
upon one man shall operate equally upon all.' "228 In 1882, Field
declared that the clause was designed "to prevent hostile and dis
criminating State legislation against any person or class of per
sons.''229 In 1883, Justice Bradley said that "[w]hat is called class
legislation" is "obnoxious to the prohibitions of" the Equal Protec
tion Clause.230 In 1888, Field said the clause "prohibit[s] discrimi
nating and partial legislation by any State in favor of particular
persons as against others in like condition."231
Field's opinion for the Court in Barbier v. Connolly,232 which
upheld against equal protection challenge a municipal ordinance
subjecting laundries in certain designated areas of San Francisco to
special restrictions, reads like a classic statement of the antebellum
doctrine against partial or special laws.233 The Equal Protection
Clause, said Field, prohibits "[c]lass legislation, discriminating
House and Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter
House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 766 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring).
227. County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722, 741 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (Field,
J.).
228. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. at 739 (Field, J.) (quoting Thaddeus Stevens presenting the
Fourteenth Amendment to the House, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866)).
Like the antebellum state courts, Field stressed that equal laws were essential to the preser
vation of liberty:
When burdens are placed upon particular classes or individuals, while the majority of the
people are exempted, little heed may be paid to the complaints of those affected. Op
pression thus becomes possible and lasting. But a burdensome law operating equally
upon all will soon create a movement for its repeal. With the amendment enforced, a
bad or oppressive state law will not long be left on any statute book.
Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. at 741. At this time, however, Field apparently believed that the
clause mandated equality only with respect to civil, as opposed to political, rights. See Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 367-68 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting).
229. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1882).
230. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883). As an example of such class legisla
tion, Justice Bradley cited a law "denying to any person, or class of persons, the right to
pursue any peaceful avocations allowed to others," 109 U.S. at 23-24, an obvious reference to
the law at issue in The Slaughter-House Cases.
231. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1889); see also 129 U.S.
at 29 ("Equality of protection implies not merely equal accessibility to the courts for the
prevention or redress of wrongs and the enforcement of rights, but equal exemption with
others in like condition from charges and liabilities of every kind.").
232. 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
233. Indeed, in several opinions from this period, the Court actually cited antebellum
state cases to explain its equal protection holding. See, e.g., Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 156 (1897) (quoting Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 230, 270 (1829)
("[E]very partial or private law . . . is unconstitutional and void")); Catting v. Kansas City
Stock Yards, 183 U.S. 79, 105 (1901) (same).
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against some and favoring others," but not "legislation which, in
carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application" to certain
individuals or groups.234 Because "[s]pecial burdens are often nec
essary for general benefits," he reasoned, the clause tolerates laws
that "press with more or less weight upon one than upon another,"
so long as they "are designed, not to impose unequal or unneces
sary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little individ
ual inconvenience as possible, the general good. "235
That the Supreme Court recognized early on that the Equal
Protection Clause was designed to constitutionalize the antebellum
doctrine against partial or special laws helps to explain many of the
unexplained - and otherwise puzzling - conclusions that it
reached in its early equal protection cases.236 First, it explains why
the Court held, early on, that the clause was concerned not just with
state action discriminating against African Americans, but with
state action singling out any group of persons for special benefits or
burdens.237 Modem constitutionalists often accuse the Court of
failing adequately to explain this holding.238 Once the Court had
indicated that the clause constitutionalized the antebellum doctrine
against partial or special laws, though, it had no need to explain
why the clause was not limited to discrimination against African
Americans, for the antebellum doctrine had not been so limited.
Second, it explains why the Court assumed that the clause ap
plies only to state action that singled out a particular group of per
sons for special benefits or burdens, an assumption that, though not
obvious from the constitutional text itself, was a constant - if often
unarticulated - theme in its early race cases, from Strauder v. West

234. See Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32.
235. 113 U.S. at 31-32.
236. Cf. Yudof, supra note 10, at 1383 (noting that "one should not underestimate the
impact of the historical roots of equality under law on modem equal protection theory").
237. While the Court hinted in its first Equal Protection Clause case that the clause might
apply only to discrimination against African Americans, see The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) (dictum) ("We doubt very much whether any action of a State
not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class . . . on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within [its] purview."), it soon repudiated that view, see
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 382 (1898).
238. See, e.g., CuRRIE, supra note 9, at 390; DAVID P. CrnmIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CoURr. THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 41 (1990).
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Virginia239 and Pace v. Alabama24o through Yick Wo v. Hopkins241
and Plessy v. Ferguson.242 The assumption makes perfect sense if
the clause was patterned on the antebellum doctrine, for the use of
governmental power to single out certain persons for special bene
fits or burdens was the evil with which that doctrine had been
concerned.243
Third, it explains why the Court did not interpret the clause as
altogether forbidding the state to single out certain groups for spe
cial benefits and burdens, but as merely forbidding it to do so with
out adequate justification.244 Modern commentators often assume
that the Court did this for no reason other than practical necessity,
"to avoid the absurd conclusion that there could be no classifica
tions at all."24s But if, as I have asserted, the Court understood the
clause to nationalize the antebellum tradition, then its decision to
incorporate this most basic aspect of that tradition is perfectly un239. 100 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1879) (explaining that a law implicated the Equal Protection
Clause because it singled out African Americans as a class for the special disadvantage of
being tried by a jury from which members of their own race had been excluded).
240. 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1882) (holding that a Jaw did not implicate the Equal Protection
Clause because it did not "discriminat[e] against" any class of persons but applied equally to
all).
241. 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (explaining that a Jaw which was "fair" and "impartial"
on its face could yet implicate the Equal Protection Clause if it was "applied and adminis
tered by public authority with . . . an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances").
242. 163 U.S. 537, 543-52 (1896) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a state law
requiring segregation of the races on passenger trains on the ground that it did not subject
any class of persons to unequal treatment).
243. Most of the antebellum cases condemning partial or special laws defined those laws
solely by reference to their discriminatory operation or effect. See, e.g., Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me.
326, 336 (1825) (defining a special law as one "granting a privilege and indulgence to one
man, by way of exemption from the operation and effect of [a] general law, leaving all other
persons under its operation" (emphasis added)); Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 593, 606-07
(1863) (using "class legislation" to describe a law whose "operation is limited to . . . certain
classes of persons" (emphasis added)); Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 58, 77-78
(1836) (defining a partial or special Jaw as one which is "restricted in its operation" to certain
persons (emphasis added)); Bank of Tenn. v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 606-08 (1831)
(Green, J.) (defining a partial law as one that is not "general in its operation, affecting all
alike" and "operating equally on all" (emphasis added)); Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn.
(2 Yer.) 554, 556 (1831) (defining a partial law as one which is "limited in its operation
to
a very few individuals" (emphasis added)). Occasionally, a court would also make reference
to the fact that the discriminatory effect had been intended. See, e.g., Vanzant v. Waddell, 10
Tenn. (2 Yer.) 259, 269 (Peck, J.) (describing a partial law as one "which is partial in its
operation, intended to affect particular individuals alone" (emphasis added)). But none of
the antebellum cases contain any suggestion that discriminatory intent, standing alone - that
is, without discriminatory effect - would raise constitutional concerns.
244. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205, 210 (1888); Soon Hing v. Crow
ley, 113 U.S. 703, 708 (1885); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30-31 (1885).
245. CuRRIE, supra note 9, at 392; see also Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Supreme Court and
Equality: Legislative Classifications, Desegregation, and Reverse Discrimination, 62 CORNELL
L. REv. 494, 499-500 (1977) ; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 11, at 343-44.
. . •
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derstandable. Equally understandable is the standard the Court
adopted for deciding when state action singling out certain groups
for different treatment is permissible and when it is not. Modern
commentators often describe this standard as a general "reasona
bleness" test, which confers "unconstrained discretion" upon
judges, allowing them to decide cases on the basis of nothing more
than their own "ad hoc policy preferences."246 In truth, however,
the standard is a good deal more principled than that: like its ante
bellum predecessor, it requires the state to justify decisions to single
out particular individuals for special benefits or burdens as advanc
ing the interests of the public as a whole, rather than the special
interests of a particular group.247
In short, many of the foundational principles of orthodox equal
protection jurisprudence can be traced to nineteenth-century ju
rists' recognition that the framers and ratifiers of the clause in
tended merely to nationalize, with some modifications, the
antebellum state constitutional doctrine against partial or special
laws. Of course, understanding that the Equal Protection Clause
was patterned on this preexisting doctrine does not answer many of
the hard questions that plague modern equal protection jurispru
dence.248 The doctrine had been in existence less than half a cen
tury when it was incorporated into the federal Constitution, and
many of its details had yet to be worked out. But on the question of
the basic evil at which the Equal Protection Clause was aimed, its
state-law background offers solid guidance: the clause was aiip.ed at
state action that had the effect of singling out certain classes of per
sons for special benefits or burdens and not at state action that was
246. Kuu., supra note 133, at 5; see also id. at 115-18, 130, 210 (discussing the standard as
a "reasonableness" test); Dixon, supra note 245, at 533 & n.208 (asserting that the stirndard
gives the Court "unprincipled discretion" and "an uninfonned power to play god with the
politics of the people"); Van Alstyne, supra note 110, at 797 (calling the standard "a sieve").
247. See Bennett, supra note 69, at 1077-88; Kay, supra note 68, at 685-86; Sunstein, Na
ked Preferences, supra note 34, at 1712-13; Sunstein, supra note 68, at 131, 134-35, 164-65;
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 11, at 365. In the Court's language, discrimination which
cannot be justified in this manner is labelled "invidious," "arbitrary," or "irrational." See
Sunstein, supra note 68, at 135, 165. Even the Court's recent affinnative action decisions
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) and City ofRichmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
can be explained as efforts to implement this public values stan
dard. See David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 1
(1995).
248. For example, the antebellum case law does not tell us when, if ever, the need to
compensate for the effects of past official discrimination can justify so-called "reverse dis
crimination." While the antebellum state courts made clear that discrimination cannot be
justified on the grounds of simple favoritism or hostility, they never addressed the question
whether compensating for past discrimination was a legitimate public purpose justification.
-

-
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somehow "infected" by consideration of race or other illegitimate
personal characteristics.
B.

In the

The Middle Years: Lost But Not Forgotten

early twentieth century, the Equal Protection Clause fell

into disuse, becoming the "last resort of constitutional argu
ments."249 When the clause finally emerged from this period of rel
ative dormancy in 1938, Cooley, Field, and Bradley were being
vilified for their role in the development of economic substantive
due process,25o their aversion to partial or class legislation was asso
ciated with the worst excesses of the Lochner era,251 and their in
sight about the intended meaning of the Equal Protection Clause
had been forgotten.

As a result, this important aspect of the

clause's background has been lost to modem interpreters.
Until the racial gerrymandering cases of the 1990s, however, this
loss did not result in any serious distortion of the Court's equal pro
tection jurisprudence. The cornerstones of that jurisprudence, laid
in the nineteenth century, reflected the original understanding. The
elaborate doctrinal structure that the Court built upon those cor
nerstones in the middle years of the twentieth century was also
fully, though perhaps not always consciously, consistent with that
understanding.252 During this period, the Court expanded the defi
nition of "state action,"253 introduced the concept of "suspect" clas
sifications,254 announced the requirement of discriminatory
"intent" or "purpose,"255 and settled into a rigid multi-tiered stan249. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927); see CuruuE, supra note 238, at 136.
250. See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 77; Al.FRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE
AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 496-520 (1st ed. 1948); CARL B.
SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 520-21 (1st ed. 1943); BENJAMIN R.
TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CoNSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME
COURT (1942).
251. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 250.
252. For a general summary of the Court's equal protection work between 1938 and 1990,
see Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History ofModern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REv.
213 (1991).
253. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177-79 (1972); Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-81 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70
(1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509
(1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-65 (1944).
254. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 192 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
255. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Haus. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976).
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dard of review.256 Throughout this period, however, the Court re
mained faithful to the framers' understanding that the Equal
Protection Clause, like the state constitutional doctrine on which it
was patterned, was concerned only with state action that had the
effect of singling out certain persons for special benefits or burdens.
We can see this most clearly in two types of equal protection cases:
those involving challenges to electoral redistricting laws and those
involving challenges to race-based state action that has the superfi
cial appearance of treating the races equally.

In

the Court's early cases applying the clause in the context of

electoral districting, the notion that the Equal Protection Clause ap
plies only to state action that has the effect of singling out a particu
lar group for special benefits or burdens was a consistent theme.
When the Court first held a malapportionment claim cognizable
under the Equal Protection Clause, it explained that the challenged
apportionment statute was a "classification disfavor[ing] voters in
[certain] counties," by "placing them in a position of constitution
ally unjustifiable inequality vis-a-vis voters in [the] favored coun
ties. "257

When it announced that the Equal Protection Clause

required state legislatures to be apportioned on the basis of popula
tion, the Court reasoned that an apportionment plan "which give[s]
the same number of representatives to unequal numbers of constit
uents . . . discriminat[es] against" individual voters living in certain
"disfavored areas."258 Such a plan "dilut[es]" the weight of their
votes vis-a-vis those of voters in other parts of the state.259 When
256. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Or., 473 U.S. 432, 439·42 (1985); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973). See generally Gerald Gun
ther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972) (discussing development of equal protection
doctrine under the Burger Court); Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 3 (discussing
development of equal protection doctrine between 1949 and 1969). During this period, the
Court also experimented with the notion that the Equal Protection Clause offered special
protection to certain "fundamental" rights or interests. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 633-38 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-70 (1966);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-26 (1956). The Burger Court sharply curtailed this strand of
equal protection doctrine. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-55; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 483-87 (1970). As others have explained, Shapiro, Harper, Griffin, and the other so
called fundamental rights cases are not really equal protection cases at all. See Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 59-62 (Stewart, J., concurring); Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Judicial Supervision of
Legislative Classifications - A More Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 BYU L. REV.
89, 108-21; Lupu, supra note 11, at 1060-75; Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 19 CoLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1024, 1074-83 (1979).
257. Balcer v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962).
258. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964).
259. See 377 U.S. 533, 563-68; see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963) (hold
ing that the Equal Protection Clause requires that "all who participate in [an] election are to
have an equal vote," for it "visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those
who meet the basic qualifications"). While Reynolds is often described as a fundamental

November

1997]

Equal Protection

303

the Court held that a multi-member districting scheme that gave
substantially equal weight to the votes of all individuals could vio
late the Equal Protection Clause by "diluting" the voting strength
of certain racial groups, it demanded proof that the scheme would
give those groups "less opportunity than . . . other [voters] . . . to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice. "26o Finally, when it found claims of political gerrymander
ing cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court made
clear that such a claim required proof of "an actual discriminatory
effect" upon "an identifiable political group" - specifically, a
showing that the electoral system "substantially disadvantage[d]"
the members of that group in their ability to influence the political
process.261 Only then, said the Court, did the districting plan "dis
criminate" against those voters in the sense required to implicate
the Equal Protection Clause.262

In the Court's cases involving facially symmetrical racial dis
crimination, the notion that the Equal Protection Clause applies
only to state action that has the

effect

of singling out a particular

group of persons for special disadvantage was also a consistent
theme. It was, for example, a prominent feature of the Court's
opinion in

Brown v. Board of Education.263

Indeed, the very pur

pose of that opinion's reliance on social science data was to demon
strate that the segregation of African American schoolchildren had
the effect of singling out those children for special disadvantage,
rights case, see, e.g., Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 50 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Reynolds for the proposition that the right to vote is "fundamental"); McDonald v. Board of
Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 806 (1969) (same), its analysis falls more into the traditional classifi
cation model. See Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 3, at 1182.
260. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755, 766 (1973) (relying on Whitcomb in stating that plaintiff must prove that the scheme
"discriminate[s] against" a certain group of voters by making "the political processes leading
to nomination and election . . . not equally open to participation by th[at] group" and giving
its members "less opportunity than . . • other [voters] in the district to participate in the
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice"); Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73,
88 (1966) (stating that a plaintiff must prove that the scheme "minimize[s] or cancel[s] out the
voting strength of [certain] racial or political elements of the voting population" (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965))).

261. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127, 133 (1986) (White, J., plurality opinion).
262. See 478 U.S. at 127-34. Even those who would recast Gomillion v. Lightfoot as an

equal protection case, rather than a Fifteenth Amendment case, have focused on the fact that
the challenged act had the effect of singling out Black residents of the Tuskegee area for
special disadvantage vis-a-vis their White counterparts by denying them the benefits of resi
dence in the City of Tuskegee. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960)
(Whittaker, J., concurring) (arguing that the act raised equal protection problems because it
"fenc[ed] Negro citizens out of' the City of Tuskegee (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting language of majority opinion, see 364 U.S. at 341)). See generally Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 658-75 (1993) ("Shaw I") (White, J., dissenting).

263. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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even when the education provided them was equal in all tangible
respects to that provided to White children.264 The post Brown per
curiam decisions, which jnvalidated racial segregation in other pub
lic facilities, temporarily obscured this aspect of Brown, for they did
not make any effort to explain why segregation had a similar effect
on African Americans in these different contexts .265 But a ration
ale for those decisions soon emerged that was fully consistent with
the original understanding: the system of racial segregation then
being practiced, viewed in social and historical context, singled out
African Americans for the special burden of stigmatization by im
plying that they were not fit to mix with the White majority.266
Most modern constitutionalists now understand this to be the un
spoken theory behind Brown itself.267 On this view, Brown and its
progeny did not reject Plessy v. Ferguson's understanding of the ba
sic concept embodied in the Equal Protection Clause - that it ap
plies only to state action that singles out a certain class for special
disadvantage - but only its understanding of the actual effect that
racial segregation had on African Americans.26s
-

264. See 347 U.S. at 494-95 & n.11 (citing various social science studies to support its
endorsement of a lower court finding that racial segregation in the public schools has "a
detrimental effect" upon African American children, for it gives them "a sense of inferiority"
which "has a tendency to [retard] the[ir] education and mental development"). Brown's reli·
ance on social science data has been widely criticized. See generally Bandemer, 478 U.S. at
127-34.
265. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (courtrooms); Turner
v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) (municipal airport restaurant); New
Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (public
parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (city buses); Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (public beaches and bathhouses).
266. Compare Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69
YALE L.J. 421, 429-30 & n.25 (1960) with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (assert
ing that laws requiring the "separation" of the races "do not necessarily imply the inferiority
of either race to the other") and 163 U.S. at 551 (asserting that state-mandated segregation
does not "stamp[ ] the colored race with a badge of inferiority").
267. See, e.g., BAER, supra note 11, at 114; CURRIE, supra note 238, at 377-78; TRIBE,
supra note 3, § 16-15, at 1477-78; Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword: In
Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1976); Lawrence,
supra note 8, at 350; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. REv. 1, 33 (1959); Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 3, at 1090. But see
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (''Jenkins Ill") (Thomas, J., concurring) (re
jecting the "stigma" explanation for Brown by asserting that "[s]egregation was not unconsti
tutional because it might have caused psychological feelings of inferiority," but because "the
State classified students based on their race").
268. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 16-15, at 1477 ("It was not the concept embodied in the
equal protection clause that changed between 1896 and 1954, but only our relevant percep
tions and understandings," for "the Court in 1954 understood, as the Plessy Court in 1896 did
.not, that racial segregation in public schools and other public facilities in fact subjugates
blacks, despite its appearance of symmetry, because it stands for and reenforces white
supremacy
"); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 836 (1992) (joint
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (explaining the Court's decision to overrule
.

.

.
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The Court's decisions in McLaughlin

v. Florida269 and Loving v.

Virginia210

also reflect the understanding that the Equal Protection
Clause applies only to state action that has the effect of singling out
a particular group for special disadvantage. In

McLaughlin,

the

Court invoked the clause to strike down a state law that forbade
cohabitation by unmarried couples of different races. To be sure,
the Court refused to hold that the law could not raise equal protec
tion concerns because it subjected both members of the interracial
couple to the same penalty.211 But the Court's holding that the law
actually did violate the clause turned on the fact that it singled out a
certain class of persons - interracial couples - for special disad
vantage because of their race,272 and that the State had not justified
this "discrimination" as "necessary . . . to the accomplishment of a
permissible state policy."273 In Loving, the Court invoked the
clause to strike down a state law criminalizing interracial mar
riage.274 Again, the Court rejected the argument that the law could
not raise equal protection concerns because it subjected both par
ties to an interracial marriage to the same punishment.275 Once
Plessy in Brown as based on its changed understanding of the implications of segregation);
EMPIRE 387-89 (1986).
269. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
270. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
271. See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188-91.
272. See 379 U.S. at 188 (stating that the statute "treats the interracial couple . . . differ
ently than it does any other couple"); 379 U.S. at 190 (noting that under the statute, "differ
ent treatment [is] accorded interracial and intraracial couples"); 379 U.S. at 192 (stating that
the statute "proscri[bes] . . . the specified conduct when engaged in by a white person and a
Negro, but not otherwise"); 379 U.S. at 193 (arguing that the statute "punish[es] [the] pro
miscuity of one racial group and not that of another," and subjects "the interracial couple" to
"separate or different treatment" than "the white or the Negro couple"); 379 U.S. at 194
(stating that the statute "lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the
same quality of offense" (citations omitted)); 379 U.S. at 196 (noting that the statute "singles
out the promiscuous interracial couple for special statutory treatment"); 379 U.S. at 198
(Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that the statute "discriminat[es]" by race, in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, because it "makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of
the actor"); see also Kuu, supra note 133, at 264 n.16 (conceding that the Court's opinion in
McLaughlin rested on the "[u]nequal treatment" of "members of racially determined
classes").
273. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196.
274. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12. The Court also found the statute invalid under the
Due Process Clause, as an unconstitutional interference with the fundamental right to marry.
See 388 U.S. at 12.
275. See 388 U.S. at 8-10. In so doing, the Court declared that "the mere 'equal applica
tion' of a statute containing racial classifications is [not] enough to remove the classifications
from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations," and
that "the fact of equal application does not immunize [a] statute" which "contain[s] racial
classifications" from "the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amend
ment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race." 388 U.S. at 8-9.
Modem advocates of colorblindness often read these comments as standing for the proposi
tion that a race-based law implicates the Equal Protection Clause even if it does not have the
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
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again, however, the Court's holding that the law violated the clause
turned on the fact that it singled out a certain class of persons interracial couples - for special disadvantage because of their race,
with no justification other than an illegitimate desire "to maintain
White Supremacy."276 The Court did not labor long to explain how
the statute did this, but it had no need to do so, for it had given the
explanation just one Term earlier in McLaughlin. 277

Anderson v. Martin27B also reveals the Court's understanding
that a showing of discriminatory effect is required to establish an
equal protection violation. In that case, African-American candi
dates for office in Louisiana brought an equal protection challenge
to a state statute that required designation of every candidate's race
on the ballot in all state or local elections for public office. The
Court held that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause,
even though it applied to candidates of all races, because it actually
"operate[d] as a discrimination against" African American candi
dates.279 As the Court explained, "by placing a racial label on a
candidate at the most crucial stage in the electoral process," the
state "indicates that a candidate's race or color is an important perhaps paramount - consideration in the citizen's choice, which
may . . . influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial lines . "280
effect of singling out a particular group for special disadvantage because of their race. See,
e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (Kennedy, J.) (citing Loving for the proposition
that "racial classifications do not become legitimate [because] all persons suffer them in equal
degree"). But Loving itself was not such a case; as the Court noted several times, the law in
question there, like the one invalidated in McLaughlin, did in fact single out a certain class of
persons for special disadvantage because of their race: a class comprised of interracial
couples. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 10 (stating that the law "defin[es] offenses based on racial
classifications"); 388 U.S. at 11 (noting that the law "proscribe[s] generally accepted conduct
if engaged in by members of different races"); 388 U.S. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting
that the law "makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor" (citing his
dissent in McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 198)).
276. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11; see also KuLL, supra note 133, at 171 (conceding that Loving
does not stand for the proposition that the Equal Protection Clause forbids all race-based
state action).
277. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), exhibits the same reasoning. The Court held
that a state violated the �qua! protection rights of a divorcee when it stripped her of custody
over her child solely because of her remarriage to a man of a different race. The Court
explained that the state's action "discriminat[ed]" against the woman "based on [her] race,"
by singling her out for a special disadvantage - denial of custody, even though she satisfied
the normal requirements for custody - because she was of a different race than her new
husband. See 466 U.S. at 432 (stating that "it is clear that the outcome would have been
different had petitioner married a Caucasian male of similar respectability"). But see KULL,
supra note 133, at 264 n.16 (asserting that the holding in Palmore "resists conventional equal
protection analysis" because of the "logical awkwardness" of identifying the "racially deter
mined classes" that are being "den[ied] equal treatment").
278. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
279. 375 U.S. at 402.
280. 375 U.S. at 402.
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Such a system is "likely," given "private attitudes and pressures to
wards Negroes," to result in candidates of the majority race - the
White race - being "favored" or "preferred" over their Black
counterparts.281 The Court concluded that the statute accom
plished "by indirection," through " 'the interplay of governmental'
and private action,' " that which the state could not do directly:
singling out African Americans for special disadvantage in running
for public office.282 While Anderson goes a step beyond McLaugh
lin and Loving in suggesting that discriminatory effect can be found
in the interplay between state action and private prejudice, it does
not deviate from the fundamental assumption that a showing of dis
criminatory effect is necessary to make out an equal protection
violation.
The Court's "suspect classification" doctrine can also be seen as
consistent with the understanding that the Equal Protection Clause
was intended to reach only state action that has the effect of singling
out a particular group of persons for special benefits or burdens.283
The Court first introduced the "suspect classification" language in a
case where the governmental action under challenge obviously did
have such a discriminatory effect.284 As others have explained, the
heightened scrutiny this language mandates is in reality nothing but
an evidentiary device, designed to facilitate judicial identification of
instances of special treatment that lack an adequate public purpose
justification.28s Proof that the state has used a "suspect" or "quasi281. See 375 U.S. at 402-03 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Palmore, 466 U.S.
at 433 ("Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.").
282. See Anderson, 375 U.S. at 403-04 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463
(1958)).
283. The term "suspect classification" derives from Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944), in which the· Court declared in dictum that "all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect," and that "courts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny." 323 U.S. at 216; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954) (citing Korematsu for the proposition that racial classifications are "constitutionally
suspect"). While the Court decided Korematsu and Bolling under the Fifth Amendment, the
Court soon transposed their suspect classification language to the Fourteenth Amendment
context. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (stating that under the Four
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, any "classification based upon . . . race" is
"constitutionally suspect, and subject to the most rigid scrutiny" (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (citing Korematsu for the
proposition that "the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be sub
jected to the most rigid scrutiny" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

284. See Korematsu, 323 U.S.
cans from certain areas).

214 (addressing the practice of excluding Japanese Ameri

285. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 147 (1980); Bennett, supra note
69, at 1077; Perry, supra note 256, at 1033-36; Sunstein, supra note 68, at 140-43; Tussman &
tenBroek, supra note 11, at 356.
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suspect" criterion to identify a group of persons being singled out
for special benefits or burdens triggers a presumption that the dis
crimination does not have an adequate public purpose justification,
a presumption that the state can then rebut by demonstrating that
the discrimination does in fact serve a "compelling" or "important"
state interest.286 Courts apply the presumption in these situations
because our common experience tells us that they are situations in
which the special treatment is particularly likely to be motivated by
prejudice or favoritism rather than by a legitimate desire to further
the overall public good.287 But what is "suspected" is thaf the state
has chosen to single out the persons in question for special benefits
or burdens without an adequate public purpose justification, not
that the state has dealt with them as members of racial, ethnic, or
other "suspect" classes rather than as individuals.
Nor are Washington v. Davis288 and its progeny necessarily in
consistent with the traditional understanding that only state action
that has the effect of singling out a particular class for special disad
vantage implicates the Equal Protection Clause.289 In the Davis
line, the Court held that a person cannot make out an equal protec
tion claim simply by alleging such a discriminatory effect; an allega
tion of discriminatory "intent" or "purpose" is also required.290
But the Court did not say that an allegation of discriminatory effect
was not necessary to state an equal protection claim, only that such
an allegation was not sufficient, standing alone, to do so.291 To read
286. See Bennett, supra note 69, at 1077 (arguing that "[t]he 'suspicion' of suspect classifi
cations in two-tiered equal protection [analysis] . . . acts as a kind of presumption of forbid
den purpose," and that "[t]he requirement that a compelling state interest be shown is mainly
an opportunity to rebut the presumed illegitimate purpose"); Sunstein, supra note 68, at 14043.
287. See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 140 (arguing that the Court's doctrine requires the
application of heightened scrutiny when there is "an unusual likelihood" that the discrimina
tion in question is "not [ ] an attempt to promote a public value"); id. at 143 (arguing that
"the device of heightened scrutiny reflects skepticism that a public value is in fact being
served and represents a presumption that the public justification is a facade, serving to con
ceal the actual basis for the classification").
288. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
289. While the narrow holding of Davis that discriminatory effect alone is not actiona·
ble, absent a showing of discriminatory intent, see 426 U.S. 229
was not compelled by the
antebellum case law, neither was it inconsistent with it. As noted earlier, the antebellum
courts did not squarely address the question of whether a law that had the effect of singling
out a certain class for special benefits or burdens would raise constitutional concerns even if
that effect had not been intended by its drafters. See supra note 243.
290. See Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74 (1979); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Davis, 426 U.S. at 23940. While Davis actually involved the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, see 426 U.S. at 239, its successors were Fourteenth Amendment cases.
291. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 ("[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a
law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory pur-

-
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this language as suggesting that a discriminatory effect is also not

necessary is to commit a basic logical error by ignoring the differ
ence between "necessary" and "sufficient" conditions.292

Washington v. Davis and its progeny did, however, mark the be
ginning of a new era in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence
- an era characterized by an increasing tendency to forget that the
basic evil at which the clause aims is the practice of singling out
certain persons for special benefits or burdens without adequate
justification, and to see it instead as aimed at purging governmental
decisionmaking of certain illegitimate considerations.293 This ten
dency first manifested itself in the gender discrimination cases of
the late 1970s and early 1980s, which contain repeated assertions
that a state cannot justify its decision to single out a particular
group of persons for special benefits or burdens by reference to
"stereotypical" assumptions about the characteristics and abilities
of individual members of that group.2?4 In the jury selection and
pose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact."); 426 U.S.
at 242 ("Disproportionate impact
is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimi
nation forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial
classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny." (emphasis added and citation
omitted)); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-65 (stating that under Davis, "official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact,"
for "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required" (emphasis added));
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260 (citing Davis for holding "that a neutral law does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact, but
that instead the disproportionate impact must be traced to a purpose to discriminate on the
basis of race" (emphasis added)).
292. See ROBERT BAUM, Lome 498-501 (2d ed. 1981). Indeed, later cases in the Davis
line seemed to assume that a showing of discriminatory effect remained an essential element
of an equal protection claim. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (stating
that an equal protection claim requires proof "that the purposeful discrimination 'had a dis
criminatory effecf " (emphasis added)); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (stating that the discrimina
tory purpose requirement needs proof "that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group" (emphasis added)).
293. Davis touched off a flurry of academic commentary suggesting that the Equal Pro
tection Clause should be read to invalidate any governmental action shown to have been
infected by racial prejudice or some other illegitimate motivation, whether or not it had the
effect of singling out any identifiable class or persons for special disadvantage. See, e.g., Larry
G. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Action: A Motivation Theory of the Constitu
tional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041 (1978). Michael Klar
man calls this the "legislative inputs" approach to the Equal Protection Clause. Klarman
argues that this explains both the Burger Court's gender discrimination cases and the Rehn
quist Court's affirmative action cases. See Klarman, supra note 252, at 284-85, 295-318.
294. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (noting that a
state may not justify gender discrimination by reference to "archaic and overbroad assump
tions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes"); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,
266 n.24 (1983) (noting that a state may not justify gender discrimination based on "an invidi
ous and indefensible stereotype"); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725
(1982) (disallowing a state's justification of gender discrimination based on "archaic and ster
eotypic notions" about the proper roles of the sexes); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that a state may not defend gender discrimina. • .
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affirmative action cases of the late 1980s and early 1990s, certain
members of the Court transformed it into the broader assertion that
the Equal Protection Clause forbids the state to deal with people on
the basis of "stereotypical" assumptions predicated on their mem
bership in certain racial, sexual, or other groups.295 This theme
went largely unnoticed when it first appeared, for it was introduced
in cases challenging state action that obviously did have the effect
of singling out an identifiable group of persons for special benefits
or burdens.296 In the racial gerrymandering cases of the last few
Terms, however, this misguided notion that the Equal Protection
Clause was designed to require the state to treat people as individu
als, rather than as members of groups defined by certain "immuta
ble" characteristics, has worked serious mischief. It is to those
cases that I now turn.

tion based on "stereotyped assumptions about the proper roles and the relative capabilities
of men and women," even when "the generalizations they reflect may be true of the majority
of the members of the class").
have an
295. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994) ("[P]otential jurors
equal protection right to jury selection procedures that are free from state-sponsored group
stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice."); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("At the heart of the Constitution's guar
antee of equal protection lies the simple command that the government must treat citizens as
individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class." (inter
nal quotation marks omitted)); 497 U.S. at 604 {O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause forbids the Gov
ernment to "embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating
their thoughts and efforts - their very worth as citizens - according to [that] criterion");
secur[es] to
497 U.S. at 609 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The right to equal protection
each individual an immunity from treatment predicated simply on membership in a particular
racial or ethnic group."); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 514-15 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that the "hallmark"
of an equal protection violation is "stereotypical analysis"); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
104 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[T)he Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State from
taking any actions based on crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes . . . ." (emphasis added)).
• • •

•

.

•

296. Batson, for example, involved an Equal Protection challenge to the use of peremp
tory strikes to exclude otherwise-qualified members of a particular racial group from a partic
ular petit jury. See 476 U.S. 469. This practice obviously had the effect of singling out those
persons for special disadvantage. Croson involved an equal protection challenge to a city's
practice of setting aside a certain percentage of its contracting work for minority-owned busi
nesses. See 488 U.S. 469. The practice subjected White contractors to special disadvantage
by denying them an opportunity to compete for business which was granted to others. See
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 681 (1993) ("Shaw I") (Souter, J., dissenting). Metro Broadcast·
ing involved an equal protection challenge to the FCC's policy of giving minorities special
preferences in awarding broadcast licenses. See 497 U.S. 547. This policy again subjected
White applicants to a special disadvantage, by denying them the right to compete for licenses
on an equal footing with other applicants. Cf. Associated Gen. Contractors of America v.
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 657 (1993) (explaining that race-based preference programs single
out the class of persons not entitled to the preference for special disadvantage by denying
them the ability "to compete on an equal footing" with other candidates).

November

IV.

1997]

THE

RACIAL

Equal Protection

311

GERRYMANDERING CASES OF THE 1990s: THE
TRADmoN ABANDONED

In this part, I argue that the Court's decisions in the recent ra
cial gerrymandering cases adopt an interpretation of the Equal Pro
tection Clause that deviates from the original understanding in a
subtle but significant fashion. In these cases, the Court has read the
clause as giving all persons a substantive constitutional right not to
have the state deal with them on the basis of their race, even when
doing so does not result in their being singled out for any special
disadvantage because of their race. If this right has any constitu
tional foundation at all, I argue, it lies not in the Equal Protection
Clause, but in the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause.
The racial gerrymandering cases came to the Court at the height
of the post-Croson enthusiasm for equal protection challenges to
race-based preference programs. Unlike Croson and the other af
firmative action cases, however, these cases presented equal protec
tion challenges to state action that, though clearly race-conscious,
did not appear to single out any identifiable class of persons for
special benefits or burdens.297 The dissenting Justices sensed this
difficulty from the outset but were unable to articulate it very pre
cisely, arguing variously that the plaintiffs had not stated a valid
equal protection claim because they had not alleged a "cognizable
injury,"298 a "cognizable harm,"299 the requisite "discriminatory ef
fect,"30o or that the laws in question "discriminated against" any
297. Appearances can, of course, be deceptive: it is entirely possible that the electoral
redistricting plans at issue in these cases, viewed in proper perspective, did in fact have such a
discriminatory effect. I do not attempt to deal with that question here. For my purposes, it is .
sufficient to note that the laws did not appear to have a discriminatory effect, and that the
majority made no effort to demonstrate that they did. See The Supreme Court, 1992 Term Leading Cases, 107 HARv. L. REv. 144, 195 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 Term] (stating that the
Shaw I majority "did not contend that the state plan treated anyone unequally"); id. at 202
(stating that the Shaw I majority "did not contend that the North Carolina reapportionment
plan used race to single some people out for disadvantageous treatment"). For the argument
that this appearance is consistent with reality, see Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 2000-03
(1996) (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct.
1894, 1907-12 (1996) ("Shaw II") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
298. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (asserting that the plaintiffs have not alleged a "cognizable injury"); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 929 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 659
(White, J., dissenting) (same).
299. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 684 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that the plaintiffs have
not alleged a "cognizable harm").
300. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 663 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiffs have
not shown the "discriminatory effects" which are "a 'threshold requirement' " for an equal
protection claim); 509 U.S. at 666 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiffs have not
alleged "the requisite discriminatory effects"); 509 U.S. at 682 (Souter, J., dissenting) (argu
ing that the plaintiffs have not alleged the "coincidence of disadvantageous effect and illegiti
mate purpose" that is "characteristic" of an equal protection violation).
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identifiable person or group.301 Early scholarly criticism tended to
describe the problem as one of the plaintiffs' "standing."302 But this
description obscured as much as it illuminated, for it suggested that
the problem was not with the nature of the claim, but simply with
who was asserting it, and that it could be cured by doing nothing
more than substituting a different plaintiff.303
By last Term, however, Justices Stevens and Souter - joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer - were explicitly arguing that the
challenged laws did not implicate the Equal Protection Clause at all
because they did not single out any identifiable group of persons for
special disadvantage.304 Justice Stevens made the point quite
clearly in his dissent in Shaw IL· "Even if an objection to a State's
decision to forego color-blind districting is cognizable under some
constitutional provision," wrote Stevens, "I do not understand why
that provision should be the Equal Protection Clause," for "that
Clause protects against wrongs which by definition burden some
persons but not others," and "it appears that no individual has been
burdened more than any other" here.305 "[T]he claimed violation
of a shared right to a color-blind districting process would not seem
to implicate the Equal Protection Clause at all," he continued, "pre
cisely because it rests neither on a challenge to the State's decision
301. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 663-64 {White, J., dissenting) (arguing that "th[is] classifica·
tion based on race [does not) discriminate[ ] against anyone"); 509 U.S. at 666-67 {White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiffs "cannot complain of discriminatory treatment"); see
also Hays, 515 U.S. at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that "[t]he major
ity fails to explain coherently how a State discriminates invidiously by deliberately joining
members of different races in the same district"); Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 681 (Souter, J., dissent
ing) (arguing that this plan does not "use . . . race to the advantage of one person • . . at the
obvious expense of a member of a different race").
302. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 641-43 (1993); Pamela S.
Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 278 [hereinafter Karlan, All Over the Map]; Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These
Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CuMB. L. REV. 287, 289-91 {1995-96) [hereinaf
ter Karlan, Still Hazy]; Brian R. Markley, Comment, Constitutional Provisions in Conflict:
Article III Standing and Equal Protection After Shaw v. Reno, 43 KAN. L. REV. 449 {1995);
see also Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in Racial Gerry
mandering Claims, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 47, 54-58 {1996).
303. The Supreme Court continues to insist that the standing inquiry is analytically dis
tinct from the question of the validity of the plaintiffs cause of action. See, e.g., Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 {1975). But see William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98
YALE LJ. 221, 223 (1988) (arguing that standing "should simply be a question of the merits
of plaintiffs claim"); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 37, 51-62 (argu
ing that standing analysis should be linked to the underlying cause of action).

304. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1977-78 (1996) (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg
and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); 116 S. Ct. at 1997-2006 {Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and
Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1908-12 (1996) ("Shaw II") (Stevens,
J., dissenting); 116 S. Ct. at 1923 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
305. Shaw II, 116 S. Ct.

at

1909

(Stevens,

J., dissenting).
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to distribute burdens and benefits unequally, nor on a claim that the
State's formally equal treatment of its citizens in fact stamps per
sons of one race with a badge of inferiority."306
Justice Souter made a similar point in his dissent in Bush v.
Vera. 3o1 Shaw I, he wrote, "broke abruptly" with the long-standing
understanding that the Equal Protection Clause is "a practical guar
antee against harm to some class singled out for disparate treat
ment."3os The claim recognized in Shaw I, he said, did not
"address[ ] any injury to members of a class subjected to differential
treatment, the standard presupposition of an equal protection viola
tion," but "a putative harm subject to complaint by any voter ob
jecting to an untoward consideration of race in the political
process."309 If this "harm is identifiable at all," he continued, it is
harm that "fall[s] on every citizen and every representative
alike."310
The majority has never responded directly to this criticism. In
stead, it has insisted that whenever a state legislature uses race as
"the dominant and controlling rationale" in drawing the lines of
electoral districts, "subordinat[ing] traditional race-neutral district
ing principles . . . to racial considerations," the resulting plan is sub
ject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, even if it
does not single out any identifiable group of voters for special dis
advantage because of their race.311 In so holding, the majority has
reasoned as follows: The Equal Protection Clause forbids the state
to "classify" persons on the basis of their race, at least in the ab
sence of compelling justification. When a state assigns voters to
electoral districts, it is "classifying" them for purposes of voting. If
306. 116 S. Ct. at 1909; see also Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1977 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Racial
gerrymandering of the sort being addressed in these cases is 'discrimination' only in the sense
that the lines are drawn based on race, not in the sense that harm is imposed on any specific
persons on account of their race.").
307. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
308. 116 S. Ct. at 2001 (Souter, J., dissenting).
309. 116 S. Ct. at 1998; see 116 S. Ct. at 2003, 2006 (stating that Shaw claims do not
involve "equal protection injury in the usual sense," for there is "no separably injured class").

310. 116 S. Ct. at 2002.
311. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913, 916 (1995); see Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1951-52
(O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion) (requiring the plaintiff to show that the state "
'subordinate[s]' " "other, legitimate districting principles . . . to race" in drawing districts);
116 S. Ct. at 1969 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that the plaintiff should have to show
that the state "subordinate[s] traditional districting criteria to the use of race"); Shaw II, 116
S. Ct. at 1900·02 (arguing that harm arises when a state uses race as "the 'dominant and
controlling' consideration" in "assigning voters to districts"); Miller, 515 U.S. at 928
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the plaintiff must show that the state "relie[s] on
race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices"); cf. Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646-47 (1993) ("Shaw I").
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the state takes race into account in making those assignments, it is
therefore "classifying" - or "discriminating" - by race, a practice
that violates the Equal Protection Clause unless shown to be neces
sary to a compelling state interest.312
The Court's logic seems, at :first blush, to be unassailable; in
deed, it seems so obvious that one wonders why no one thought to
challenge race-conscious redistricting under the Voting Rights Act
on this ground earlier. But the Court's argument depends on a sub
tle misuse of the terms "classify" and "discriminate," which are
terms of art in equal protection jurisprudence. In common par
lance, to "classify" means to arrange, sort, or divide into groups or
categories (called "classes"),313 and to "discriminate" means to dis
cern or perceive a difference between.314 In traditional equal pro
tection j urisprudence, however, the terms " classify" and
"discriminate" have much more specialized meanings. To "classify"
means to sort people into groups for differing benefits or burdens

312. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1951, 1960, 1963-64 (O'Connor, J.) {plurality opinion); 116 S.
Ct. at 1972-74 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Shaw II, 116 S.
Ct. at 1900-02; Miller, 515 U.S. at 904, 910-15; Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642-52; see also United
515 U.S. 737, 744 (1995).
313. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S TlilRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DicnONARY 417 (1976)

States v. Hays,

[herein
after WEBSTER'S] {defining the term as "to group or segregate in classes" or "sort" or "put
into a class, classification, or category"); 3 THE OXFORD ENousH DicnoNARY 283 (2d ed.
1989) {"To arrange or distribute in classes according to a method or system."). Similarly, a
"classification" is "the act or a method of classifying . • . of distributing into groups, classes, or
families: an assigning to a proper class: sorting." WEBSTER'S, supra, at 417; see 3 THE Ox.
FORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY, supra, at 283 ("The action of classifying or arranging in classes,
according to common characteristics or affinities; assignment to the proper class.").

314. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S, supra note 313, at 647-48 ("[T]o mark or perceive the distin
guishing or peculiar features of: recognize as being different from others . . . : distinguish
between or among."); 4 THE OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY, supra note 313, at 757-58 ("To
make or constitute a difference in or between; to distinguish [or] differentiate"). Similarly,
"discrimination" is "the act or an instance of . . • making or perceiving of a distinction or
difference... WEBSTER'S, supra note 313, at 648; see also 4 THE OXFORD ENOUSH DICTION·
ARY, supra note 313, at 758 {defining "discrimination" as "the action of • . . perceiving, not·
ing, or making a distinction or difference between things"); George Rutherglen,
Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 127-28 (1995) (defining "discrimina
tion" as "a process of noticing or marking a difference,'' of "recognizing, discerning, appreci
ating, or identifying a difference").
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under the law,315 and to "discriminate" means to single out for spe
cial benefits or burdens not accorded others.316
315. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 256, at 90 {defining "classify" as "to treat different
classes of people in different ways"); Sunstein, supra note 68, at 147-48 {defining "classify" as
to "treat[ ] one group differently from another" or to "single[ ] out for special treatment");
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 11, at 343-44 (defining "classify" as to "impose special bur
dens upon or grant special benefits to special groups or classes of individuals"); Develop
ments: Equal Protection, supra note 3, at 1069 (defining "classify" as to "treat some
differently from others"). For examples in the cases, see Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R.
Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 103 (1899) {defining "classify" as "to impose special duties or
liabilities upon individuals and corporations, or classes of them"); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S.
305, 308-09 (1966) (defining "classify" as to "single[ ] out" certain "defined classes" for "spe
cial burdens"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) {defining "classify" as to "treat[ ] differ
ent classes of persons in different ways").
In the language of traditional equal protection jurisprudence, a "classification" is an act
or practice of government which has the effect of sorting people into groups for differing
benefits or burdens under the law. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 553 {1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) {defining a "classification" as "[w]hen [the state] creates a special
preference, or a special disability, for a class of persons"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425 {1961) {defining a "classification" as state action which "affect[s] some groups of
citizens differently than others"); Bayside FISh Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 429 (1936)
(defining a "classification" as state action which "subject[s] . • . one and not the other to a
particular form of disadvantage"); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, 114 U.S. at 106 ("It is the
essence of a classification that upon the class are cast . . • burdens different from those resting
upon the general public," for "the very idea of classification is that of inequality"); Gulf,
Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 153-59 (1897) {defining a "classification" as
state action which "singles out a certain class" of persons for "special burdens" not imposed
upon everyone else).
316. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 256, at 93 (defining "discriminate" as to "single[ ] out
for special treatment"); Epps, supra note 8, at 441 (defining "discriminate" as to "target[ ]
some • . . group or groups for unequal treatment"). For examples in the cases, see Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 637 {1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) {defining "discrimi
nate" as "to disfavor some citizens and favor others"); carter v. Jury Commn. of Greene
County, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970) (defining "discriminate" as to extend "a right, a privilege, or
�
a duty" to "some . . . citizens and deny it to others").
In orthodox equal protection jurisprudence, a "discrimination" is an act or practice of
government which has the effect of singling out certain persons for special benefits or burdens
not accorded others. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 267, at 6 (defining "discrimination" as state
action which "selectively disadvantage[s] the members of a [certain] group"); Tussman &
tenBroek, supra note 11, at 358 {defining "discrimination" as "[t]he imposition of special
burdens, the granting of special benefits"). For examples in the cases, see Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400, 423-24 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "discrimination" as "singl[ing]
out" a "particular group" for special disadvantage, "in the sense of being deprived of any
benefit or subjected to any slight or obloquy"); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986)
(defining "discrimination" as "singl[ing] out" a particular class "for differential treatment");
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-09 n.10 (1985) (defining "discrimination" as
"singl[ing] out" a particular class "for different treatment under the laws, as written or as
applied" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494
(1977))); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954) (defining "discrimination" as when
a "distinct class" is "single[d] out . . . for different treatment" by "the laws, as written or as
applied"); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 663 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (defining
"discrimination" as "singl[ing] out a class of persons . • • for distinctive treatment"); Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe, 174 U.S. at 105 {defining "discrimination" as "mak[ing] a classification of
individuals or corporations . • • and impos[ing] upon such class special burdens and liabili
ties"); Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 759 (1884) (Field, J., concur
ring) (defining "discrimination" as "favoring some to the impairment of the rights of
others"); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (defining "discrimination" as
"singl[ing] out" a particular class for special disadvantage); see also Rutherglen, supra note
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The distinction between the legal and lay usages of these two
terms is seldom of any practical importance in equal protection liti
gation, for most state action does have the effect of singling out
certain persons or groups of persons for special benefits or bur
dens.317 But a state can classify persons in the lay sense - that is,
divide, sort, or arrange them into classes - without subjecting
those classes to differing benefits or burdens. For example, it can
sort persons into classes for informational purposes, as it does when
it gathers and organizes census or other demographic data. Such a
classification does not, in and of itself, implicate the Equal Protec
tion Clause, for it does not single out any class of persons for special
benefits or burdens.318 Similarly, a state can sort persons into
classes for administrative convenience in the distribution of a uni
form benefit or burden, as it does when it assigns schoolchildren to
different classrooms. Again, such a classification has not been
thought to raise equal protection concerns, unless its effect is to sin
gle out one or more of those classes for special disadvantage rela
tive to the others.319
The electoral redistricting plans at issue in these cases plainly
classify and discriminate by race in the lay sense, for they sort vot
ers into electoral districts based, at least in part, upon their race.
But they do not classify or discriminate by race in the traditional
equal protection sense unless they can be shown to single out an
314, at 128 (noting that the "technical legal" meaning of "discrimination" is different than its
"common" meaning).
Legal scholars and judges sometimes use the term "discrimination" in a more restrictive
sense, to describe the particular kind of special treatment which has been held to violate the
Equal Protection Clause: treatment which is based on impermissible or otherwise inade·
quate grounds. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 3, § 16-21, at 1515 (defining "discrimination" as
"an act based on prejudice"); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 11, at 358 n.35 (describing a
"discriminatory" act as one which is "biased, prejudiced, [or] unfair").
317. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) ("[M]ost legislation classifies for
one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons."); Tussman
& tenBroek, supra note 11, at 343 ("The legislature, if it is to act at all, must impose special
burdens upon or grant special benefits to special groups or classes of individuals."); Develop·
ments: Equal Protection, supra note 3, at 1075 ("[A] state cannot function without classifying
its citizens for various purposes and treating some differently from others.").
318. Cf. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam) (rejecting an equal protection
challenge to a state statute requiring the parties' races to be recited in divorce decrees, on the
ground that "the securing and chronicling of racial data for identification or statistical use
violates no constitutional privilege"), affg. Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F.
Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964).
319. See Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30-33 (1879) (rejecting an equal protection chal
lenge to a state law requiring residents of St. Louis to take appeals to a different appellate
court than residents of the rest of the state, because there was no evidence that the justice
dispensed by that special appellate court was inferior to that dispensed by the general appel
late court, and hence no showing that the law "injuriously affect[ed]" or "discriminated
against" a particular class of persons).
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identifiable class of persons for special benefits or burdens because
of their race. In short, in its haste to find some conceptual peg on
which to hang its distaste for these laws, the Court seems to have
forgotten the first lesson learned by most law students: that the
language of the law is often quite different from that of the
layman.320
At bottom, the majority's position, though couched in the lan
guage of traditional equal protection jurisprudence, rests upon a
premise quite foreign to that jurisprudence. It is, simply put, that
the Equal Protection Clause confers upon every person a substan
tive constitutional right not to be classified by the state on the basis
of their race - in the literal sense of being arranged, sorted, or
divided into groups or categories, whether or not that classification
has the effect of singling them out for any special disadvantage be
cause of their race.321
This premise was lurking beneath the surface in Justice
O'Connor's initial opinion in Shaw L The "central purpose" of the
Equal Protection Clause, she wrote, is "to prevent the States from
purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of
race."322 An electoral redistricting plan that "purposefully distin
guishes between voters on the basis of race" in assigning them to
districts is therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the clause be
cause it is a form of "state legislation classifying citizens by race."323
Significantly, Justice O'Connor spoke of the Equal Protection
Clause as limiting the state's ability to discriminate "between" or
"among" individuals on the basis of race, in the sense of sorting
them on that basis, rather than its ability to discriminate either "in
320. Cf. RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 3 (1990) ("[L]egal lan
guage often differs from lay language."). Professor Kull makes the same mistake. See, e.g.,
Kuu. supra note 133, at 1-6, 166 (using "classify" in the Jay sense, to mean sort into groups,
regardless of whether or not those groups are then subjected to different treatment); id. at
117, 220-21 (using "classify" in the more specialized equal protection sense, to mean to sort
into groups for differing benefits and burdens); id. at 69 (using "discriminate" in the lay
sense, to mean "distinguish between"); id. at 49, 182, 223 (using "discriminate" in the more
specialized equal protection sense, to mean to "subject to different treatment"). For further
discussion of Kull's sloppiness with language, see supra note 144.
321. See James F. Blumstein, Shaw v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson: Where We Are and
Where We Are Headed, 26 CuMB. L. REv. 503, 504 (1996) (arguing that Shaw I and Miller
establish that all "purposeful discrimination by government based on race" is subject to strict
scrutiny, whether or not it results in any "racial disadvantage"); see also lssacharoff & Gold
stein, supra note 302, at 49 (arguing that Shaw I and Miller suggest that the Court views the
mere fact of sorting by race to be "inherently injurious"); Robert A. Curtis, Note, Race
Based Equal Protection Claims After Shaw v. Reno, 44 DuKE LJ. 298, 312 (1994) (arguing
that the constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiffs in Shaw I was "the mere fact of racial
classification").
322. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) ("Shaw I") (emphasis added).
323. 509 U.S. at 646 (emphasis added).
,

318

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.

96:245

favor of' or "against" them on that basis, in the sense of subjecting
them to special benefits or burdens.324 In her mind, the North Car
olina redistricting plan evidently raised equal protection concerns
simply because it dealt with voters as members of particular racial
groups in assigning them to districts, rather than as individuals,
whether or not it actually resulted in any group of voters being sin
gled out for special disadvantage because of their race.325
That this sorting by race was the real vice Justice O'Connor saw
in the North Carolina plan was obscured somewhat by her frequent
references to "segregation" by race.326 These references gave the
impression that she thought the plan actually "segregated" voters
by race, in the sense forbidden by Brown and its progeny. But the
districts produced by the North Carolina plan - at least those
under challenge in Shaw I and Shaw II - were not "segregated"
districts in the Brown sense, for they were not entirely, or even
324. For further examples, see 509 U.S. at 642 (Laws that "explicitly distinguish between
individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of [the Equal Protection Clause's] prohibi
tion." (emphasis added)); 509 U.S. at 643 ("[T)he Fourteenth Amendment requires state leg
islation that distinguishes among citizens because of their race to be narrowly tailored to
further a compelling governmental interest." (emphasis added)). Other commentators have
also noticed Justice O'Connor's use of "discriminate between," rather than "discriminate
against" See, e.g., J. Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real World ofRedistricting and
Representation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 625, 641, 643 (1995); Jonathan M. Sperling, Equal Protec·
tion and Race-Conscious Reapportionment: Shaw v. Reno, 17 HARV. J.L. & Pus. POLY. 283,
291 (1996); Thomas C. Goldstein, Note, Unpacking and Applying Shaw v. Reno, 43 AM. U.
L. REV. 1136, 1154 (1994); 1992 Term, supra note 297, at 200-04 (1993). Other members of
the Shaw I majority have also described the Equal Protection Clause as limiting the state's
ability to discriminate "among" or "between" its citizens on the basis of race. See, e.g., Mis·
souri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120 (1995) ("Jenkins Ill") (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he
government cannot discriminate among its citizens on the basis of race." (emphasis added));
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("I cannot
agree with the Court that the Constitution permits the Government to discriminat[e] among
citizens on the basis of race in order to serve interests so trivial as 'broadcast diversity.' "
(emphasis added)).
325. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647 (holding that when a state assigns voters to districts on
the basis of race, it relies on "impermissible racial stereotypes"); see also 509 U.S. at 643
(discussing the dangers of "an explicit policy of assignment by race" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
326. See, e.g., 509 U.S. at 642 (characterizing the plaintiffs claim as an allegation that the
plan "segregate[d] the races for purposes of voting" (emphasis added)); 509 U.S. at 645 (hold
ing that redistricting legislation which "segregate[s] eligible voters by race" is presumptively
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause (emphasis added and internal quotation
marks omitted)); 509 U.S. at 646-47 ("[A] reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular
that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 'segre
gat[e] . . • voters' on the basis of race." (emphasis added)); 509 U.S. at 651-52 (distinguishing
United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), on the ground that
the plaintiffs in Shaw I are asserting an "analytically distinct claim" that the plan is "an effort
to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race" (emphasis added)); see
also 509 U.S. at 647 ("A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who
belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and polit
ical boundaries . . . bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid." (emphasis
added)).
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predominantly, of one race.327 A careful reading of Justice
O'Connor's opinion, however, reveals that she was not using the
term "segregate" in the conventional sense, to mean "set apart" or
327. The issue of how much racial separation is required to constitute "segregation" was
presented in the school desegregation cases of the 1970s. In those cases, the Court made
clear that it would not consider a school in a district of mixed-population to be "segregated"
merely because its racial composition deviated somewhat from that of the district as a whole.
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1971). The Court re
fused to adopt a hard-and-fast rule about the degree of racial concentration required to make
a school "segregated," saying it would vary, "depend[ing] on the facts of each particular
case." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 195-98 (1973). But the Court indicated
repeatedly that the school would have to be "virtually all" or "predominantly" of one race.
See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 529 & n.1 (1979) ("Dayton II")
("virtually all" one race); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977)
("Dayton !") ("predominantly" one race); Keyes, 413 U.S. at 193 ("predominantly" one
race); United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491-92 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., concurring) ("virtually all" one race); Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1971) ("all or predomi
nantly of one race" and "one-race, or virtually one-race"). A race-based assignment policy
can be said to subject one racial group to the kind of "stigmatization" to which Brown re
ferred - suggesting that one group is not fit to mix with the rest of humanity - only when
the policy separates that group from everyone else to such a radical degree.
Neither of the districts challenged in Shaw I was "virtually all" or "predominantly" of one
race: District 1 was 45.5% White and 53.4% African American in voting-age population,
District 12 45.2% White and 53.3% African American in voting-age population. See CON
GRESSIONAL QUARlERLY, INC., CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS IN nm 1990s, at 549 (1993).
Compare the districts under challenge in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), which the
Shaw I Court cited for the proposition that the deliberate "segregation" of voters by race can
violate the Equal Protection Clause: District 17 was 94.9% White and 5.1 % non-White, and
District 18 was 13.7% White and 86.3% non-White. See 376 U.S. at 54, 59 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); 376 U.S. at 71-72 n.1 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (describing the districts at issue in Wright as "predominantly" of one
race) . .
Four of the districts created by the North Carolina plan and challenged in Shaw I had
voting-age populations which were "predominantly" of one race: District 6 was 91.9% White
and 7.1 % African American, District 9 was 90.2% White and 8% African American, District
10 was 94.3% White and 4.9% African American, District 11 was 92% White and 6.4% Afri
can American. See CONGRESSIONAL QuARlERLY, INC., supra, at 549. The racial composi
tion of these four "predominantly White" districts was substantially out of line with that of
the state as a whole, which was 77.7% White and 20.1 % African American in voting-age
population. See id. Under the analysis set forth in the school desegregation cases, these four
districts might well be considered segregated districts. But the plaintiffs in Shaw I, all of
whom were White, did not challenge the four predominantly White districts before the
Supreme Court. A Shaw I challenge to these districts would, in any event, be likely to fail at
the threshold, on the ground that the districts are not "racial gerrymanders" under the Miller
Vera "predominance" test.
This is p erhaps the greatest irony of the Shaw I decision: it purports to be based on
concern about segregation of the races, yet it has resulted in the approval of four districts
which are among the most racially segregated in the country and the invalidation of two
which are among the most racially integrated. Cf. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 2002 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("Whatever [the districts challenged in Shaw I] may have symbolized,
it was not 'apartheid.' "); Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 671 n.7 (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice
O'Connor's suggestion that the North Carolina plan "segregates" voters by race as not "a
particularly accurate description of what has occurred"); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism?
Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 83, 94 (calling the
districts challenged in Shaw I "among the most integrated districts in the country"); Karlan,
Still Hazy, supra note 299, at 293 (same).
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"isolate" from the masses,328 but instead to mean "separate"329 and not "separate" in the sense of "setting or keeping apart," but
"separate" in the sense of "sorting into groups."330 In her view, the
state can "separate" by race without actually "separating" the
races.331
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Miller was much more ex
plicit. He began by declaring that the "central mandate" of the
Equal Protection Clause is "racial neutrality in governmental deci
sionmaking. "332 He conceded that the redistricting plan before him
did not "disadvantag[e] voters of a particular race," but said it mer
ited equal protection scrutiny nonetheless, because it "used race as
a basis for separating voters into districts. "333 Like Justice
328. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 313, at 2056-57 {defining "segregate" as to "set apart" or
"isolate"); 14 THE OXFORD ENGLISH D1cnoNARY, supra note 313, at 889 (defining "segre
gate" as to "separate . . . from the general body, or from some particular class; to set apart,
isolate, seclude").
329. Throughout her opinion, Justice O'Connor used the words "segregate" and "sepa
rate" interchangeably. See, e.g., Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 658 {holding that the plaintiffs "have
stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina Gen
eral Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be
understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their
race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification" (emphasis added)). She described
the claim that she was recognizing both as a claim that the state has segregated voters by
race, see supra note 326, and as a claim that it has separated voters by race, see Shaw I, 509
U.S. at 645, 649.
330. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 313, at 2069 (listing two different usages of the verb
"separate": "to set or keep apart," and to "sort," as in "separate mail"). This curious usage
of the term "segregate" also appears in Justice Thomas's concurrence in Holder v. Hall, de
cided during the same term as Shaw I. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 894 (1994) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the Voting Rights Act "encourages federal courts
to segregate voters into racially designated districts"); 512 U.S. at 905 (stating that the Voting
Rights Act, as currently applied, requires courts to "segregat[e] the races into political home
lands," producing "a system of 'political apartheid' "). It is worth noting that the "segrega
tion" rhetoric does not appear in Justice O'Connor's later opinion in United States v. Hays.
See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 {1995).
331. On this reasoning, any electoral redistricting plan that uses race as a basis for as
signing voters to districts is state action segregating or separating by race, without regard to
the actual racial composition of the districts it produces. A race-based plan which makes the
racial composition of each district exactly the same as that of the state as a whole is just as
suspect as a race-based plan which concentrates voters of certain races in certain districts.
332. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 {1995) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 {1954)); cf. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 518 {1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The moral imperative of racial neutral
ity is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause."); 488 U.S. at 519 (referring to "the
principle of race neutrality found in the Equal Protection Clause"); 488 U.S. at 519 (referring
to "the imperative of race neutrality"). To Justice Kennedy, this "principle of race neutral
ity" apparently requires the government not only to remain "neutral" between the races, in
the sense of not favoring one over another, but also not to consider race in dealing with
people.
333. Miller, 515 U.S. at 911; Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 1931 (1997) (Kennedy,
J.) ("[T]he essence of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw [I] is that the state has
used race as a basis for separating voters into districts." (in�al quotation marks oinitted)).

November 1997]

Equal Protection

321

O'Connor before him, Justice Kennedy used "separate by race" to
mean sort or divide into groups on the basis of race, without regard
to the ultimate racial composition of those groups.334 A state's use
of race "as a basis for separating voters into districts" implicates the
Equal Protection Clause, he asserted, because it violates "the sim
ple command that the Government must treat citizens as individu
als, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or
national class," a command that Justice Kennedy found implicit in
Brown and its progeny.335 "When the State assigns voters on the
basis of race," he explained, it "engages in the offensive and
demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of
their race, 'think alike, share the same political interests, and will
prefer the same candidates at the polls.' "336 The Equal Protection
Clause, said Justice Kennedy, forbids such "racial stereotyping."337
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in United States v.
Hays338 ultimately rests on the same premise. In Hays, the Court
was asked to decide who has standing to assert a Shaw I challenge
to a race-based redistricting plan. In other contexts, the Court had
held that only those persons who have been "personally denied
equal treatment" by allegedly discriminatory state action have
standing to challenge it under the Equal Protection Clause.339 The
lower federal courts had difficulty applying this rule in the Shaw I
334. See 515 U.S. at 915 (describing a Shaw I claim variously as a claim "that the State
has separated voters on the basis of race" and as a claim "that [the] State has assigned voters
on the basis of race" (emphasis added)).
335. 515 U.S. at 911 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515
U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) ("Jenkins Ill") (Thomas, J., concurring) ("At the heart of . • . the
Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that the government must treat citizens as individ
uals, and not as members of racial, ethnic or religious groups.").
336. Miller, 515 U.S. at 911-12 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)); see
515 U.S. at 912 (stating that race-based assignment relies upon " 'stereotypes that
treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts - their
very worth as citizens - according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and
the Constitution' " (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting)).

Miller,

337. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 928; see also 515 U.S. at 914 (asserting that the Equal Protec
tion Clause "forbids" the state to act on the basis of "stereotypical assumptions"); Johnson v.
De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 997, 1029 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing the Equal Protection
Clause as being "set against" racial "stereotypes"). For further discussion of Justice Ken
nedy's "stereotyping" theory, see Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 302, at 58-61.
338. 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
339. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740
(1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489-90 n.26 (1982); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 280-81 n.14 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1976);
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
166-67 (1972). Of course, persons who have not been "personally denied equal treatment"
by a particular act of government are occasionally allowed to assert an equal protection claim
on behalf of those who have, when they meet the rigid requirements of the third-party stand-
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context,340 and the Court attempted to provide some guidance in

Hays.
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor said that to have stand
ing to challenge a race-based redistricting plan, a voter must either
reside in a district that has been "racially gerrymandered" by the
plan, or produce some other "specific evidence tending to support
th[e] inference" that he too has "personally been subjected to a ra
cial classification" by the plan.341 She did not explain why a voter
who resides in a "racially gerrymandered" district has necessarily
been "denied equal treatment" by the plan that created that dis
trict, other than to say it was "because of the legislature's reliance
on racial criteria."342 Nor did she explain what kind of "specific
evidence" a voter who does not reside in a "racially gerry
mandered" district must produce to establish that he too has been
"personally subjected to a racial classification" by the plan. For this
reason, critics have charged that the Hays line is a completely arbiing doctrine. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-15 (1991). Hays dealt only with
traditional "first party" standing. See Hays, 515 U.S. 737.
340. See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1370-71 (S.D. Ga. 1994), affd., 515
U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 423-27 (E.D.N.C. 1994), affd., Bush v. Vera,
116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1331 n.38 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd.,
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1192 (W.D. La.
1993), judgment vacated by Louisiana v. Hays, 512 U.S. 1230 (1994). See generally Markley,
supra note 302, at 463-67.
341. See Hays, 515 U.S. at 745. The Court applied this rule, without further explanation,
in Miller, Shaw II, and Vera. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1951 (1996) (O'Connor, J., for
plurality); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1900 (1996) ("Shaw II"); Miller, 515 U.S. at 909.
342. 515 U.S. at 745. To be fair, Justice O'Connor also said that voters in racially gerry
mandered districts "may" suffer "special representational harms," because the officials
elected from those districts "are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to
represent only the members of th[e] (particular racial] group" whose interests the district was
"created . . . to effectuate." 515 U.S. at 744 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Justice
Stevens has explained, however, a voter who resides in a racially gerrymandered district will
suffer this alleged "representational harm" - which is evidently a euphemism for inadequate
representation - only if (i) he is not a member of the race for whose "special benefit" the
district was created, and (ii) voters in that district vote along racial lines, and (iii) the candi·
date elected by the majority race chooses to ignore the interests of her constituents of other
races. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1911 (Ste
vens, J., dissenting). In assuming that every voter in a racially gerrymandered district will
suffer such representational harm, then, the Court is not only engaging in undue speculation,
but also relying on "the very premise [it) purports to abhor: that voters of a particular race
'think alike, share the same political interests, and
prefer the same candidates at the
polls.' " Miller, 515 U.S. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
648 (1993) ("Shaw !")); see also Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1911 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that "[t)here is no necessary correlation between race-based districting assignments and inad
equate representation," and "any assumption that such a correlation exists could only be
based on a stereotypical assumption about the kind of representation that politicians elected
by minority voters are capable of providing"). This assumption is also difficult to square with
the majority's insistence that African-American voters placed in majority-White districts
have no reason to question the adequacy of their representation. See Issacharoff & Gold
stein, supra note 302, at 55, 63; Karlan, supra note 327, at 95.
•

.

.
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trary one, driven purely by the need to avoid the assertion that the
claim recognized in Shaw I was a "generalized grievance" beyond
the jurisdiction of the federal courts under Article III.343
The apparently arbitrary standing line drawn in Hays makes
more sense, however, if we assume that the State denies a person
"equal treatment" whenever it deals with that person as a member
of a particular racial group rather than as an individual. If so, then
any voter who can prove that he was assigned to a particular district
because of his race has been "personally denied equal treatment"
by the plan and should have standing to challenge it.344 Add an
unarticulated evidentiary presumption, and the line becomes clear.
If a voter resides in a "racially gerrymandered" district - a district
that the legislature used race as "the dominant and controlling ra
tionale" in drawing345 - the court will presume that the legislature
assigned him to that district because of his race.346 If a voter resides
in a district that has not been "racially gerrymandered," however,
343. See, e.g., Shaw II, 116 S. a. at 1908-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hays, 515 U.S. at
750-52 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Con
tours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. Cr. REv. 45, 61 (calling the Hays line "bizarre"); Is
sacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 302, at 63 (calling the Hays line "peculiar" and asserting
that it "does not elucidate a coherent view of harm"); see also Ryan Guilds, Comment, A
Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74
N.C. L. REv. 1863, 1894-98 (1996) (arguing that the Hays decision is impossible to reconcile
with traditional standing analysis).
344. This is precisely how Chief Justice Rehnquist described the Hays principle in his
majority opinion in Shaw II. See Shaw II, 116 S. a. at 1900 (dismissing the claims of plain
tiffs who resided outside the challenged voting districts under Hays, on the ground that they
had "not provided specific evidence that they personally were assigned to their voting dis
tricts on the basis of race"); see also Thomas C. Berg, Religion, Race, Segregation, and Dis
tricting: Comparing Kiryas Joel with Shaw/Miller, 26 CuMB. L. REv. 365, 370 (1995-96)
(suggesting that the most "coherent" explanation for the Hays standing principle is that "any
individual who has been subjected to racial 'sorting' " has standing to sue).
345. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-20.
346. Justice O'Connor's opinion did not explain her per se rule of standing for voters who
reside in racially gerrymandered districts in these terms. But she used the language of evi
dentiary presumptions when she wrote that voters who do not reside in racially gerry
mandered districts must produce "specific evidence tending to support th[e] inference" that
they have "personally been subjected to a racial classification." Hays, 515 U.S. at 745. The
obvious implication is that evidence that a voter lives in a racially gerrymandered district will
also "support [an] inference" - or, more accurately, a mandatory presumption - that he
has "personally been subjected to a racial classification." In other words, if a voter estab
lishes that the state used race as the "dominant and controlling rationale" in constructing the
district to which it assigned him, the court will presume that the state assigned him to that
district because of his race. Cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 207-13 (1973)
(adopting an analogous evidentiary presumption to facilitate proof that racial segregation in
a public school system was the product of intentional state action). As is generally true with
evidentiary presumptions, the fit between Justice O'Connor's "basic fact" (residence in a
racially gerrymandered district) and her "presumed fact" (assignment by.race) is not perfect.
Cf. Karlan, Still Hazy, supra note 302, at 292 (challenging the accuracy of Hays's assumption
that all voters who live in racially gerrymandered districts have been placed there because of
their race).

324

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:245

the court will not presume that the legislature assigned him to that
district because of his race. He therefore lacks standing to chal
lenge the plan unless he can produce some other "specific evi
dence" showing that the state assigned him to his district because of
his race.
The "unequal treatment" of which Justice O'Connor speaks in
Hays seems to be utterly divorced from any notion of comparative
disadvantage in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of gov
ernment. Indeed, O'Connor's right to "equal treatment" bears a
closer resemblance to Dworkin's right to "treatment as an equal"
than to the right to "equal treatment" of traditional equal protec
tion jurisprudence: it is a right to be treated "with equal dignity and
respect," not a right to receive an equal distribution of the benefits
and burdens of the state.347 In O'Connor's view, the state fails to
treat a person with "equal dignity and respect," and hence triggers
equal protection scrutiny, whenever it deals with him as a compo
nent of a particular racial group, rather than as an individual.348
The word "equal" is apparently mere window dressing, which does
no real work in her analysis: her concern is not with the failure to
treat persons with equal dignity and respect, but with the failure to
treat them with appropriate dignity and respect. She would find a
state law that deals with all persons as members of particular racial
groups just as offensive as one that deals only with certain persons
in that way.349 Her notion of the "right" being recognized in the
347. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 226-29 (1977) (drawing a dis
tinction between the "right to equal treatment," defined as "the right to an equal distribution
of some opportunity or resource or burden," and the "right to treatment as an equal," defined
as "the right, not to receive the same distribution of some burden or benefit, but to be treated
with the same respect and concern as anyone else"). Note the striking resemblance between
Dworkin's language and the language Justice O'Connor used in her plurality opinion in
Croson. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that the
Equal Protection Clause gives every person the right "to be treated with equal dignity and
respect").
348. At times, Justice O'Connor's language suggests that she thinks a state denies a per
son equal treatment whenever it deals with him as a member of any group, rather than as an
individual. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J,, dissent
ing) ("At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple com
mand that the Government must treat citizens 'as individuals'
) If so, then virtually all
statutes are subject to challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, for virtually all deal with
people as members of groups, rather than on an individualized basis; indeed, that is the es
sence of a legislative rule. See David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and
Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 790,
798 (1991). Of course, only those statutes that deal with people as members of certain sus
pect groups would be subject to strict scrutiny; the rest would be analyzed, and virtually
always upheld, under the very tolerant rational basis test. See id. at 798 & n.31.
349. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 651 (stating that "racial classifications receive close scrutiny
even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally"). In this respect, Justice
O'Connor's "right to treatment as an equal" is quite different from Dworkin's, which is
clearly comparative in nature. See DwoRKIN, supra note 347, at 227 (describing the "right to
. • . ."

.
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racial gerrymandering cases is not significantly different from Jus
tice Kennedy's.350 She couches it in the more familiar language of
"equal treatment," and adorns it with vague references to special
"representative" and "stigmatic" harms. But it is the same basic
right: a right not to be dealt with by the state as a member of a
particular racial group rather than as an individual, without regard
to the way in which others are being treated.351
The vision of the Equal Protection Clause embraced by the ma
jority in the racial gerrymandering cases, which does not require a
showing of comparative disadvantage in governmental benefits and
burdens, clearly draws its inspiration from prior rhetoric declaring
classifications based on race to be inherently suspect.352 It finds
further support in the gender discrimination cases of the 1980s,
which established that a state cannot justify its decision to single out
a particular group for special benefits or burdens by reference to
"stereotypical" assumptions about the characteristics and abilities
of individual members of that group.353 And it represents the final
maturation of a subtle variation on that theme, first introduced in
separate opinions in the jury selection and affirmative action cases
of the late 1980s: the notion that the Equal Protection Clause is
concerned not only with the practice of singling out certain groups
for special benefits or burdens on the basis of mere prejudice or
treatment as an equal" as the right "to be treated with the same respect and concern as
anyone else" (emphasis added)).
350. But see Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 302 (arguing that Justice O'Connor's
idea of the "right" being recognized here differs substantially from that of the other four
members of the majority). Of course, Justice O'Connor claims to be more willing than the
other members of the Shaw I majority to tolerate interferences with that right which are
designed to remedy the effects of past discrimination. Compare her opinions in Bush v. Vera,
116 S. Ct. 1941, 1960-63 (1996) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) and 116 S. Ct. at 1968-70
(O'Connor, J., concurring) with those of Justice Kennedy 116 S. Ct. at 1971-72 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) and Justices Thomas and Scalia 116 S. Ct. at 1972-73 (Thomas, J., joined by
Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Compare also Miller, 515 U.S. at 928-29 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) with 515 U.S. at 920-28 (Kennedy, J.). On the difference between Justice
O'Connor's position and that of the four other members of the Shaw-Miller-Vera majority,
see Issacharoff, supra note 343, at 63-64; Rosen, supra note 7, at 19-20.
351. Justice O'Connor continued to adhere to this view of the Equal Protection Clause in
last term's racial gerrymandering cases. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1964 (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion) ("Our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces a commitment to eliminate
unnecessary and excessive governmental use and reinforcement of racial stereotypes."); 116
S. Ct. at 1963 (O'Connor J., plurality opinion) ("[W]e subject racial classifications to strict
scrutiny . . . because that scrutiny is necessary to determine whether they . . . misuse race and
foster harmful and divisive stereotypes without a compelling justification."); 116 S. Ct. at
1969 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[O]ur national commitment to racial equality . . . can and
must be reconciled with the complementary commitment of our Fourteenth Amendment ju
risprudence to eliminate the unjustified use of racial stereotypes.").
352. See supra note 283.
353. See supra note 294.
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favoritism, but also, and more fundamentally, with the very practice
of dealing with people as members of groups defined by certain im
mutable personal characteristics rather than as individuals.354
This new vision of the Equal Protection Clause has much to
commend it, in raw normative terms. Generalizations based on
race - like those based on gender and other immutable personal
characteristics - are often inaccurate, at one level or another.355
When the government deals with people on the basis of such gener
alizations, it undermines our cultural commitment to the notion
that individuals should be judged on the basis of their individual
merit.356 In addition, as various members of the Shaw-Miller ma
jority have pointed out, there is good reason to suspect that the
government's use of racial generalizations can cause serious harm
to the nation's social fabric - even when it does not have the effect
of singling out any identifiable group of persons for special disad
vantage - by fanning the flames of racial hostility and encouraging
racial separatism.357
For all its moral attractiveness, though, the notion that the
Equal Protection Clause gives every person a substantive right not
to be dealt with by the state on the basis of race remains flatly in
consistent with the original understanding. Those who framed and
ratified the Equal Protection Clause certainly intended it to prevent
the states from using racial generalizations as a basis for singling
out anyone for special disadvantage, except perhaps in very com
pelling circumstances. But the suggestion that the clause was also
intended to render presumptively unconstitutional all race-based
state action, whether or not it has such a discriminatory effect,
354. See supra note 295.
355. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995).
356. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
357. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) ("Shaw /") (asserting that classifying
based on race "incite[s] racial hostility" and "stimulate[s] our society's latent race conscious
ness"); 509 U.S. at 648 (classifying based on race serves as "a divisive force in a community,
emphasizing differences between [people] . . . that are irrelevant in the constitutional sense"
(quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1963) (Douglas, J,, dissenting))); 509 U.S.
at 657 (asserting that classifying based on race "reinforce[s] the belief, held by too many for
too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin"); 509
U.S. at 657 (asserting that classifying based on race "may balkanize us into competing racial
factions"); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 603 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that classifying
based on race "endorse[s] race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into
racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict"); City of Rich
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (assert
ing that classifying based on race "promote[s] notions of racial inferiority and lead[s] to a
politics of racial hostility").
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would have absolutely astounded them. The Thirty-ninth Congress
specifically rejected a number of proposals that would have done
tbis.358 Even its most radical members understood that the Equal
Protection Clause it finally passed did no such thing.359
If the limitation on state action recognized in Shaw I and its
progeny has any constitutional foundation at all, then, it lies not in
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, but in its
Due Process Clause.360 Moreover, it must lie in the substantive as
pect of the Due Process Clause, for its concern is not with lack of
procedural fairness, but with the essential irrationality of dealing
with individuals on the basis of group stereotypes that may not ac
curately reflect their individual characteristics.361 In essence, the
Court has declared that every person has a fundamental right not to
be dealt with by the state on the basis of race, a right that the Due
Process Clause forbids the state to infringe without compelling jus
tification, even when it does so even-handedly. Like the much358. See supra section 11.B.
359. This seems clear from the congressional debates on the desegregation bills of the
early 1870s. In those debates, Radical Republicans argued that state-mandated racial segre
gation violated the newly ratified Equal Protection Clause because it singled out African
Americans for the special burden of social stigmatization. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 2d Sess.384 (1872 ) (statement of Sen. Sumner ) (calling segregation "an ill-disguised
violation of the principle of Equality" ); see also 2 THE WoRKS OF CHAru.Es SUMNER 350, 357
(1875 ) (asserting that segregation is "in the nature of Caste," and "[w]here Caste is, there
cannot be Equality" ). In so arguing, the Radicals indicated their understanding that the
clause did not apply to all race-based state action, but only to that which had the effect of
singling out certain persons for special benefits or burdens. Further evidence that the Radi
cals did not understand the Equal Protection Clause to reach all race-based state action lies
in Thaddeus Stevens' speech to the House just before the final vote on the final version of the
Fourteenth Amendment In that speech, Stevens expressed his disappointment at the narrow
scope of that version, as compared to the rejected "no racial distinctions" alternatives:
I had fondly dreamed that . . • the intelligent, pure and just men of this Republic . . .
would have so remodeled all our institutions .. . that no distinction would be tolerated
. • . but what arose from merit and conduct.
This bright dream has vanished "like the
baseless fabric of a vision." I find that we shall be obliged to be content with patching up
the worst portions of the ancient edifice.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.3148 (1866 ). Stevens declared, however, that he would
accept this "imperfect" amendment, "because I live among men and not among angels."
CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866 ).
360. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 2001-02 (1996 ) (Souter, J., dissenting ); Shaw v.
Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1909-10 (1996 ) ("Shaw II") (Stevens, J., dissenting ); see also Michael
W. McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment: A Second American Revolution or the Logical
Culmination ofthe Tradition?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1159, 1162-63 (1992 ) (suggesting that the
state's act of dealing with persons on the basis of their race might be seen as presenting a due
process problem "if we assume that the [racial] categorization is being used as a substitute for
individuated judgment" ).
361. A procedural due process challenge to an electoral redistricting plan would, in any
event, appear to be foreclosed by Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization,
239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915 ) (holding that procedural due process does not require the state to
grant affected persons a hearing before enacting a rule of general applicability ). See, e.g.,
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 431-33 (1982 ) ("[T]he legislative determina
tion provides all the process that is due." ); TRIBE, supra note 3, § 10-1.
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maligned fundamental rights line of equal protection cases,362 then,
Shaw I and its progeny are, at bottom, nothing but substantive due
process decisions " decked out in the trappings of E qual
Protection."363
CONCLUSION

Why did the Court ground the limitation on state action recog
nized in Shaw I in the Equal Protection Clause, given its inconsis
tency with the original understanding? The answer cannot be
simply that the Court does not care about original intent. Unlike
some of its predecessors, this is not a Court that is comfortable with
the notion of a "living Constitution";364 to the contrary, many of its
members are committed to originalism.365 Why, then, was the
362. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
363. Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 3, at 1132 (referring to the "fundamen
tal rights" line of Equal Protection cases); see also Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1910 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (accusing the majority of basing its decision on the "unarticulated recognition of a
new substantive due process right to 'color-blind' districting itself "); Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 200102 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same); 1992 Term, supra note 297, at 199-200 n.49 (1993) ("[O]ne
is tempted to dismiss [Shaw I] as a case of substantive due process masquerading as equal
protection analysis."). Commentators have long noted that heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause has the potential to serve as a substitute for substantive due process
review. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 245, at 516-17, 529-30; Gunther, supra note 256, at 41-43;
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 11, at 361-65.
364. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV.
693, 695 (1976) (using the term "Living Constitution" to refer to the idea that judges are free
to invoke the Constitution to impose upon the elected branches of government "values
[other than] those which may be derived from the language and intent of [its] framers"). For
early uses of the term, see HOWARD LEE McBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (1927);
Charles A. Reich, The Living Constitution and the Court's Role, in Huoo BLACK AND THE
SUPREME CouRT 133 (S. Strickland ed., 1967).
365. Three of the five members of the Shaw-Miller majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas - have repeatedly declared themselves to be originalists.
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845-926 (1995) (Thomas, J., joined by
Rehnquist, CJ., and O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 584-85 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court must remain "faithful to
the original understanding" in interpreting the Constitution); Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections
Commn., 514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that in interpreting the
Constitution, the "original meaning" of the text should control, for "[it] is a written instru
ment" and "[t]hat which it meant when adopted, it means now" (quoting South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that it is "a fundamental principle of constitutional adjudica
tion that the terms in the Constitution must be given the meaning ascribed to them at the
time of their ratification"); Rehnquist, supra note 364; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989). Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have shown
strong originalist tendencies as well, see, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(O'Connor, J.), although they have been willing to depart from a strict originalist stance in
their substantive due process jurisprudence, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 847-50 (1992) Goint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.); Cruzan v. Missouri
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287-89 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See generally Ernest
Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpreta
tion, 72 N.C. L. REv. 619, 717-18 (1994) (arguing that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are
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Court willing to ignore the original understanding of the Equal Pro
tection Clause in the racial gerrymandering cases? Why did it not
rely on substantive due process instead?
One explanation comes immediately to mind: reliance on sub
stantive due process would have presented considerable difficulties
for certain members of the Shaw-Miller majority. Two members of
that majority, Justices Scalia and Thomas, have recently committed
themselves to the position that the Due Process Clause .of the Four
teenth Amendment confers no substantive rights other than those
mentioned in the incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights.366
To cast Shaw I as a substantive due process decision, they would
have had to renounce this position. Even if they had been prepared
to do that, other difficulties remained. To decide whether a particu
lar unenumerated right is encompassed within the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause, the Court has previously asked first and
foremost whether it is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."367 Regardless of the level of generality with which the
right being recognized in Shaw I had been framed - as a general
right not to be dealt with by the government on the basis of race or
a more specific right not to have one's voting rights assigned on the
basis of race - it would not have satisfied this test, for the states
were broadly abridging it at the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified.368 So the majority would have had to rely on the argunot strict originalists, but rather advocates of "common-law constitutionalism"); David B.
Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice
O'Connor and Justice Scalia Over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 FoRD. L. REv. 895,
915-21 (1993) (arguing that Justice O'Connor has "abandoned her originalist approach" in
substantive due process cases). But see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L.
REV. 1165, 1264-65 (1993) (arguing that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are in fact "dy
namic" originalists, who attempt to "accommodate changes in context so as to preserve
meaning across contexts").
366. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (ac
cepting the proposition that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes
"certain explicit substantive protections of the Bill of Rights" but rejecting the proposition
that it "guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties"); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(conceding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates certain
substantive guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights" but denying "that it is the secret repos
itory of all sorts of other, unenumerated, substantive rights").
367. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 4669, 4674-75 (U.S. June 26, 1997); see also
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-30 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986)
(same).
368. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 n.2 (opinion of Scalia, J., joined in relevant part by
Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.) (asserting that an interest cannot be con
sidered "fundamental" for substantive due process purposes if there is "a societal tradition of
enacting laws denying [it]"); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94 & n.6 Gustifying the Court's
refusal to find a right to engage in homosexual sodomy in the Due Process Clause on the
ground that many states had laws criminalizing that conduct at the time the Fourteenth
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ment that the concept of "liberty" is not static, but can evolve over
time.369 But that would have had significant implications for the
privacy cases, implications that at least three members of the Shaw
Miller majority could not have tolerated.370 The majority could not
have avoided those implications by hiding behind the doctrine of
stare decisis, for the right being recognized did not resemble any
right the Court had previously found to be part of the "liberty"
protected against state interference by the Due Process Clause.371
Given these obvipus difficulties with the substantive due process
route, one is tempted to see the Court's decision to rely on equal
protection instead as an act of conscious duplicity. On this view,
the Court knew full well that it was creating a new constitutional
right out of whole cloth and made a calculated decision to couch
that right in the language of equal protection, as opposed to sub
stantive due process, to insulate itself from charges of judicial activ
ism. The Court saw the Equal Protection Clause as an attractive
means of disguising its project, so the argument would go, because
that clause carries little of the historical baggage of the Lochner era,
and the basic value it sounds - that of equality - is one with
which virtually everyone can agree. By invoking the rhetoric of
equality, rather than openly relying on substantive due process, the
Amendment was ratified). For a critique of this historical approach to the substantive due
process question, see L. Benjamin Young, Jr., Justice Scalia's History and Tradition: The
Chief Nightmare in Professor Tribe's Anxiety Closet, 78 VA. L. REv. 581 (1991).
369. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500-02 (1965) (Harlan, J., concur
ring) (arguing that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause should not be confined
to those rights that were recognized at the time the clause was ratified); Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, S42 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Due process has not been reduced to any
formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be
said is that • . . it has represented the balance which our Nation . . . has struck between th[e]
liberty [of the individual] and the demands of organized society."). In Casey, Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter firmly rejected the argument that the "liberty" protected by
the Due Process Clause includes only those interests that were already protected against
state interference at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-50 (1992). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas, however, refuse to accept this proposition. See SOS U.S. at 979-81 (Scalia, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White J., and Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); see also Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 n.2 (plurality opinion) (asserting that
the purpose of substantive due process "is to prevent future generations from lightly casting
aside important traditional values - not to enable this Court to invent new ones"). For
more on the differences between the substantive due process jurisprudence of Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy and that of Justice Scalia, see Anders, supra note 36S.
370. For example, this argument would have strongly suggested that Roe
U.S. 113 (1973), and Casey were rightly decided and that Bowers was not.

v. Wade, 410

371. It is not expressly recognized in the Bill of Rights; nor does it involve the freedom to
engage in a particular activity, like the fundamental rights of free association, interstate
travel, and voting; nor does it resemble the fundamental right to privacy in marital, sexual,
and family matters. For a discussion of the rights the Court has previously declared to be
fundamental, see 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, § lS.7.
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Court hoped to cloak in credibility what it knew in its heart to be an
act of judicial strong-arming equivalent to that foisted upon the na
tion in Roe v. Wade. 372
I believe the explanation is a bit more complicated, and a good
deal less sinister: the Court is trying to be faithful to the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, but is no longer able
to remember that original understanding very accurately. The
Court's memory of the original understanding is incomplete in a
number of critical ways. It remembers that the Fourteenth Amend
ment was largely a reaction to the Black Codes, but it no longer
remembers precisely why the framers and ratifiers found the Codes
offensive. It remembers that some members of the Thirty-ninth
Congress lobbied fiercely for a constitutional amendment that
would forbid all governmental consideration of race, but it no
longer remembers that the Thirty-ninth Congress rejected each and
every one of those proposals. It remembers that the amendment
the Thirty-ninth Congress ultimately passed and sent to the states
for ratification was the result of some sort of compromise, but it no
longer remembers the exact nature of that compromise. Finally, it
remembers that the Equal Protection Clause was originally under
stood to strike at class legislation and discrimination, but it no
longer remembers what those terms meant to the Reconstruction
generation.
How exactly did the Court come to forget these things? Was it
merely the passage of time? Once again, the explanation is a bit
more complicated.

In the last thirty years,

the Court has often felt

compelled to adjust its equal protection jurisprudence to invalidate
forms of discrimination that seemed perfectly acceptable to the
framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment but now seem
intolerable to us. It did so in the mid-1960s, when it rejected the
assumption, held by many of those who participated in the framing
and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, that a desire to
maintain the purity of the White race was sufficient to justify the
discrimination worked by laws forbidding interracial marriage.373
The Court did so again in the 1970s, when it rejected the assump
tion, held by many of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment and endorsed by its own prior case law, that a pater
nalistic desire to protect women from moral and emotional
"hazards" was sufficient to justify discriminating against them in
372. Cf. Rosen, supra note 7, at 20 (accusing the Court of "unabashed opportunism").
373. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
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various ways.374 And the Court did so once again in the late 1980s,
when it rejected the assumption, held by many members of the
Thirty-ninth Congress375 and endorsed by many prominent twenti
eth-century jurists, that a desire to remedy the effects of past dis
crimination is generally sufficient to justify wide-ranging
discrimination in favor of African Americans.376

In each of these situations,

the Court's change of course can be

seen as a legitimate exercise of the discretion the framers and ra
tifiers of the Equal Protection Clause understood that provision to
confer upon the courts. The antebellum doctrine against partial or
special legislation left the courts with wide-ranging discretion to de
cide what public purposes could justify discrimination in the distri
bution of benefits and burdens.377 When the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment drafted an Equal Protection Clause pat
terned on that developing state law doctrine, they were similarly
vague: they declared that state action singling out certain groups
for special benefits or burdens was unconstitutional unless sup
ported by an adequate public purpose justification, but they made
no effort to list the public purposes that would suffice - other than
to indicate that sheer favoritism or prejudice, racial or otherwise,
would not. Instead, recognizing that the list of acceptable public
purposes might change over time, they chose to confer broad dis
cretion on the courts - and Congress, through its section five en374. Compare Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invoking the Equal Protection Clause to
strike down a state law giving men a preference over women as administrators of estates)
with Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a state's
practice of automatically entering all men on jury lists, but excluding women unless they
expressed an affirmative desire to serve) and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (re
jecting an equal protection challenge to a state law denying most women a right to be li
censed as bartenders that was freely available to any man).
375. See Schnapper, supra note 111, at 758.
376. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218-35 (1995) (holding
that all race-based preference programs adopted by governmental actors are presumptively
unconstitutional, even when they are designed to benefit groups that have been the victims of
past discrimination) and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989)
(opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, JJ.) and 488
U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmon, JJ., concur
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that race-based preference programs designed to
benefit groups that have been the target of pervasive discrimination in the past should be
upheld more readily than those designed to burden such groups) and Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301-02 (1986) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmon, JJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that intermediate scrutiny should apply to race-based preference pro
grams that are designed to eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination) and Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518-19 (1980) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmon, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment) (making the same argument with respect to race-based affirma
tive action programs enacted by Congress).
377. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
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forcement power - to deal with that question, in accordance with
changing perceptions of the public good.378 In holding that the dis
crimination worked by laws forbidding interracial marriage, laws
denying women various economic and civic opportunities, and laws
awarding African Americans special preferences

did

violate the

Equal Protection Clause now, even though it had not been thought
to do so in earlier times, the Court was acting well within the scope
of that discretion, simply adjusting its "public purpose" analysis to
reflect changing notions of the public good.379
The difficulty is that the Court did not explain the about-faces it
made in these cases in these terms. Why not? Because its memory
was again incomplete: while it recalled that the framers and ra
tifiers of the Equal Protection Clause understood it to give the
Court some discretion to adjust its equal protection jurisprudence
to meet the demands of changing times, it no longer remembered
the precise nature of that discretion. Unwilling to rely on the no
tion of a "living Constitution," the Court fell back instead on vague
platitudes about discrimination,380 suspect classifications,381 and im
permissible stereotypes.382 In the process, the Court lost its bear
ings a bit, losing sight of the fact that the Equal Protection Clause
was actually designed to prevent the states from singling out certain
classes of people for special benefits or burdens without sufficient
justification, not to prevent it from dealing with people on the basis
of race, gender, or other immutable personal characteristics. The
378. Cf. Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 34, at 1702 (conceding that his "public
values" approach to the Equal Protection Clause "may allow constitutional prohibitions to
change dramatically over time as the category of public values expands and contracts").
379. Cf. David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 SuP. Cr. REv.
1, 3-4, 25-43 (arguing that the Court's recent about-face on affirmative action should be un
derstood as an effort "to revive
one of the noble dreams of American public law - that
courts should try to ensure that legislation does not just benefit narrow interest groups but
instead serves a public interest").
. • .

380. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (asserting that the Equal Protection
Clause was designed to eliminate all forms of "arbitrary discrimination"); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 10 (1966) ("The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination
").
. • • .

381. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (asserting that all "racial classifications" are "sus
pect" under the Equal Protection Clause).

382. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 604, 617-19, 626 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting); 497 U.S.
at 632, 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94, 510
(1989) (plurality opinion); 488 U.S. at 515 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 495 (plurality opinion) (asserting that the "ulti
mate goal" of the Equal Protection Clause was to "eliminat[e] entirely from governmental
decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's race" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 320 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting))).
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peculiar vision of the Equal Protection Clause embraced in the ra
cial gerrymandering cases of the 1990s is but the logical conclusion
of that earlier misstep. It is also a powerful illustration of the mis
chief that abstract doctrinal and rhetorical constructs like "discrimi
nation," "suspect classification," and "stereotyping" can work when
they become unmoored from their historical and theoretical
foundations.
The Court has yet to cross the Rubicon of originalism, for it has
yet to declare explicitly that a showing of discriminatory effect, as
traditionally understood, is no longer an essential element of an
equal protection claim. Indeed, the Court does not appear to rec
ognize that this is the logical implication of its decisions in the racial
gerrymandering cases. There is still time for the Court to provide
an explanation for these decisions that would bring them more in
line with original intent. How might it do that? Two possibilities
suggest themselves.
First, the Court could explain precisely who these race-based re
districting plans single out for special disadvantage and exactly
what that disadvantage is.383 For example, it might explain that
while race-based redistricting designed to give effect to existing mi
nority voting strength has no immediate discriminatory effect on an
identifiable group of voters, its long-term effect is to subject minor
ity voters to special disadvantages by reinforcing negative racial ste
reotypes and increasing racial-bloc voting.384 Such an explanation
might follow rather logically from Anderson v. Martin, which estab
lished that discriminatory effect can be found in the interaction of
state action and private prejudice.385
Alternatively, the Court could explain the decisions as announc
ing some sort of overbroad prophylactic rule designed to ensure ad
equate enforcement of equal protection rights. The argument
would be something like this: While the essence of an Equal Pro
tection Clause violation is the singling out of certain persons for
special benefits or burdens without adequate justification, rather
than the consideration of race per se, the likelihood that govern
mental consideration of race will produce such a discriminatory ef
fect is so strong, and the difficulty of proving that effect so great,
383. This is essentially what the Court did when it developed the "stigma" theory to ex
plain its decision in Brown. See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
384. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (making a similar argument with respect
to race-based affirmative action).
385. See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
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that a rule declaring all race-based state action presumptively un
constitutional is necessary to ensure adequate enforcement of equal
protection rights.
Should the Court bother to craft an explanation of its decisions
in the racial gerrymandering cases that would bring them more in
line with the original understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause? Does it really matter that those decisions, as currently ex
plicated, are inconsistent with the original understanding? The in
consistency may, of course, mean that the Equal Protection Clause
is invoked to invalidate certain kinds of state action that should
raise no equal protection concerns: race-based actions that do not
have the effect of singling out any identifiable group of persons for
special benefits or burdens because of their race. But the number
of race-based practices that fall into that category are few and far
between, for most race-based state action does have such a discrimi
natory effect.386 If the Due Process Clause might be interpreted at least under the more elastic Harlan approach - to invalidate
those same practices, why should the Court care that it is the Equal
Protection Clause that has been invoked instead? Does it really
make any difference?
I think so, for several reasons.

In the first place, by invoking the

Equal Protection Clause to strike down laws that do not appear to
have any discriminatory effect, the Court sends misleading signals
to the lower courts about the basic evil at which the clause aims,
further muddying conceptual and doctrinal waters that are already
less than clear. As the historical evidence indicates, that evil is the
practice of discriminating in favor or against any class of persons in the sense of singling them out for special benefits or burdens not
accorded everyone else - without an adequate public purpose jus
tification, not the practice of dealing with persons on the basis of
race, gender, or other immutable personal characteristics. By ob
scuring that fact, the Court blurs the already fuzzy line between
equal protection and substantive due process. We cannot predict
the exact consequences of that blurring for future cases, but we can
be fairly certain that it will lead to incorrect results in some cases.387
386. Other than racial gerrymandering of electoral districts, the only practice that comes
immediately to mind is that of taldng race into account in assigning children to public
schools, and perhaps to individual classrooms within those schools, in order to maintain a
modicum of racial balance in each school and each classroom.
387. Ct McConnell, supra note 360, at 1163 ("[T]he equation of due process with equal
protection obscures important differences between the issues of rights and equality."); Cass
R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between
Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161 {1988) (arguing that substantive
due process and equal protection serve different purposes and should sometimes lead to dif-
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In addition, it may further encourage courts entertaining equal pro
tection claims to shirk the difficult "public purpose" inquiry envi
sioned by the framers and ratifiers, by falling back on abstract
rhetoric about discrimination, suspect criteria, and impermissible
stereotyping.
Second, and perhaps more important, the Court's reliance on
the Equal Protection Clause to support what appears to be the cre
ation of a new substantive right leaves it open to charges of hypoc
risy, given its recent declarations that "[i]t is not the province of this
Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws."388 The damage to the
Court's credibility is magnified by the fact that certain members of
the Shaw-Miller majority have been so strident in their insistence
that original intent must always be the lodestar of constitutional in
terpretation389 and that judges should not rely upon their own per
sonal values to strike down political choices made by the people
through their duly-elected representatives.390 We are thus left with
the disturbing sense that this is a Court utterly without shame, will
ing to throw principle to the wind in order to reach its desired re
sults.391 Unless the Court takes action to correct that perception,
the decisions in the racial gerrymandering cases stand poised to go
ferent results); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term
Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 6, 67-68 (1996) (same).

- Foreword: Leaving

388. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973); see also City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980); Lindsey v. Nonnet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); Dan·
dridge v. Wtlliams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1970).
389. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(castigating the majority of the Court for subscribing to the "original-meaning-is-irrelevant,
good-policy-is-constitutional-law school of jurisprudence").
390. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2292 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(accusing the majority of destroying the democratic system by writing into the Constitution
"the counter-majoritarian preferences of the society's law-trained elite"); Romer v. Evans,
116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting)
(asserting that when "the Constitution . . . says nothing about" a particular issue, the Court
must leave its resolution to ''nonnal democratic means," for "[t]his Court has no business
imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from which the Mem
bers of this institution are selected"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979-80
(1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452-53 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Irrespective of what we may believe is wise or prudent
policy . . . the Constitution does not constitute us as 'Platonic Guardians' nor does it vest in
this Court the authority to strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desir
able social policy." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rehnquist, supra note 364, at 699;
Scalia, supra note 365, at 854, 863-64.
391. Cf. Rosen, supra note 7, at 19-20 (arguing that the Shaw-Miller majority's interpreta
tion of the Equal Protection Clause reveals its members to be fundamentally "unprincipled,"
given its prior commitment to "the conservative rhetoric of judicial restraint, strict construc
tionism and devotion to the original understanding of the Constitution").
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Lochner of this generation, rather than the

